

THE RVLE
of Reason, con-
teinynge the Art
of Logike.

Hette sothe in Englishe,
and newlie correc-
ted by Thomas
Wilson.

Anno Domini.

1567.

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THE RAVEN

By John Green

Illustrated by

John Green

A picture book for children
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120.



To the moste excellent Prince, and
our moste redoubtēd soueraigne Lorde Edward the
sixt, by the grace of God king of Englaude, Fraunce
and Irelaunde, defendor of the saiche, and of the Churches of
Englaude and Irelaunde, in yeare the supreme
hebre: your moste faithfull and obedient sub-
iect Thomas Wilson, wylleth long-
lyng to haue a life, with moste prosper-
ite to his soueraigne.



For my power and abilitie were
as unswervable to my good
will, moste excellente Prince
and Soueraigne lorde, this
token of mine humble dutie
whiche I nowe offer unto
your Maestie, shold bee as
greate and precious, as by
reason of the contraray it is base & slender. Where-
fore I muste humbly beseeche you Maestie, in no
worse parte to accepte this little offer then as the
presente of a true faithfull subiecte, whiche would
haue brought better if his power had been there-
after. But following the example of poore men in
the aunciente histories of Pluarche and other wri-
ters muche commended: I offer unto your high-
nesse, parte of suche fruities as haue growne in a
poore stidentes Garden. This fruite beying of a
strange kinde (suche as no Englishe ground hath
before this tyme, and in this sorte by any Village
brought forth) mighte perhaps in the first tastynge,

The Epistle.

seeme somewhat rough and harshe in the mouthē
because of the straungenesse: But after a little vse
and familiar accustomyng thervnto: I doubt not
but the same will ware every one daie more plea-
sant then other. But in simple and plaine wordes
to declare vnto your Maestie, wherein my witte
and earnest endeouour hath at this season traui-
led: I haue assaied through my diligence to make
Logike as familiar to the Englishman, as by divers
mennes industries, the mooste parte of other the li-
berall sciences are. For consideryng the forward-
nesse of this age, wherein the verie multitude are
prompte and ripe in all sciencies, that haue by any
mannes diligence been set forthe vnto them: bei-
ng also the capacite of my countrie men the En-
gylshe nation, is so pregnant and quicke to achieve
any kinde or arte of knowledge, whervnto it maie
attaine, that thei are not inferiour to any other:
and farther, pondering that divers learned men
of other Countries, haue heretofore for their fur-
therance of knowledge, not suffered any of the sci-
ences liberall to be hidden in the Greke or Latine
tonge, but haue with mooste earnest traualle, made
every of them familiar to their vulgate people: I
thought that *Logike* among all other being an art,
as apte for the Engylshe voltes, and vs profitable
for their knowledge as any other Sciences are,
mught with as muche grace be set forthe in En-
gylshe, as the other attes heretofore haue bin. And
therefore, I haue so farte as my slender practise
hath enabled me, enterprised to yorne an aquain-
tance betwene *Logike* and my Countreymen: from
the

The Epistle.

the whiche ther haue been heretofore barred by
tonges vnaquainted. Nor withstandyng I must
needes confess, that the Princet. herc of your ma-
iesties serauant prouoked me first herevnto, unto
whom I haue ever founde my self greate in behol-
dying, not onely at my bryng at Lambeth, but also
at all tymes els when I moste uised help. But
as touching the thyng self, though I haue not
doen it with so good perfection, as the worthines
of the aucte requireth, or as some other better lea-
ned could doe: yet I hope that where as now it is
dedicated unto your highnesse, and so made com-
mon to all: my good will shall want no fauourers
in that I haue firste laboured, to bryng so noble a
Maitresse bothe of Reason and Judgement, ac-
quainted with so noble a Countrey, and here to be
made of a straunger a free Denison. Wher in I
take not uppon me so tunnyngly, and perfectly to
haue written of thesaid art, as though none could
doe it better: But because no Englischeman vntill
now hath gone through with this enterprize, I
haue thought mete to declare, that it may be doen
And yet hereto I professe it to be but a spurre, or a
whetstone to sharpe the vñenes of some other, that
ther maie polishe, and perfecte that I haue ruddelij
and grossly entered. And albesit I doe hercina take
vpb me nomore, but to be as a poore meane man,
or a simple person, whos charge wer to be a lode-
man, to conney some noble princes into a strange
lande, where she was never before, leauing the en-
tertaining, the enrichyng, and decyng of her to
suche as were of substance, and furniture afor-

The Epistle.

Dyng; Yet if this woorke make not at the first ente-
raunce, haue the safe conduite and protection of
your moste noble roiall Maestie, I truste it shall
in processe appeare that I haue not altogether in
vaine taken vpon me this strange labour, but ra-
ther to vertie good purpos and effecte attempted
thesame. I knoue your grace for your owne stu-
die, little needeth any helpe of suche an English
enterprise, beeynge so well trainald bothe in the
Greke and in the Latine for the same purpose, thd-
rone the helpe of those worthie men, sir thome cheke,
and sir *Anthony Cooke*, your maesties teachers and
Schoolemaisters in all good literature. But to
feede and satissie the chirk and desire of suche En-
glishemen, as for default of the cladd tongies, could
otherwile not come to the knowldge of Logike. I
haue iudged it labbor worth, to giue the preceptes
and rules thereof in English, that all men accor-
dyng to y gref that so every one is measured, maie
bee the more prouched to followe the examples of
your Maestie, alweyl invidiousnes and desire
of knowldge, as also in the exercise of all vertue,
and princely worshipp, wherin your grace hath
made a godly estat. In whiche moste godlie
trade, if your grace shall continue together with
the feare of God, and the moste reverent obserua-
tion of his moste holie Commandementes and
Gospel (wherin at this date all England, to their
incomparable ioy and comfort, doeth see and find
your maesties cheef delite to be) it can not be dou-
ted, but that thesame shalbe to the wicked a terror
to the godly a comfort, to this realme of England

The Epistles.

a perpetuall defence and safegard, and to all chris-
tian kynges either now living, or hereafter to
come, an example of kyngly worthinesse, and a
mirroure of princely gouernance. And where as
to the moste noble kynges of Isratt and Iuda,
the Lorde for their sondrie vertues gaue sondrie
giffes of grace (as to ^David his dearyng, puissance
and might against his enemies: To ^Salomon wise-
dome and richesse: To ^Abraham innocencie of life, and
perenesse of Religion: to ^Isaphar prudence of king-
ly regiment, to set good ministeres and officeres vnder
hym: To good kyng ^Jacob, the aduaancement
of Gods true seruice, and the rootyng vp of Ido-
latrie: To ^Toachan, a long and a prosperous regne
and all good reste and quietnesse:) all these noble
giffes of Regall excellencie, shall the Lorde your
guide and gouernour, bounchsa to pouere hym
your highnesse to endue you withall in whom are
now planted such graffes of his heauenly grace,
as the fruities hereafter is monte like to be incom-
parable. whiche chyrge that is merte to bee, your
maiestie hath and perpetually shall haue, the daie-
ly and incessant prayars of all vs your most faith-
full louing subiectes, for the long and prosphe-
rous regne of your highnesse to the
glory of GOD, and the honour.

and princely dignitie of
your Readines and
Dominions; L
which alioles, doing to
all chappell Chapel chappell

GUALTERVS HADDO_r
nus Cantabrigiensis, Legum
professor_{as}

Grammatice lingua nos est affata Britannia,
Curaret ne latus lingua Britanna rotet.

Nunquam dixi enim, Es possum te prospicere affect,

Et ratio nostros possit habentes sonos.

Ante peregrinus linguis instructa fuisse, Dicitur

Anglia non propria discere posse potest.

Contra hanc duidant omnes quae verbis palmarum

Qualis erit Logice nos ratione regens quid tunc

Accidit hanc, nosque Thomas VII Johannes ad amores

Verba et quae se frustile sue

THOMAS VII Lusus ei

et et sonus, Lection S.D., auor

et et sonus, Lection S.D., auor

If sit amarum, que sit amarum, vel habeat sit tibi cura,

Que tibi fons inservia, docere decet.

Instruct ars mentem, vel ipse doceto,

Utere quando placeat, corrige, quando liber.

The arte of Logike.

I



Logike, or Logyke, is a general iuste, though the
same is called Logyke in divers places, and in divers
editions.

In every cause that man doeth handle
this one lesson shoulde stel be learned.
Neuer to enter upon any matter, nor
per once to talke without godly advise-
ment. Actes therfore were inuited,
wisenemen are yet for the same cause es-
timated, and sage counsallours had in
muche honory. In consideration wher-
of, Aristotle, in whom Nature hath
powred her graces plentifully, teacheth preceptes in all our do-
ynges to take good advise. It is alwaies right needfull (saith
he) by these fower speciall pointes, to examine every matter, be-
fore we take in hande to teache it any other. First, to knowe whe-
ther the thyng bee or no whereof we entreat. Againe, what it is
in substance, and by the owne Nature. Thirdly, what maner of
thyng it is. Fourthly, wherfore, or to what ende it is. Now in
talkingyn of Logike, I neede not to question whether Logike be or
no. For he that knoweth reason to be in man, and the same given
by the greate might of God; must needs confessse, that Logike al-
so is in man, and that onely by God. For there is none other diffe-
rence betwixte the one and the other, but that Logike is a Greeke
woorde, and Reason is an Englishe woorde.

And therefore he that speakeþ Logike, speakeþ noþyng els
but Reason, yea, there be many Greeke woordis made Englischt,
whereof all men haue not the meanyng. As for example. A yong
man of Cambridge sittyn in his chamber, with twoo or three of
his fellowes, and happenynge to fall in talke of a woman that late-
ly maried to a scholer, when every one had saied his phantasie,
as well of the man as of the woman, comparing the qualitieſ of the
one, with the propertieſ of the other, saying their pleasure every
one of them of her beautie and her bodie, pro & contra: this yong
man choppyng in with his reason, saied: I can not tell my mai-
sters, but surely I for my parte take her for a Catholike woman.
Let other men thinke what thei list, When his fellowes heard this

Fower que-
stions nec-
esse to bee
made of any
matter be-
fore we de-
spire.

The arte of Logike.

þis reporte, þei lauged apade, as knownen by their learnyng, what this woord meante. For (Catholike beeynge a Greeke woord, signifieth nothing in Englishe, but universall or common). And we callin Englishe a common woman, an euill woman of her bodie. Therefore, though termes be darke, and the meaning unknownen to many, yet the trothe enclosed, is alwaies one, and gauenys of Godlye wharternes bee liste. This then perceiuey, þat Logike is the rule of reason, I thinke it as nedeleſſe, to aske whether it bee, or no; as to aske, whether any manne can speake, or no. Thus þe fee wee must triu Logike by the seconde question, learning thereby to knowe firsle of all, what is the substance and nature thereof.

¶ The definition of Logike.

Logike is an Art to reason probablie on both partes, of all matters that be putte forthe, so ferre as the nature of every thing can bear.



In declarynge what manner of thyng Logike is, we must understande that al chynges happenyng, or the whiche doe fall in controvercie, and māie through reason fully be examined, are in this question evermore considered. It happeneth therefore to Logike, and accidentally also belongeth to the same upon all thynges to entreate, which commonlie by wittē are examined, or māie through reason at all be discusseſ. Neither cōve doe any thing, without the helpe of reason, to guide al our actos.

Wherfore, or to what ende Logike is.

Hayne, by Nature hath a sparkē of knowledge, and by the secrete woorkyng of God, iudgeth after a sorte, and discerneth good from euill. Before the fall of Adam, this knowlde was perfecte, but through offence, darkenesse folowed, and the bright light was taken awaie. Wheremē therefore, considering the weakenesse of mannes wittē, and the blidoneſſe alſo, wherein we are drouned inuent this Arte, to helpe vs the rather by a naturall order, to finde out the truthe. For though before Adams fall, knowledge was naturall, and came wiſhout labour, yet no one man can now of hymself, attaine the truthe in all thynges, without helpe and diligent learning.

¶ The

The arte of Logike.

3



His Art diuided in twoo partes. The firste
partie standeth in framynge of thinges aptlie
together, and knyting wordes for the pur-
pose accordynglie, and in Latine is called
Iudicium.

Iudicium.

The secounde parte consisteth in findyng
out matter, and searchyng sylle agreeable
to the cause, and in Latine is called *Inuentio.*

Invention.

For yourmiste understande, that when one goeth aboue to
proue any thyng, he muste firsst inuenue somewhat to proue his
cause, the whiche wherthe hath dooen; he muste use iudgemente
bothe in framing the same reason so iuined, and also to see whe-
ther it serueth for the purpose, or not.

And now some will say, that I shoulde firsst speake of the
fyndyng out of an argumente, before I shoulde reache the wate how
to frame an argumente. Truthe it is, that naturallie we finde a
reason, or we beginne to fashon the same. And yet notwithstanding
fyndyng, it is more meete that the ordering of an argumente shoulde
be firsst handled: forasmuche as it shal no man profite a manne,
to finde out his argumente, excepte he firsst knowe howe to or-
der the same, and to shape it accordynglie, (whiche he doeth not
per perfectie knowe) then stones or timber shall profite the Ma-
son, or Carpenter, whiche knoweth das howe to use the uppon the
same. A reason is callid sound, then falso, or unsound: man can
geue a reason iust or iuste, and without iuste, but howe to fashon
and frame the same, according to Artes, man can doe at all, ex-
cepte they be learned. Therefore, because every mannes wit, can
geue lightly a reason of divers thynges, without any learning at
all, then byche instynct of naturall, mannes witnes is able to set the
same in other schollerlynes either to purpose, or to vnuature: If you
pose firsst to shewe the maner of makinge an argumente (as which
is more nevessill) nexte after that, the maner of fashyoning of an ar-
gumente, and the places where all argumentes doe resell. And laste of all, the capious of vertuall legumincles, as they bee in
Annotatio or *Annotations*, most pertinente to these artes, and other
annexed to them.

B.ij.

g.4

The arte of Logike.

*A breef declaration in Metre of the seuen liberall
Artes, wherin Logike is comprehen-
ded as one of them.*



Rammer doeth teache to utter woordes:
To speake bothe apt and plaine.
Logike by Arte setteth foxythe the truche,
And doeth tell what is vaine.
Rhetorike at large paintes well the cause,
And make that seeme right gaire,
Whiche Logike spake but at a woyde,
And taught vs by the wate.
Musike with tunes, delites the eare:
And makes vs thinke it heauen:
Arithmetike by number can make
Reckenginges to be even.
Geometrie thynges thicke and broad,
Measures by line and square:
Astronomie by Starres doeth tell,
Of soule and eke of faire.

The difference betweene Logike and Sophistrie.

*The differ-
ence be-
tweene Lo-
gike and
Sophistrie.*



Logike other wise called Dialecte (for the late
bothe one) is an Arte to trie the coyne from
the chasse, the truche from every fallyshod, by
defining the nature of any thyng, by diui-
ding the same, and also by knittpynge together
true argumentes, and vntwinynge all knot-
tie subtleties, that are both false and wyng-
fullie framed together.

Sophistrie is ever occupied either in prouyng the truche al-
waies to be false, or els that whiche is false to be true, so that ever-
woere one part of the argument is either false, by usyng some am-
biguous woerde, or by not well applying it to the purpose, or els
not framynge it according to the rules; so that a skilfull artificer
mais lone put the paine Sophister to silice by operynge the fraude
and declarynge the crase of his inuentione, Whereas other wise an
argumente

The arte of Logike.

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argumente made by the rules of *Logike* can not bee avoided, but must needes be true whosoeuer saie naye. And so mutche more is *Logike* to be preferred before Sophistrie, as he is the moxe to be esteemed that tellereth a true tale, then he which tellereth a lye. And even as a Grammianer is better liked, that speakest true & good Latine, then he þ speakest false: Euen so *Logike* of it selfis good, when Sophistrie on the other side is naught. And well maie we, saie, that Sophisters are like those which plaine with false Dice, & woul d make other belieue þ thei are true or els properly to terme them, thei bee like those that goe for honest men, and are none.

To the difference betwene Logike and Rhetorike.

Both these Artes are mutche like, sauyng that *Logike* is occupied about all matters, and doeth plainly and nakedly sette foorth the wite woordes the somme of thinges, by the wate of argumentation. Again of þ other side, *Rhetorike* vseth gaie painted sentences, and setteth forth those matters with freshe colours and goodly orvamentes, and that at large. In so muche that Zeno beng asked the difference betwene *Logike* and *Rhetorike*, made awnsweare by demonstration of his hande, declarynge that when his hande was closed, it resembled *Logike*, when it was openand stretched out, it was like *Rhetorike*.

The difference betwene Logike and Rhetorike.

To the office of Logike.

Logike professeith to teache truly, orderly and plainly. And here we maie see how uniuersall this commoditie is, and how largely it extendeth, not onely to knowe worldly affaires, but also to knowe God and all his heavenly woorkes, so farre as Nature maie comprehendē.

The office of Logike.

There be fower partes of this office of dutie, wherunto *Logike* is bounde. That is: To define the Nature of every thing, to diuide, to knitte true argumentes, and unknitte false.

The partes of Logikes dutie or office.

To Questions.

This same maner of knityng woordes in due order, bee, yng one of the partes of *Logike*, or rather *Logike* it self, therewer the maner of questions, whiche otherwise are

V. iiiij. either

The arte of Logike.

either propositions, or severall woorde. A question is either a woorde or sentence put foorth, as when I aske what suchethyng is, and would knowe an other mannes advise therin, as thus: What is man? What is truth? What is ambition?

Euery question is either single or double. A single question, resteth in a single woorde, as thus. What is friendship? What is Philosophie? A double question standeth not in one woorde, but in two severall sentences, as thus. Is the studie of Philosophie praise worthie, or is it not?

Likelike a proposition, whiche is a sentence, uttered in plain woorde expelly, signifying either truthe or falsoode, is either single, or double. A single proposition, as thus. Wicked men can not abide to reade the woorde of GOD. Of the whiche you maie make a double proposition, by addyng somewhat therunto, as thus. Wicked menne, not onely can they not abide to reade the woorde of God, but also they seeke, by all meanes possible, to ouerthowre the same.

¶ Of the five predicables, otherwise called the five common wordes, whiche are spoken of other.

When we go aboute to expounde any matter, first we must beginne with the definition, to knowe the verie nature of cha thyng, the whiche we can not doe, except we first learne the predicables, for thei shew the largenesse and the narrownesse of wordes, how farre they doe extende, and how much they comprehend in them. As when I see ones a farre of come unto me, first I knowe that he is a man, then when he cometh nigher, I knowe whether he be of myne acquaintance, or no. Likewise, when I goe abounte to declare what one is, and to open the nature of any thyng, I use the largest wordes, and so it must needs be, that I beginne with the predicables, because thei shew how much every woorde doth comprehend in it self, and how large, or how narrowre it is. They be called predicables, because some one thyng, is spoken of an other. And thei are (as a man would saye) markes or notes of wordes that are spoken of many, shewyng howe and by what maner the same wordes are ascribed to other. And even as the child begin-

neth

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nes with his Crosse rowe, and the scholer with his eight partes of speche, so the *Logician* first and formoste, professeith to knowe wordes, before he purposeth to knitte sentences. Neuer is there any one worde, which is not comprehended, vnder one of these ffeine common wordes. And to this ende were those markes limited, that every thing might be knownen in his kinde. For if every singular substance, of herbes, of stones, and such like, shold haue a seuerall name, neither the ihyng self, nor yet the names could once be comprehended in our memoires. Therefore as every thing is ioigned by nature, one with an other, so thei beyng of one affinitie, are comprehended vnder one of these ffeine common wordes.

<i>Genus.</i>	The generall worde.
<i>Species.</i>	The kinde, or speciaill.
<i>Differentia</i>	The difference.
<i>Proprium.</i>	The propertie.
<i>Accidens.</i>	The thing chauncing or cleauning to the substance.

Genus is generall worde, the whiche is spoken of many, that differ in their kinder: as when this question is asked, what it is. As *Animal*, a living creature, *Ars*, an Arte, *Virtus*, *Certe*, *Gemma*, a pretious stone. O^r els thus: *Genus*, is a generall worde, vnder the whiche, diverse kindes or sortes of thynges are comprehended, as vnder a living creature, are comprehended, men and beastes. Under Arte, are comprehended, Logike, Grammar Rhetorike, &c. Every generall worde hath diverse kindes, and is spoken euermore of them all. As *Lapis*, a stome, comprehendeth in it self, a Saphire, a Rubbie, a Christall, a Turkas: as thus. *Sapirus est lapis*. A Saphire is a stome, and so of other.

Every generall worde, is two wates considered, and commonly called the chief generall, in Latine, *Genus summum*, and the middle generall, in Latine, *Genus inter medium*.

The chief generall is so, that where as it is in the heede of all and aboue all, it can never become inferior, to be of any kunde or sorte in thynges. As the substance, the qualitie, the quantitie, are ever chief generall wordes, and can not be comprehended vnder any

The arte of Logike.

any other. The middle generall is the same, that beeynge comprehendēd betwixte the cheef generall, and the lowest kinde or sorte in thynges, maie bee also some kinde or forme it self, as a bodie, a lyng creature, a precious stone, the whiche thre beeynge compared with their inferiors are generall woordes: beeynge referred to their superiors, thei are *Species*. That is to say, shapes, kindes, or sortes of thynges.

¶ The kinde.

The kinde.

Species, seu forma, the kinde, or sort of any thyng (con-
prehendēd under a woorde more uniuersall) is the same
of whom the generall woerde is spoken, when the que-
stion is asked what it is: And when I aske: What is
Justice: I answeare a vertue. Therefore in this Proposition
(Justice is a vertue) Justice is the kinde, and vertue is the gene-
rall woerde, whiche comprehendēth the saied Justice, and is spo-
ken of the same.

Or thus, *Species* is a common woerde that is spoken of ma-
ny, whiche differ onely in nomber, as manne is spoken of *Socra-
tes*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and of every proper name belongyng to any
manne. As *Socrates* is a manne, *Plato* is a manne, *Aristotle* is
a manne.

Every *Species* or kinde in thynges, is of two sortes. The
one is called the lowest kinde, whiche is alwaies spoken of every
proper name, and euer is the kinde, neither can it at any tyme be
the general woerde, although sometyme it heare the name of the
generall woerde. The other is called *Species inter media*, that is
the kinde placed betwene the highest and the lowest, whiche at di-
uerse tymes and by diuerse considerations, maie bothe bee the
generall woerde and the kinde. For that whiche is under the ge-
nerall woerde, that same maie bee called *Species*, or kinde, that
whiche comprehendēth other, maie bee called the generall woerde.

A Nowne proper, is that whereof the kinde is rehearsed. As
Cato est homo, *Cato* is a manne: In this Proposition *Cato* is the
Nowne proper, whiche belongeth to one manne onely, and man
is the kinde whiche is more large, and comprehendēth all men.

This

I Nowne
p. oper.

The arte of Logike.

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This Table sheweth the order of every substance and kind, as they are appointed by Nature, what the cheef generall wordes are, what the middle generall are, what the lowest kindes in every kind are, and what the kindes betwixt bothe are.

		GOD.
Wuh bodie.	{ A Sub- { Without bodie { Aungelle's. stance. { As { Spirits. The soule of is mā.	
		The fower Elementis.
		Fire.
Compounded of divers Elē. { Abodie { without mixt mentes.	{ Ayre. Water. Earth. Heauen and all the Planeteis.	
Beeing al. { Abodie { Without lifte. Luyng luyng. { Luyng. { Asdū.	{ Stones. Mestalles. Lignores.	
Hauyng the Sences of seling. { Abodie { Without sens. Luyng. { Luyng. { or feling at al.	{ A Tre. { A Shrubb. { An Hearbe.	
Endued with Reason. { Loxenure.	{ Without the gift of reason. { In the lande. as beastes, birdes, or fishe.	
		In the water. In the Aire, or in them bothe.
		some luyng.
		Scipio.
Sed man:	{ Socrates.	
		Alexander, and many severall Luyng.

Difference is the same that is broken or māg, which differ in forme and kinde when the question is askē, what manner of thing it is, as whē we say: Quād quād s̄t̄mōr? Cest maner of thing is māg. There māt̄e
the differ-

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answering

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answere: he is indued with reason: If the question be asked what man is: we must answer by his *genus* or generall woorde, he is a living creature. If the question be asked what maner of thyng a beast is: Wee maie saie: he is without the gifte of reason. Every difference that is moste proper to euery thyng, is naturally and substancially ioyned to the kynde, whiche is comprehended under the generall woorde.

Cre pro-
pertie.

Propertie is a naturall pronenesse and maner of doing, which agreith to one kynde, and to the same onely, and that evermore. And also maie be spoken of the same kynde, and by conuersation the same kynde maie bee spoken of hym also. As to speake, and to haue power to laugh, doeth not onely agree to manne, and to none other creature earthly. And as I maie saie: whosoever is a man hath power givien hym of Nature to speake: So maie I also saie by conuersation backward, whosoever hath power givien hym of Nature to speake, that same bodie is a man. To barke is proper to a dogge, and onely proper, and evermore proper. Ergo, whosoever hath power, or rather an inclination givien of Nature to barke, that same is a dogge. And again: whatsover creature is a dogge, that same hath power, or rather an inclination to barke. A goe upright is proper to a man, and onely to a man, and to none other living creature. Notwithstāding ye must marke one thing, that althouḡ many men doe goe crooked, and some also cannot speake: yet bothe to goe upright and to speake, are properly to all menne generally, and therefore this rule serveth to diuide sutch objections. *Vtrbiatō definitionib⁹ posita, non aliud, sed potius significans.* Whiche is almutche to saie: that wordes used in definitions, dooe not signifie the very acte in deede, but the power, the aptnesse, or the inclinations of Nature therontos: as when I saie, it is proper to every man to speake; I meane to bee able, or to bee apte by Nature to speake, is proper to every man.

Note further, that the propertie is not alwaies taken after one sort, but it is somer waies considered.

First, the propertie is that whiche agreeith to some kynde onely, although not to every personne comprehended under the same kynde. And it is proper to humān men to be a Mortal, namely a

hylacanthum,

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6

objection, also petro property owner.

Secondly, the propertie is that whiche agreeeth to every singular persone, and yet not onely to man. As to have two feete, agreeeth to every singular persone, and yet not a man onely.

*Thirdie, the propertie is that whiche agreeth to every man,
and to no man onely, and yet not alwayes, nor so euermore. As
to have hoare heares in the old age, agreeth to manthe onely, and
yet not alwayes, but so the mooste parte men haue hoare heares in
their old age.*

Fourthly, the propertie is that whiche in deede is moste aptly and chechly called *Proprium*, when any thyng dooeth agree to every man, to man onely, and alwaies to man. As to bee able to speake, to laugh, to goe upright; agreeeth to every man, to man onely, and alwaies to man.

This diversitie may haue made betwixte the difference and
the propertie, that the difference is one part of mannes substance,
and is the parte that maketh up man. As to haue the gise of ex-
eſon doeth ſignifie the minde, whiche is one parte of man, fo man
himſelfe is compaſte of body and minde.

A properte doorth signifie a certaine chyng, whiche is attributed to man when he is made, and as a man would faire, doorth come after, when man is wholly made, as to bee & able to speake, to laugh, to goe by night.

Accidentz (that is to saye, a dyping cleaung, or cheuncyng, or
commynge to a substance) is that whiche doeth not reme by hym
self, neither is the parte of a substance, but rather is after such
forme in the substance, that it make bothe be at wate, and be therre,
sometymes more, and sometymes lesse, without destruction or
losse of the subiecte or substance, as mythe, for rowme, to runne,
to stite, to bee well colouren, all these make her awaie, and yet the
men make be on ille, in whom they were before. So that the lacke
of cheim in their quantite or greatnessse, is not the losse of the sub-
stance. And although no substance at any tyme dooeth altogether
 forsake his accidentes, Yet this we see, that answere the same
 substance, doeth somtyme alter his Accidentes, forsaking some
 and taking other. As water beynge sette on the fire, altereth the

C.IJ. coldmelt

The arte of Logike.

The division
of accidents.

coldnesse, and taketh heate, so that we maye judge by this, that coldnesse in the water is not a substance, but an accident.

An accident is two waies considered, for either it maye be separated, or it maye not, some maye bee separated from their subiecte, as colde maye bee taken from water, and knowledge from the minde. Other are inseparable, because they can not bee taken awaie altogether, as stature or hidadnesse can not be taken from manne. Heate can not bee taken from fire, nor moysture from Water, the whiche notwithstanding, they are not separate from their substance, if the quantite or greatnessse is chaungeable in every one of them, for sometyme it is more, and sometyme it is lesse. And we see heate in other thynges, to bee separate from the subiecte. Whereupon we judge that the heate is an other thyng, then the verie substance of fire. Therefore this is worthie to bee knowne, that the substance is one thyng, and the accidente an other thyng, and meete it is to make a difference betwixt them, as thus: The soule is one thyng, the feare of God is an other thyng. Manne maye be without the feare of God (as manye are at this daie the more pitie) therefore the feare of God is an accidente, the soule is a substance.

The use of the accident.

Many man could bee knowne from an other, neither yet any other thyng, if it were not for the accidentes whiche happen unto them. As when I would knowe an hearebe, a stonye, a beaste, a manne, I muste gaine the proper accidentes, declaryng thesame to be of this or that colour, separating all fytche by description from all other, as well of that kynge, as of any other sort els.

The use and commoditye, whiche we haue by,

these five common worder, called by some, still as otherwise Predicabiles, and no idem nam-

The first vise.

Here be sowe especiall commodities. First the largenesse, and the narrownesse of the molsse ge-
nerall woderes, called other wise Predicamentes,
whiche hereafter followe: so that hereby ye maye per-
ceive how muche every woder comprehendeth in it selfe, and how-
farre

farre it bee applyed. The seconde propertie, that every thyng is
defined by these five common woordes, so farre as muche as all thynges,
the more narrow we thei bee, are alwaies defined by woordes
that are more large. As by the generall woordes by the kynnes, by
the difference, and the propertie. *Ita tamen nihil ad modum nominacionis*

The sec-
ond vse.

The thirde,
vse,

Thirdlie, thet are good to judge the knyting of wordes, and
to see what thyng made deuely bee ioyned to other, for ther is no
proposition, by yet loyning togidher of any sentence (accordingy
to the common order of Nature) but thei alwaies aggre to these
aboue rehearsed Predicables: So that either the kynne is spoken
of the singular or proper name, whiche is euer sone one persone,
as thus: *Ciceron est homo*, Cicero is a man. Or else the generall
woorde, the difference, the propertie, or the accident are all spo-
ken either of the kynne, or of some one persone. As thus: *Homo*,
vel Cicero, est animal ratione praeditum, loquendi facultatem ha-
bens, album, longum, satum. A man or Cicero, is a living crea-
ture endued with reason, having aptnesse by nature to speake,
being white, long, and broad. So that no proportion can bee, but
the partes of the same are compayned within these five com-
mon woordes.

The fourthe
vse.

Fourthlie, the generall woorde, the kynne, the difference and
propertie are loyned together necessarilly, to that when you name
one, all the other followe. Therfore when a proposition is made
from the kynne to the generall, to his difference or propertie it is
euermore an undoubted true proposition, as this: *Homo est ani-*
mal ratione praeditus, loquendi facultatem habens. A man is a li-
ving creature endued with reason, having aptnesse by nature
to speake. A man can not be, except he be a living creature endued
with reason, and having aptnesse of Nature to speake. The acci-
dent notwithstanding is not necessarily spoken of the subject, but
is there casually, and may be changed as thus: *Homo est albore*
some man is white. This proposition may be afterward false, for
he may be blacke, or after his complection som other wale, so that
the accident is often altered, and an other succeedeth in his countie.

Therefore it is good to be knowable when you have a proposi-
tion, whether it bee undoubted true for euermore, or els may bee
C. lxx. false

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failer at any time. And all Scholders ought to knowe
these ffe common woordes in all their daynges, as those that
learne to write, shoulde diligently marke their letters. By this
ende over is bette hat, wher every cause is brought to these ffe
common woordes: the generall woordes ffe considered, nexte
after, the kindes falling upon the same well observed, and sett
as though they were in array, after that the differences, the pro-
perties, pas, and the accidentes also placed accordanly. As *Tul-
he* in his *Offices* shewynge what that thyng is, whiche we call
honestie: Ffist speakingy generally, nexte after he setteth forth
the sortes and kindes of honestie, partynge them into fower hende
vertues, wherupon he declareth the difference, and the propertie
of every one; and lastely he toucheth thynges that belong unto e-
very vertue, and sheweth thynges that happen in this life.

¶ Of the Predicamentes, called in Englyshe

¶ The moste generall woordes.



Predicament is an order of ffe woordes, where
in thynges of one kynde are couched and compre-
hended under one woorde, whiche is made general.

A Predicament is nothyng els in Englyshe,
but a shewynge or rehersyng, what woordes make
be truely ioyned together, by els a setting forth of the nature of
every thyng, and also shewynge what male be truly spoken, and
what not. And for this cause Actes were iauenct, that the truth
mght be knowne, and every thyng uttered had his proper
woordes. Ff; when I say, A manne is a creature, I knowe this
Proposition hath his proper woordes, and that like as manne is
a substance, so in the creature, whiche is the generall woorde
unto hym, whiche bothe are in the Predicamente, and the other
in this Proposition is observed according to Acte sfor wee must
alwaies beginne at the lowest and god lowardes, whiche order
agreeth also to nature, when thynges less knowne are decla-
red by thynges that are more knowne, as shall more plainly here
after appear.

The Predicamentes are divided into the substance, and the
accidente, so according to this division is it ordered.

The

Division of
predicamen-
tes.

The fiste is bathe called the substance, and is a substance in deede. The other are accidentes, as not beeynge of the substance, but declaryng therewerto.

The commodite of these predicationes are greate. Firsste, where as thei bee digested into the substance and accident, it is good to shew to knowe eueryone the substance, from the thyng whiche is accidentall. And againe of these moste generall woordes ariseth this profit, that if you will desyng any thyng or shewe the Nature thereof, you maye knowe in whiche of all these stoe- houses the woordeth relleth, whiche would expresse the Nature of an other.

Thirdie, Ione will bestowe a little diligence herein, shewing where every woorde is setled, and his way to whiche of all these moste generall woordes he maye best exerte is: he shall faithfully knowe the Nature of all thynges, no man before, then the whiche, nothing is more necessarie, and this difference is betwixt the ffe spynnon woordes, otherwise called Predicabiles and these moste generall woordes called Predicationes, that the Predicabiles sette forth the largenesse of woordes; the Predicationes doe name the very Nature of thynges, declaryng (and that substantially) what thei are in very deede.

Difference
of Predica-
bles and
Predica-
mentes.

*A note of certayne thynges, diligently to be had by
men observed, before theye fall into vaine
and vaine handling of moste generall woordes.*

Considerynge ambiguitie breedeth vnuersall miste
warenesse ought to bee used, that the doublenesse
of no one woord deserve the benter. The cause of
all controversie, is either the not well understand-
yng, or els the wyllyng of woordes, that in sens
have double meanning.

And so shal Schooles maister to all
Schoulers, giveth good warappay to all men, bee right wryte in
any wise, to haue the righte interpretation of every severall
woorde.

There bee wordes that haue one and the same title, con-
yndering the nature of many thynges, as thei haueesse sole
lonyng.



Indicatio
nemotella

The arte of Logike.

A Croune, A Croune signifieth
the croune of a man
nes hevde , and also
 { A Noble,
Tyme. A Noble signifieth a Croune
of gold, such as is currant, or els such as kynges weare at the
tyme of their Coronation. A shewre boye sayng of late deths a
Priest, clerkeley thynker in the croune, at what tyme Frenche trou-
nes do deare in highe pice here in Englynde, shied to the Priest
full unhappely in this wiste: I praye you Maister Parson (qu he)
how goeth crounes now with you, wherast the Priest was aba-
shed, and would rather haue loste a croune in deede, then that his
croune shuld haue been so curstly, and in suchis waies taunted.
 A Noble signifieth also the weires of a realme, but also thet
are the godlye peple we habbes in a mannes purse: A Priest had a
Noble for preaching a funeral sermon, upon the death of a wyf.
His full man the Priest purposyng to geatise the dede, and with
the paise to commend his liberallite, sait chalurely he was a good
man, a certayn man, þea he was a noble gentleman. I thynke if it
had been his happye haad haue recall, he had called hym a roiall
gentilman too.

Tyme noteth bothe the space of howe, daie, and yere, and also
we call an hevde by that name, whiche groweth in Gardines.

Sage also breedeth an herbe, and yet we call wise men, sage
men: so that every one of these wordes haue a double meanyng,
and stande clene together by fellowship of name by nature and in
every place haue very muche differenc. Therfore this ought euermore
to be marked, that all wordes be well noted according to their na-
ture, than the rather we haue escome erron. Thos are onely to be
seceuied, þe beloþ to the maintenanc of all crache, whose name
and nature is all one, þe whiche are euer myred to be taken and
haue haiden after one tyme. For þis word signifieth none other
thing but a man, þere as signifieth none other thing in al the world
but a tree onely, and so of other. If any worde be used that hath a
double meanyng, retreteþ the latengesse thereof, and declare how
you will haue it calld, by whate þe wort of the toun þou ferer
þe avoided.

Wordes
allowable.

The

<i>The predicamentes are in number x.</i>	
<i>Substantia.</i>	<i>The substaunce.</i>
<i>Quantitas.</i>	<i>The quanticie.</i>
<i>Qualitas.</i>	<i>The qualitie.</i>
<i>Relativa.</i>	<i>The relation.</i>
<i>Actio.</i>	<i>The maner of doing.</i>
<i>Possessio.</i>	<i>The sufferyng.</i>
<i>Quando.</i>	<i>When.</i>
<i>Ubi.</i>	<i>Where.</i>
<i>Similitudo.</i>	<i>The setting.</i>
<i>Habitus.</i>	<i>The apparelyng.</i>

Substaunce or being, whiche Cicero calleth *Natura*, is a thyng whiche standeth by it self, and needeth no helpe of an other, but hath his proper being and substance naturally. As thus,

The substaunce is a thyng whiche hath his proper being of hymself, and containeth accidentes whiche happen thereto.

The definition of the substaunce.

Substaunce is divided into the first and second. The first substaunce is called every singuler persone, or proper name, as *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Virgil*, *Homere*.

The seconde substaunce comprehendeth bothe the generall worde, and also the kinde of every singular persone. As thus, *Talle*, *Calem*, *Hannibal*, with other. Likewise this worde (a living creature) being a substaunce and generall worde of every proper name, containeth all thinges particularly that haue life.

It is profitable to marke the order of substaunce, set forth in a Table a little before; for we may by the same diuide severally every substaunce of all thynges in this worlde, the whiche when we knowe, and remeber in our mindes, we perceyue evidently the difference betwene God and his Creatures, and seyng the thyng created of God, and the propertie therewithall, wee restre vpon the same, and leare the vse and proper commoditie of many thynges here in earth. We may define many thynges by the
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The arte of Logike.

same Table, and we make deince God, Manne, Heauen, earth,
Beaste, Stonne: and any thyng els that is a substance.

The proprietie of substance.

1. The substance receiveth by alteration of it self, and at sondrie tymes diuers and contrary accidentes, and yet the substance is not contrarye of the divine nature.

2. No substance can be either greater or lesser then it is by nature, although according to the bether hys largenesse, it appeare to be otherwise.

3. No substance can bee seen with our eyes, but onely the outward accidentes, whereby wee judge and knowe every severall creature.

Quanticie is the greatness of a thyng, or the number, and proper it is to this moste generall worde, to be divided as greatness is divided into severall partes, and numbers into every severall number. *Quanticie.*

Quanticie is twoe waies considered.

The one is called *continua quantitas*, that is when the question is asked, how grete or broade any thyng is. And therfore the length, the latitudo, and the deepenesse of bodies artificiall are herein obserued: the vse whereof is moste seen in *Geometrie*.

The other is called *discreta quantitas*, when the question is asked how many thynges there be, and it is occupied altogether in numberyng. The vse of this is perceiveth in *Aritmetike*.

The proprietie of quanticie.

1. The quanticie hath nothinge to bee contrary unto hym, for greate and little are not contraries according to their quanticie, but they are relatives compared the one with the other.

2. The quanticie worth receiveth of the divine nature any thyng, either greater or lesser, but it is alwaies on, and althoough it happeneth that one life be longer then an other, yet according to the quanticie, a short life is almuche a life as a longer life is.

3. By quanticie also, one thyng is compared either equalis, or else unequalis unto an other thyng.

Of qualite.

Quanticie
hath no con-
trarie.

Quanticie
neither en-
creaseth, ne
diminueth.

Qualite.

The arte of Logike.

10

Glorie is a forme or shape of the body or wimde, whereof some name is derived; As of Wisedome, men are called wise; of Justice, men are called iuste.

There be three maner of qualities, wherof the first doeth contain the habite, otherwher is called the perfect chayping of any theng.

The other is a forewardnesse in any theng; gotten by laboure and traualle, not grynted by creatures goodnesse, or choyce male cal it the halfe attaynyng of that whiche we goe about to haue, wantynge perfection, for lache of full tyme, and is called in Latyn *disposicio*. As to haue meane knowlidge, and not to be fully instruced in the practise of Justice, is *modestia*.

Againe to be fully learned, to haue accomplished all thynges due to righenesse and iustice, is called in Latyn *Habitus*. As who shoud sole the absolute attayning and frog hold of the same. The ympe of this wodde *Habitus*, can hardly be deuised with one wodde in this our tonge, notwithstanding it may in no woorde bee opened, for the better understanding of it, for even as ware chaysed with the handes is made softer, evyn so some partes of man are made by hys more apt to compasse any theng.

He that vseth ofte to speake Frenche, shall by continuauunce obtaine perfection, He that vseth muche to write, at length shall haue a readie hande, and this is called *Habitus*. So that no man hath knowledge, or perfect chayping of any theng, except he get it by laboure, and acquaint Nature hys traualle, and withstandynge, I must needs confesse, that all creatures bee not like apte to receive knowledge. Some are gisen to one thyng, and some to another. Therefore, they whiche by Nature haue a promptnesse, shall sooner attaine perfection then any other can doe, if by laboure and earnest traualle, they will stroche to attaine that whereunto they are apte, and with good endevours fylling Nature forwarde. God giveth some one maner a passing gift, to searche the influence of the Startes, to another he graunteth a naturall inclination to Musike and all heavenly Darmounes. So that if either of the se twos would stroche to folloe their Naturall appynesse, it were moste like they shoulde excell. And therthat doth not finde Nature so favourable, can never come to suche perfection.

an hyst of
dowt primar
not cert
in a thyng.

The habite
in a thyng.

The fore-
wardnesse in
any thyng.

The full att-
aining of
any thyng.

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The full at-
teining twoo
waies con-
sidered.

The full attaining of anything by long tyme, is twoo waies considered: for either it is of the bodie, or els of the mynde.

Perfection gotten by helpe of the bodie, is, when men can by muche vse, leape, wassle, or caste the barre better then any other, or els vde excell in any handie crafe above the common sort.

The habite of the mynde, that is to saye, that constante hold of any thing whiche is in the mynde, either consisteth in knowledge, or els in practise. In knowledge are comprehended all Artes, as Grammer, Logike, Astronomie, &c. and all other learnyng wherunto witte can attaine. That habite of the mynde whiche is in practise, and by good aduertisement is chosen, standeth in the will of manne. As all vertue and all vice dooth. Of vertues these bee in mannes will, luste or alyng euermore, manhoode in sufferyng all harmes stoutly for honesties sake, and temperaunce of life, in forbearynge luste and flicke gluttonie. These vertues though their ossyng be from God, yet tym makest them perfect in the iyes of man. Other vertues are givene of God wholie and altogether, without mannes labour to attaine them. As Faathe, Hope, Charite, and all other like giftes of the holie Ghost.

The seconde forme is called the power, strength, or promesse of Nature, in Latine *Naturalis vis*. And the contrary hereunto is called the weakenesse of Nature, when she hath denied her power to any one chyng, in Latine is called *Imbecillitas naturae*.

Naturall strengthe is an aptnesse of Nature, givene either to the bodie or to the mynde. To the mynde as aptnesse to learne, promptnesse of memorie: to the bodie in man is aptnesse by Nature to wassle: for a horse to be quiche and stirring: for a bird to be apt to flye: for fish to liue in the water, the whiche man cannot doe: for an Isle to bee slowe: for a stone to be hard &c. Naturallis weakenesse, is when Nature diminished her gift, as when she denieth aptnesse to learning, as we se many dull wittes for learning, and muche bliste that waile. Nature hath denied some men health of bodie, that thei are never well or easie: some iuerme are so sickle in their braine, that thei are never well: Some are Capone by kinde, and so bliste by Nature, that no arte at all can wheate them. An Isle will never be slowe: a stonell will never be softe of Nature,

The natu-
rall strengthe.

The arte of Logike.

II

Nature. All qualities be instrumentes of nature, whereby the wooyhew, as heate is the instrument of fire. Heate and cold in the iuste of hearbes are instrumentes, whereby men either are healed, or els paste healyng for this wylde.

The thirs kind comprehendeth the passions of man, called in Latine *Passiones*, and also those qualities whiche tary a good while, and more man either this wale or that wale.

A perturbation or els affection, is a sodaine chounghe of the mynde, and also of the bodie.

There bee fower stirrynges principall, whiche are in all the mynde, whereof all other haue their offyng.

<i>Libido sex capitatis.</i>	<i>Luste, or desir.</i>
<i>Litteria.</i>	<i>Herte.</i>
<i>Eristudo.</i>	<i>Greed.</i>
<i>Metus.</i>	<i>Feare.</i>

The which are stirryng up by some motion of the minde, either desirynge any thing earnestly, or abhorryng the same.

There bee fife qualities of the bodie whiche moue the senses, and are called thynges offered to the senses, as colours, either whitenesse, blacknesse, or any like moue the eyes. All soundes and noises that be made moue the hearyng, as coughyng, speakyng, bhaiyng of a Derr, loowyng of a Cowe, or neighyng of a Horse. Smayres moue the smylling, as perfumes, swete odors, the strong smell of ordure, or of suche stikk. Smayres moue the taste, as bitternesse, tartnesse, sourenesse. Suche qualities as are touched moue the sense of touchyng, as hardnesse, softnesse, roughnesse, plainnesse.

Affectiones permanent called *Peribiles qualitates*. The qualities that tary a good while, differ from sodaine passions, so as muche as these tary not long, but sodainly come and sodainly go, as blushing in a mannes face, sodaine feare, sodainly to chaunge colour and ware pale. The other tary longer, as Enue, Ambition, Loue, continuall feare, greedenesse with suche other.

The fourthe comprehendeth the figure and forme of any thing. The figure comprehendeth the shane of chinges that haue no life, as the fashyon of the vilenesse, of Erres, of hondres, of an house, a shipp, a coate and herte like.

D.iii. The

The arte of Logike I

The forme containeth the portraiture of all living thynges,
as the very lively Image of Hym, of an Horse, or a Lion, as we
call a man well favoured, or hard favoured.

¶ The propertie or qualite.

- 1 There is somwhat contrary unto qualite, as Clerte is con-
trary unto vice, vice unto folie, malitouse unto cowardise.
- 2 The thyng containing or recryting any qualite, mae bee
sated to receive either more or less. As one man is thought to bee
wiser then an other, not that wisedome it selfe is either greater or
lesse, but that it mae be in some man more, and in some man less.
- 3 By qualite thynges are comded, either like or unlike. Those
are like whiche are of like qualite, and have properties bothe ac-
cordingly.

¶ The table of the qualites.

¶ Of the mynde.	¶ The Qualite.	¶ Of the body.
¶ Gotten by studie.	¶ Of the mynde.	¶ Given by nature,
¶ Tariyng still with a manne, and hardly goyng away.	¶ Gote by studie.	¶ The natural inclina- tion to any thyng.
¶ As knowlege which mae be either confesteth by practised skill, or hard Exerice of vertue.	¶ Speculation, and by Or else by Practised skill.	¶ Practised skill.
¶ Justice.	¶ Temperance,	¶ Fortitude.
¶ Temperance, or selfe rea- soning of every singular person, as Caso, Socrates, Plato.	¶ Of vertue.	¶ Of of

¶ Of Relatiues.

Relatiues are those which are comprehended with other, or the whiche are named one with an other, and as a man would say, haue a mutuall respect one to an other.

The other Predicamentes before rehearsed, were absolutely spoken, so that we maie understande by one and the same woerde what it meaneth. As we maie perceiue what a man is, although we sygne nothing to hym. Wee knowe what Justice is, although we compare hym with none other thyng. But these relatiues can not be so well understanden, except we sygne some thing to them. As when I saye fater, I can not call hym except I understande a sonne that he hath. So that every bodie is called a fater, in respect that he hath a sonne, or els not. Againe, no bodie can bee calld a schowlemaster, except he haue Scholers. There is no houerbande except he haue a wife.

Therefore we maie see, that relatives are referred euermore to an other, neither can they be taken absolutely, without hauyng respect to some other woerde. There is no woerde but we maie consider the same to bee a Relative, if we referre it to some other thyng, and therefore we maie goe throughout all the predicamentes with this one place, and finde relation of every one of them. Those that are referred to some thyng, are of two sortes.

First they are properly so called, as the fater and the sonne, the master and his seruaunte, neither can they be considered, except they be compared by some other; for when one is called fater, he is properly so called, because he hath a sonne, and therefore hath he his proper being. Again, relatives unproperly so called, are those severall woordes whiche are knowne and haue their being, even whyle they stande alone, and yet considered with other, they haue diuers respects, as loue is the loue of the thyng loued: or thas. Loue beholdeþ the thyng loued. Faith beholdeþ the thyng whereunto it leaneþ. And therfore whereas Paule saith, wee beynge iustified by faith, haue peace before God, it is as muche to saye, that we are not received for the worthinesse of the qualitie, but for his sake that is the sonne of God: for I prie you whereunto leaneþ faische, or what thyng doorth it is beholdeþ sayng onely our loue Jesus

Relation
maie be in
all wordes.

Relatiues
properly so
called.

Relatiues
unproperly
so called.

The arte of Logike.

Jesus that died feely once for all. Or else thus. Relatiues are so called (and yet unproperly) whiche are not according to their proper beeving, but accordyng as thei are so named, whereof the fise predicamentes that followe beare the name. As he that doeth any thyng, is referred to a thyng done, wherein the twoo places that followe are declared, whiche signifie to doe and to suffer.

By the place *Ubi*: where, one neighbour is compared with his next neighbour.

By the place *Quando*: when, a child of sixe yere old, is compared with a child of the same yeres.

By the place *Suum esse*: That is to bee settled, or to lye any maner of waie. He that lieth bynight, is compared with hym that lieth dounne grouelyng. In all these the proper beeving is not declared, for a child mait bee sixe yeres of age, although he bee not compared with an other, and therefore it is called *Relatio secundum dicti improprie*. But a man can never be a father, sawyng onely in consideration of his sonne. And yet note this one thyng, it is proper to all Relatiues alwaies to bee true, euen by conversion. As thus: whosoever is a father, the same hath a sonne, whosoever is a sonne, the same hath a father. Whosoever hath faithe, the same man leaneth to Christe onely. Whosoever leaneth to Christ onely, that same man hath faithe. Here are twoo thynges to be marked in Relation. The ground of every thyng, and the ende wherunto it hath respecte or consideration. As a father is the grounde, in that he doeth beget, and hath respecte to his sonne, in that he is begotten. The sonne is the grounde, in that he is begotten, and hath respecte to his father whiche did beget hym.

And thus like wise in all other.

¶ The propertie of Relatiues.

1 Relatiues receive contraries, as vertues are contrary to vice, not that is referred to vice, as yet thei twoo are contrary.

2 Relatiues properly so called, according to their naturall beeving, are euer bothe at one and the same tyme: and also lose their names, bothe at one and the same tyme: as a man is so soone called a father, as he hath a sonne, but so soone as the childe dieth, he is no more called a father to that child,

Relatiues
are alwaies
true by con-
versation.

In relation
twoo thy-
nges are to
be marked.

The

¶ The Table of the Relatiues.

{ By Nature.	{ As by the cause and the effeete, the Father and the Sonne are considered.	
{ By some maner or waise vsed.	{ The Magistrate, and the Mace, the Kyng and his sworde caried before hym are compared together.	
{ By degrees in Calling.	{ The lord and his seruaunt the Advocate & his client	
{ Relatiues are compared one with another.	{ By kindred. By Mariage. By covenauant. By accidentall happening. By natural kind. By yeres. By condition of life.	{ The brother and sister, The Sonne in Lawe, the Mother in Lawe. The graunter of a Lease, and the Tenaunte. A Poet to be a liar, a Phi- losophier to bee a marqueller, or a Lawier to bee a theef. A man, woman. Ayong man, an old man. A poore man, a riche man, A free man, a bond man.

¶ The maner of doing, in Latime called Actio.

 *Gere, seu facere, is when we are saied to be occupied in a matter that is before vs, or when our labour is extended upon a weake or lesse thyng: and in this place are conteined all Clerches actiues, as to write, to dispute, to banquet, to begette, to encrease, to diminishe, or to chaunge, and to speake at a woordie, all thole are contained in this place whiche aunswere to this question, what doeth he, or what doeth it? Excepted alwaies Clerches verteyning to the senses or affection, as to heare, to taste to see, to enuie, all whiche haue the passiue signification.*

Every action is either Naturall, or voluntarie, That is cal-

C.i. led

The maner
of doing.

The arte of Logike.

led naturall whiche is doen by the myght of nature, as to beget, or
to bring forth, to encrease, or decrease, to alter by qualitie, as to be
Every action
either Natu-
rall, or vo-
luntarie.
moiste, drye, colde, or hot, to moue frō place to place. That is called
voluntarie, whiche dorth betoken any thing doen freely, as to teach
to write, to read, to plaine the merchant man, or to do any other ac-
tion. And hereunto maitre be referset every mans duetle liyng.

¶ Parpassio, called in English a sufferyng.

A sufferyng.

Pari, fieri, sen accipere, to suffer to be doen, or to take is
the effect of the action, and to make it plain, it is a verbe
passiu, even the same whiche the Grammarians use, as
to be taught, to be encreased, to bee diminished, all these
are passiu, and are referred to this predicament.

¶ Ubi, where.

Where.

Vobi is an order or Predicamente, whiche comprehendeth
the description of places, wherein some thing is reported,
either to be doen, to haue been doen, or els hereafter to bee
doen. As to be at London, to be at Cambrige, to be at home, to be
in a chamber, to be aboue, beneath, on the right hande, leste hande,
before, or behinde, and what soever is unanswered to this question,
whē I alake where any thing is, or where any thing is doen. This
place serveth for conjectures, either in praisynge, or dispraisynge.

¶ Quando? When?

LHis Predicamente quando, conteineth the difference and
diversite of tymes, as nunc, now, heri, yesterdaie, noctu,
in the night tyme, interdiu, in the daie time. This place al-
so giueth light to confirme causes. As to proue that one is pain-
full, I maitre saie suche a one studeth daie and night, so muche as
Nature can beare: therfore he is a painfull man.

¶ Situm esse, to be settled.

Situm esse, is then considered, when a mannes boode is in any
wise placed as to be a shoo, to stande wynght, to sit, to scane
to lye geouelyng, to lye wide open.

¶ Habitus, the araying or cloþing.

Home call this Predicamente, habitus instrumentum,
that is a conertyng or apparelling of any boode, as to
haue a coate, to weare a gonne, to bee harnessed, to haue

a Jacke, a shurte of Haile, a coate Armour. Also to goe gorge, ouslie: as to weare chaines of golde, to haue bracelettes, ryuges, Duches, and Stones, to haue a Scepter or Pace in his hande. Thordlie, to possesse Golde, Siluer, Lande, wife, Children, or to containe any thyng, as the Hoggeshedde doeth holde Wlne, the Barne holdeth Coyne. &c.

I he vse and commodite of these predicamentes.

If you will define any woord, and knowe the proper nature of the same, ye must needes knowe these ten *Predicamentes*. As for an example, if ye will knowe what a man is, ye muste haue recourse to the place of *Substantia*, and there ye shall learne by the same place, that man is a liuyng creature endued with reason. If ye will knowe what vertue is, ye muste goe to the *Predicament Qualitas*, and there ye shall see that vertue is a constance habite of the mynde, makynge them praise worthie in whom it is. If ye will define the *Nature* of a Father, seeke for *Relatina*, and there ye shall learne that he is a Father, that hath a Sonne, he is a Maister that hath a seruaunt, and so forthe of the reste. Therefor ye muste needes haue these *Predicamentes* ready, that when soever ye will define any woord, or give a naturall name unto it, ye maje come to this store house, and take stusse at will.

Of a definition.

IHere is nothyng in all this whole Arte of Logike *A definition*, more necessarie for man to knowe, then to learne diligently the definition and diuision of every matter, that by reason maje be comprehended. For he that firste understandeth what he doeth goe about (knowyng fullie the *Nature* of every cause propounded) shall lesse erre in the whole discourse followyng, and easlie shall it be for hym to avoide false argumentes, if he can learne firste to see the vertue *Nature*, and substantiall properties of every thyng.

A definition is twoo waies considered, for either it is a definition of a woord, or of a substance. A definition of a woord, is any maner of declaration of a woord, as a Realme is so called, because it is by a Kyng ruled, and merly to sole it. A woman hath her

C.ij.

*B definition
of a woord.*

The arte of Logike.

name so giuen her, because she bryngeth woe vnto man.

A definition of the substance, is a speche whiche sheweth the very Nature of the thyng, and every perfecte definition is made perfecte by the generall woode, and his difference ioyned together. So that whatsoeuer is defined, it is alwaies the kynde or sort of some one thing, as thus, Man is a liuyng creature endued with reason: Man is the thyng defined, and the other (that is, a liuyng creature endued with reason) is the definition. There be fower rules to be obserued in every perfect definition. First, that the definition containe no more then the thing defined, nor yet that the thing defined containe any more then the definition doeth. Again we must take heede, that the definition expresse the very Nature and substance of the thing defined, or els it is no good definition. Thirdly, we must see that the definition be plaine and open without ambiguitie, not hauyng any obscure or farre fetched wordes.

When *Plato* had defined a manne to be a liuyng creature, hauyng twoo feete, and without feathers. *Diogenes* that scoffyng Dogge, whiche loued to take aduaantage bypon small occasion, seyng *Plato* upon a tyme moste earnest in teachyng his Schoulers, sodainly chopt into the Schoole, and settynge a Cocke in the middest of them, whiche had all his feathers pluckte of, behold q̄ he, here is *Plato* his man, whom he hath painted out so Clerkely vnto you. Because this definition was not plaine and open, *Diogenes* thus iested as ye haue heard. Not withstandyng *Plato* his saying was true enough, and good enough also, if it had pleased hym so to understande it. For *Plato* his meanyng was of a creature, that by Nature lacketh feathers, not of one that had his feathers pluckt of, and so the definition is without fault.

Fourthly, whosoever purposeth either to teache or to learne, to perswade vehemently, or plainly to expoune, it is for him right necessarie, alwaies to binde hymself to a certayn appointed order, and particularly to gather that thyng, the whiche he myndeth at large to expresse. For so shall he see what he doeth, and not swarue as some doe, but keep his matter as he ought to doe. Whereby bothe he shall teache better, and other shall learne the sooner.

What admision is.

Rules to be
obserued in a
definition.

Plato.

*Diogenes
Cocke.*

A diuision is, a diuidyng of that whiche is more common, into those v hiche are lesse common. As a definition therefore doeth declare what a thyng is, so the diuision sheweth how many thynges are contained in the same. A diuision is either the diuision of a woerde, or of a thyng. A diuision first of a woerde, is, when any woerde that signifying divers thynges, is diuided into every seuerall signification that he hath: as I would diuide this woerde *Canis* into a Dogge, a Fishe in the See, and a Starre in the Clemente, thus might I saie, *Canis* is either a Dogge that liuereth vpon the Earth, or a Fishe, or els a Starre in the Clemente.

A diuision of the thyng is three waies considered, for either it is when the generall is diuided into the kinde, the whole into his partes, or els when the substance is diuided into the accidentes. The generall is diuided into his kinde, thus, as an Clemente is diuided into the Fire, the Ayre, the Water, and the Earth. A commonweale is diuided into the state of the people, which beare rule, and also into that power, where the beste and wissest haue their gouernaunce: and thidly into ones hande whiche alone beareth the stroke, and is cheef Magistrate.

The whole is diuided into his partes, as thus. The bodie is diuided into the hedde, healle, handes and feete. A manne is diuided into bodie and soule, and this kinde of diuidyng is properlie called a partition. And the very difference betwene a diuision and a partition is, that in a diuision where the generall and the kinde are, the generall woerde is spoken of the kinde it self, as *Justitia est virtus*, Justice is a vertue, where as it can not be so, when the whole is diuided into his partes, that the whole shold be spoken of his part, as I can not saie, *caput est homo*, the hedde is the man. For the hedde is not manne, nor yet the healle neither, although thei bothe be partes of manne. We haue furthermore neede of this partition in all matters. The lawe of Moses is diuided into thre partes, for either it is Morall, Judiciall, or Ceremoniall, neither is this partition necessarie for Moses commonweale only, but for all other regimenter that be. The Morall Lawe standeth souer, and is not altered at any tyme, but is received from time to

C.iiij. tyme

A diuision.

A diuision
of a woerde.

A diuision
of a thyng.

A common
waile diu-
ded three
waies.

A partition.
The Morall
Lawe.

The arte of Logike.

The Judicall Lawe. tyme, even as Moses received the same of God in stonie Tables, The Judicall lawe is next, the whiche although we be not bound to obserue as the Israelites were, yet muste there bee actes of Parliament made, for the reformation of thynges that be amisse, and Magistrates appointed to punishe suche as breake the same Commandementes, called the Morall Lawe, and even so maie we iudge of the Ceremoniall Lawe, that although it appertaine nothyng to vs to keepe suche Ceremonies, as Moses and Aaron haue enacted, yet it is needefull that there bee an order in all our doppes, and that wee resorte together to the temple reverently, and that the parentes appoynte their children a tyme to leare at schoole, and for these seruautes a tyme to doe their true service.

The Ceremoniall lawe. The substance is diuided into his accidentes, as thus, of men some are free, some are bondyng. **Substaunce diuided into his accidentes.** An other maner of diuiding there is contrary to this, as whē the accidentes are diuided into their substances, as thus. Of good thynges some are of the mynde, some of the bodie, and some of Fortune. Also there is a diuision whē accidentes are diuided into accidentes, as of good thynges, some are honest, some profitabile, and some pleasant.

Accidentes diuided into substances. **Accidentes diuided into accidentes.** It is an olde sayng, and woxthe remembraunce, beeynge as true, as it is aunciente. *Qui bene distinguit, bene docet.* He that dooeth diuide well, dooeth teache well. And Socrates in *Phedra Platonis*, pratisyng muche the maner of diuidyng, saith at length that if he knewe a manne whiche could well diuide, and severally sette every thing in his place, he would followe hym as though he shoule followe God hymself. In whiche miserable blindnesse we we, if we kneue not the difference betwixt the lawe and the Gospell, the whiche onely we dooe knowe by the benefite of diuision. There bee many sondrie people whiche muche dispraise all temporall lawes and ciuill lawes, thinking it unrate that all common weales should onely haue the Gospell, and none other lawe at all. This mate seeme to some a gaye sayng, where as in dede it is bothe foolish and wicked. For there is a difference betwene politike Lawes and the Gospell; for the politicall lawe doeth cause an outward discipline to bee obserued, even of the wicked; so that

The politickall lawe.

they

thai dare not offend outwardly, for feare of corporall punishment. The Magistrate whiche hath this charge, is ordained of God: and first his charge is, to set forthe the tenne Commaundements, givene to Moses in stonie Tables, and to cause the same to bee obserued uniuersially, punishing the offendours for their euill deedes corporally. After this, he must enact other particulaire Lawes as occasion shall serue, whiche doe not dissent from these tenne, considerynge these Lawes are generall, and therfore particular thynges maie be drawnen out of them. As where it is said, Thou shal doe no thente, the Magistrate sayng falsoode in bargaining, and muche deceipt used to fraude one an other, straighe causeth it to be proclaimed, that all such as use deceipt in bargaining commit thente, and shalbe attainted therewpon as felonys: the whiche maner in so doing, hath fulfilled Gods Commaundement. Now again as for preaching of the Gospell, it is an other maner of thente, for thereby spymes are souguen, the inheritance of life everlasting graunted, and an euer living Chutche of mankind, gathered to bee Gods chosen people, and also the true knowledge of God, perfecte righemoulesse, and the life everlasting, is kindled in the hartes of all godlie thourgh the power of Gods holy ghoste. But there be fewe that will obey willyngly, and withall their hartes the wordes of the Gospell in suche wise. Neither can any Lawe be able, violently to forre the inwarde thought of man. Therefore the darwarde Magistrate, though he can not bind meners consciences from the thing that is euill, yet may he labour to withdrawe them from doing euill, and in dede if Lawes were not, men could not live. Therefore the politicall regiment and the Gospell, are twoo diuers thynges. This shott distinction reacheth right to many weightie matters, the whiche thyng when men knowe not, they wonder in grete parkurst, and so lacke of sight, fall into errour.

The lawe of
the Gospell.

Rules needful to be observed in the execution of Lawes. First, it must be phronded that the diuinall, as muche as may be (so it can not alwaies be so) ought to be made with twoo contrary differences, fully contēmning in them selfe, the whiche compasse of widenesse of the ge-

nerall
Lawes ned-
full for a dis-
missall.

The arte of Logike.

herall woode, or that whiche is diuided: for it is a faulfe to forget
any thyng, or let slip any parte.

Againe, the difference whiche diuide the generall woode, being ioyned bothe together, must bee equall to the said generall woode, and the partes coupled together, must bee as mutche as the whole, or els the diuision is not good. A liyng creature is diuided into his twoo differences, as into a thyng hauyng reason, and a thyng that hath no reason. Now what soeuer is a liyng Creature, the same is a thyng that either hath reason, or els that lacketh reason. And againe, every thyng that is endued with reason, and without reason, that same is a liyng creature. So that in every diuision, the members or partes that dooe diuide by conuersion, are courned wth the thyng diuided, and even likewise it is with partition, as I haue spokēn before of diuision. Whereas Logike hath twoo partes, Judgemente, and finding out of thynges, even as I saie, Logike is nothing els but Judgemente, and finding out of thynges, so of the other side, Judgemente and finding out of thynges, is nothing els but Logike it selfe. Wherby appeareth a plaine conuersion, that whatsoeuer the one is, the same is the thyng, whiche must diligently bee obserued in every diuision. For if the members that diuide bee either more or lesse, then the thyng diuided, straight waie the diuision is not good, for accordingyng to a precepte that we haue in Latine. *Membra diuidentia semper cum divisione converti arbitantur.* The partes that dooe diuide, must alwaie bee equall wth the thyng diuided, and courned by conuersion wth the same, or els the diuision is not lawfull.

*If the maner of handling of a single question, and the readie
waie how to teache and set forth any thyng plainly,
and in order, as it shoulde be, in Latin Methodus.*

Fault in
diuision.



Handling of any single question, the preceptes and rules given before in the common woordes, in the mooste generall woordes, in the definition and diuision doos verite good seruice, and helpe towardes the ordering of every pluthe matter. The wholle nature of such questions are thoroughly leernyd by dantz

The arte of Logike.

17

of this order. Every single question is eight waies examined, first to aske whither the thing be dy no, as thus. Is there any one man that maie be called wiser? Is ther any lawe? Is there any freendshippon yearch? This question is often proved, either by experiance, or els by authopstie of the wise. Therefore in questioning what the thyng is, we must declare the veris nature, as if I shall speake of freendship, I will first bee at a point of what freendship I must speake. For freendship is of two sortes. The one is true and perfit freendship, whiche commeth from the harte for vertues sake, and is onely emong good men: the other is feignes fauour, when one doth brachte a faire face outwardly, and seebeth inwardly a malicious stonache. And this is the common freendship, whereof the wicked onely are partakers. The second question is, to aske what a thyng is. And this commeth from the definition whiche is of two sortes, either of the substance of any thing, or els of the name. Of the name as thus. A Realme is that Countrie whiche is ruled by a kyng. Of the substance thus. A realme is a gathering of people together, beynge able to live and withstande other, for preseruation of them selfes abyding seuerall. The lawe is an ordinance whiche commaundeth thynges in order to bee doen, and forbiddeth the contrary. The third question is when the partes and every severall kinde is considered, and for this question the diuision and partition dooe muche good. As the lawe of the Gospell, and the politicall lawe. The fowrth question is, to aske what are the causes, and especially what is the efficiente cause, and what is the small cause, or the ende of any thyng. The efficiente cause of all good lawes is, God and his minister. The small cause or the ende is, to live uprightly in the feare of God, and to walke all the daies of our life, in the obseruation of his holie will. The fift question is, when the effecte, the office, or proper worckyng is examined. As the effecte of the Lawe is, to conserue the state of manne, to contynue peace uniuersally, to encrease wealthie, and to make loue betwixt all. The sixte question is, when thinges be asked that happen after, or the whiche haue greate affinitie or likelihooe together. As if lawes bee kepte and followed, we see our chilidrens chilidren ware to wealthie. We see

What whi-
ther it bee or
no.

square and tri-
angular

What a
thing is, and
how it may
be called.

How many-
fold h' thing
is diuided.

What bee
the causes.

What are
the effectes
or proper
worckyng.

F.J.

muchē

The arte of Logike.

What appelle
therewpon.
What are
disagreeyng.

What exam-
ples.

much the neighbourhoode, and good will to helpe the needie, and so forthe. The seuenmb is, to aske, what are disagreeyng. And from the Lawe dissenteth rebellion, stubbornesse, pride, wilthother. The eight question is to byzynge in witness, and to shew by whose authoritie the Lawe taketh place. The Scripture teacheth, that God gave the Lawe to Moses, and Paule with Peter also and Christe hym self commandement every manne, to obeye the higher power in all thynges, that are not directly repugnaunte from the will of God. Thus the question is eight maies examined, and the maner taught thereby to frayne it in due order, so that he whiche kepereth well this trade, can not faille in any cause that he taketh in hande. And because they maje the rather bee remembred; I will let them altogether.

1. Whether it be y^e or no.
2. What it is.
3. What the partes are.
4. What the cauds are.
5. What are the effectes & proper working.
6. What are next adioynynge, what art like, what happen therew^r.
7. What doe disagree, or what contrarie.
8. What example there is, or authoritie to monste.

No this lesson ought diligently to bee learned of all, that evermore they begin from the generall, and come to every severall parte. As in declarynge what vertue is, first to tell the Nature of it generally, and after to handle every vertue by it self. And this order bothe *Tullie* hath followed in his booke *De Officiis*, and also *Aristotele* in his *Ethica* hath doyn the like, to the greate admiration of all those that he learned.

Order to bee
obserued.



Of a Proposition.
Unt the verie order of Nature requireth, that first of all we should speake of severall wondes, and as a man would sois, trache one his letters, and shew hym the maner of spedynge before wee teache hym to reade; and afterward ioyne sentences together,

and

and frame Propositions by knittynge severall woordes in order: for it is the vertle office of the minde, firste to knowe, and then to knitte, neither can any childe vicer a sentence, before he learne to speake a wooyde. Againe, when Nature hath taughe severall woordes, then the minde wrynteth diuided, and afterward giveth a iudgement whether they be well or no. For a man were little better then a brute beaste, if he could but vniely apprehende severall woordes, hauyng no gyfe or aptnesse to joyne them in order, and so judge how thynges are ioyned together. But seyng God hath kindled his lighte in mannes, that he can bothe ioyne and iudge, we will now speake of the knittynge together, and ioyning of woordes in a Proposition.

What a Proposition is.

A proposition is, a perfecte sentence spoken by the Indicative mode, signifying either a true thyng, or a false, without all ambiguitie or doubtfulnesse, as thus. Every man is a lyer.

There be twoo partes in a Proposition, the one is called *Subiectum*, that is to say, that whereof some what is spoken; the other is *Predicatum*, commonly called *Predication*, that is to say, that whiche is spoken of any thyng, as in the aboue rehearsed Proposition. Every man is a lyer. Man is that whereof this saying to be a lyer is spoken, and this same saying to be a lyer is that whiche is spoken of man.

Definition
of a Proposition
according to
the quantitie
and number
of words

Definition
of a Proposition
according to
the quantitie
and number
of words

Twoo parts
in a propo-
sition.

Definition
of a propo-
sition

Definition
of a propo-
sition
twoo wares
diuided ac-
cording to
the substance

Every Proposition is twoo wares diuided, either it is a single sentence standing of one perfecte sentence: as, Justice is vertue: or els it is a double sentence hauyng two Propositions in it, as thus. If Justice be a vertue, it is a good thing, praise worthy. That Proposition is called false, the whiche either Naturall reason poureth either to bee plainly false, or the crueltie of man declareth to bee vertue, as thus: I thone doeth well. The soule of man is mortall. Excellence lies neare about the last scripture affirmeth the soule to be immortal: and Nature teacheth us, that no soule hath the sense of feeling.

The second division of a Proposition,
according to the quantitie
and number
of words.

Againe

The arte of Logike.

A proposition
divideth
according to
the qualitie.



Gaine. Propositions doe either affirmie or denyng, as this Proposition: Pleasure is a good thyng, doereth affirmie that pleasure is good. Againe, Pleasure is not a good thing, doereth denyng that pleasure is good. That proposition doereth affirmie, when any thyng is reported to bee in any thyng. That Proposition doereth denyng, when any thyng is denied to be in any thyng.

The third division of a Proposition according to the quantitie.

A proposition
divideth
according to
the quantitie.



Thirdlie, all Propositions are either generall, particular, indefinite, or singular. Those Propositions are called generall or uniuersall, the whiche haue a generall signe layned to the first part of the proposition, as thus: Every covetous man is poore. No man bothe loueth god and is wile, no not one. No man is euermore happy. Generall signes are these: *Omnis*, *Nullus*, *Qualiter*, *Nemo*, *Cuius* bodie, *No* bodie, All the world, *Non* one in all the world. Particular Propositions are these, where a particular signe is aded to the sommer part of the proposition whiche doereth not conteine all, but parte, or a fewe. As thus: Some men feare god, Some men are to mythe desirous of glorie. The particular signes be these: *Quidam*, *Aliquis*, *Plerique*, *Plexunque*, A certain man, Some bodie, All men for the mostpart, Oftentimes.

General
signes.
Particular
Propositions

Particular
signes.

Indefiniti
on.

The Propositions are called indefinite (that is to say, vncertaine) where the sommer parte is the Proposition, is a generall woord without a signe, as thus: The soule is immortall. Man-hode is a vertue. Young men are riotous. Old men are covetous. And note this diligentlie, that those Indefinite Propositions (whose laste reþearled parte is necessarie, and is soþpened of the former parte, that it doereth alwaie agree to the same, and to the whole nature of the same) doe impon aliusceter as a generall proposition, as in the above reþearled proposition. The soule is immortall. This woord (to bee immortall) whiche is spoken of the soule, agreeth not to one man, or to certayne, but to every man living. When the accidentes are spoken of the former part, it imponeth as muche as a particular proposition doereth. As *Homo hor
mijni*.

mini prestas, ingenio, virtute doctrina. (Man is better one then an other in witte, learnyng, and vertue) is no moxe to saie, then *Quidam homo homini prestas.* Some one man is better then an other. A singular Proposition is, when a proper name of a man is contained in a proposition, and is the former parte of the same, as *Cicerio* is an *Diatm.* *Alexander* is a warriour.

The use of a Proposition.

Men men by occasion of talke fall at variance, and can not agree vpon the matter, being bothe earnest to knowe the truche, it is good to bryng the whole matter to some issue, and there restyng vpon a point, to debate that parte onely before thei goe any further, the whiche is called of the *Logicians* a Proposition, of the *Rhetoricians* the stace of the cause, whiche is alsmuche to saie as the poynt wherevpon thei shall stande, or resle to trie their matter. Now because every Proposition is thre waies diuided, according to the substantie, the qualitie, and also the quantitie, good reason it were to trie every cause by these three partes also.

By the first we knowe, whether it bee a single proposition, or a double.

By the seconde wee perceiue, whether it doe affirme or deny.

And by the third also we see, how largely it doeth extende, the whiche three poyntes are right needfull to be marked.

The repugnancie of Propositions.

Repugnancie is, the diuerlite of twoo propositions, whiche haue bothe one *Subiectum* (called the former parte) and one *attributum*, whiche is the reharsed partie, and in sense spoken of the former.

There bee fower in number, called in Latine: *Contraria, Subcontraria, Contradicторia, Subalterne.*

General contrary Propositions are those, wherof the one doeth generally affirme, and the other doeth generally deny. As thus: *Omnis homines gloria ducuntur.* All men are moued with glorie, *Nulli homines gloria ducuntur.* No manne are moued with glorie.

Particular contraries are twoo particulars, wherof the one

f. iij.

doeth

*thing most
necessarie.*

*The repu-
gnance of
propositiō.*

The arte of Logike.

poeth deny, *Aliqui homines gloria ducuntur*: Some menne are moued with glorie. *Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur*: Some men are not moued with glorie.

Contradiccione Propositions, are when the one is uniuersall affirmative, and the other particular negative, or els when the one is uniuersall negative, and the other particulaſt affirmative, as thus: *Omnis homines gloria ducuntur*: All menne are moued with glorie. *Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur*: Some men are not moued with glorie, and likewise backward.

Subalterna, are those whiche be either uniuersall affirmative, and particular affirmative, or els uniuersall negative, and particular negative.

¶ The nature of a proposition three waies diuided.

Repositio Categorica (other wise called a single Proposition) is diuided into true and false Propositions.

They are true propositions whiche agree to the matter, and are either necessarie, or els such as may bee either true or false, called in Latine *fortissime*, or *contingentes*.

Necessarie Propositions are alwaies true, and knowne to be either by Nature, or els by experiance.

Of those that necessarily be knit together are these. The proper name, the knide, the generall woorde, the difference, the propertie, the definition, the causes, the proper woork of caules, and some accidentes that euer tary. As thus: *Cicero est homo*: Cicero is a man. *Homo est animal ratione praeditum, spiritu ad risum*: A manne is a living creature endured with reason, apte to laugh. *Dies est necessario, quoniam Sol exortus est*: It must needs be day, because the Sunne is up. *Ignis calidus est*: Fire is hotte.

Those Propositions are changeable whiche may bee true, or chaunce to be so, as: Fewe Preachers are ambitious. Fewe kynges heate the truthe. And when soever the accident is spoken of that whiche conteineth him, every ſuiche Proposition is called changeable, or that whiche may bee true, as: Water is made hotte; here we ſee that it chaunceth to water (contrarie to her na-
ture) to bee warme, and therefore it is called changeable, as the
whiche maye chaunge, or be chaunged.

¶ The

*The Table of repugnaunt
Propositions.*

All men are moued with glorie.	General contrary.	No manne is moued with glorie.
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General and Particular
affirmative.

Some men are moued with glorie.	Particular contrarie.	Some menne are not moued with glorie.
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HE we must bee diligent, that in all suche repugnancie of Propositions, there bee no doubtfulnesse in any woyde, and that alwayes there be one maner of woodes that goe before, and also one maner of woodes that ende the sentence plainly, and without double understandyng. For if I saie thus: Manne doeth hym. Manne doeth not hym. Herein is no repugnancie; for the man of God, whose synnes are redeemed through Christes deach, by the vertue of his faiche, the same manne doeth not hym, accordyng to saint Ithon. He that is of God synneth not: but that manne whiche followeth the fleshe, and hath given ouer hymself to the luste of this worlde, doeth hym deadly. Therefore

the

No doubtfullnesse in
the speche.

The arte of Logike.

the part must not alter the nature of either proposition, the tyme also must be all one, the maner of doing of one sort, and the place likewise must be like.

¶ Therfore.

His diuersitie of propositions is verie necessarie to diſcern the truthe from that whiche is false, for when we ioyne twoo Propositions that are diſſonante, wee shall easily trie the Chaffe from the Coyne, the whiche when we haue doen, we maie the better ſtiche to the truthe with full affeſſe, the contrary beyng once diſclosed and reiecteſſe.

¶ De conuersione, or the turninge of Propositions.

Conuersion.

Plaine conuersion.



Conuersion is the chaungyng, or alertyng of wordes in a Proposition, when the former part (where of any thing is rehearſed) & the hinder part (whiche is rehearſed of the former) are chaunged, the one in to the others place. There be three maner of Conuersions, *Simplex, per Accidens, per Contrapoſitionem.*

A plaine Conuersion is, when bothe the Propositions are like in all thynges, bothe in signes and also in affirmation, or negation, ſauyng onely that of the laſte rehearſed, is made the former parte of the ſentence, and the former parte is made the laſte rehearſed parte.

Butche Conuersion is made, when bothe the Propositions be either vniuersall negatiues, or els particular affirmatiues, for the firſte thus. *Nemo timens Deum, contaminat se adulterio.* Ergo *nemo contaminans se adulterio timet Deum.* No manne that feareth God defleſh hymſelf with adulterie, therefore no man that defleſh hymſelf with adulterie feareth God. Here we maie ſe the conuersion plaine, as the rule aboue rehearſed teacheth. For the particular affirmatiues, this ſhalbe an example. *Quidam Autici boni sunt.* Ergo, *quidam boni, Autici sunt.* Some Courtiers are honest. Ergo, some honest men are Courtiers.

Conuersion by accident.

A Conuersion by accidente is, when the former parte of the ſentence is made the laſte rehearſed parte: and the laſte rehearſed parte made for the former parte, bothe the Propositions affeſſyng

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myng, or denying, sauyng onely that the signes be chaungyn, that
is the one w^r y^r p^r vniuersall, the seconde being particular. First, a
conuerstion made of two affinatvies, thus. *Omnis virtus est
laudanda. Ergo laudandum aliquid, est virtus.* All vertue is to be
praised, therefore, some thyng to bee praised, is a vertue. A con-
uerstion of twoo negatives, thus. *Nemo malus felix felix igitur
(sapiens cum sit) non est manus.* No enny man is absolutelye hap-
py. Thererfore, an absolute happy man (savyng he is Godly wise)
can not bee enny. This kynge of conuerstion, is very profitable for
hem that will disspye. For, where as wee reason often from the
generall wooyde, to the kynde, we must needes use this maner of
conuerstion, as thus. If all exerccise be good, then this kynge of ex-
erccise is good, and so of other.

A contradiction by contrapositionis, when the former parte of the sentence, is turned into the last rehearsed parte, and the lasse rehearsed parte, turned into the former part of the sentence, both the propositions being universall, and affirmative, sauyng that in the seconde Proposition, there bee certaine Negatives enterlaced. As thus.

સુધીમાં
અનુભૂતિ

Omnis homo autem aliquid videre, autem scire.

{Ergo quod non amet aliquid videre, audire, scire, non est homo,

Every man desireth to see , to heare , or to knowe some what: therefore, what soever he is that desireth not to see , to heare , or to knowe somewhat, the same body is not a man: this conuertion is profitable , and serueth well to rea son by : thus rea soneth I haue by his conuertion against the Jewes in the 8. Cap. of Thom. *Quis ex Deo est, verba Dei audiat: vos igitur eum non audiatis, ex deo non eritis.* He that is of God, heareth the worde of God. You therefore, because you heare not, bee not of God. This conuertion confuteth the Jewes plainly , and moueth them that they are not of God. If we will reason from the greater of moorde to the kinde of moorde, the greater to the leste , we haue by this conuertion, verie well, *Omnis homo est animal.* Ergo quodcumque non est animal, id nec Homo est. Every man is a living creature, therefore, whatsover thyng is not a living creature , that same is not a man. Take away the generall woorke , and there can no kinde remaine aray.

Seasoning by the con- vection.

ପ୍ରକାଶନ କମିଶନ

Groupes

The Arte of Logike.

From the d-
niversal su-
perior, to
the inferiour

From the superiour uniuersall to the inferiour, thus wee make reason. All pure golde lokeþ yeallowe, therefore, whatsoeuer lo-
keth not yeallowe, that same is not pure golde. This conversion serueth well to make an argument in the second figure, as I will declare hereafter, the whiche ought diligently to be obserued.

A lesson to be obserued.

 If singulare woordes, whiche are proper names of thin-
ges, or els determinately vobe betoken some one certaine
thyng, no conversion is mad, because no argumente is
made of particulaire woordes or sentences, whereunto to whole
nature of conversion serueth onely, therfore. If one shold say unto me, yonder is a Horsemill, the conversion were amisse to say,
yonder is a Millehouse, for what idiotte knoweth not, except he had
a horse hedde, that here the sence is altered, and that it is twoo
thynges to say, a Horsemill, and a Millehouse. So that of singu-
lar Propositions, declarynge the nature of one severall thyng, no
true conversion can be made, bothe in woyde and sentence.

The vse.

 Test, conversion profere, for the evident eyeng of
Propositions, as if I shold say: there is nothing profit-
able, but the same is honeste, and how then canst thou
make a diuorsement, betwixt honestie and profit, as though the
one could bee without the other. Againe, it serueth well to make
thoake argumentes, as thus. *No Christian is an usurer.* Ergo *na*
Usurer is a Christian. Some Bisshoppes are good: Ergo some
good men are Bisshops. Thirdly, it sheweth how to reduce the se-
conde and the thirde figure, byng bothe unperfect, to the Modes
of the first figure, as I will shewe more at large hereafter.

Propositio Hypothetica. That is to say, a double Proposition.

A double pro-
position.

 *Propositio Hypothetica.* is a sentence which twon single Pro-
positions, knitte togrether alwaies with some communion,
As this. *Si Injustia est pirus, est landabilis.* If Justice bee
a vertue, it is praise worthie.

There be three maner of double Propositions.

The partes
of a double
proposition.

A Double Proposition standeth of three partes, whereof the
one is a conditionall Proposition, affirmynge a thyng to be ei-
ther

ther true, or false, with an*if* has shew*if* faith bee upon the earth some men feare God. If the wylde continueth still as it doeth, wallowyng in moche abominable sinne, God will at length punishe the offendours very sore. All whiche Propositions are euer true, when the partes are so knitte together, that the latter parte must never folowe upon that, whiche goeth before. The seconde parte is, when a Proposition hath a disjunctiue, whiche knitteth the Sentence vp, as thus. Either it is Day, or els it is Night. Such Propositions are true, when both the partes are true, and the same also are false, when either of the partes are false. The thirde parte is, when coniunctions that doe denie, are signified together, as thus. Battaille beyng not lawfull, is not to be desired. By all whiche double Propositions, we maie reason sommly in diuers causes, as thus by the firste. If faische be upon the earth, some men feare God, but no man leareth God. Therefore, faische is not upon the earth. Againe, if we feare God, we are in charite, but wee are not in charite, therefore, wee feare not God. By the seconde thus. Courteous men either be the seruautes of God or els of the Devill, but thei are not the seruautes of God: Ergo they are seruautes of the Devill. By the thirde thus. Battaille beyng not Lawfull, is not to bee vied, but Battaille is Lawfull, therefore, it is to be vied.

*¶ The use of all those things, that have
been spoken of a Proposition.*

HWill vse this Proposition for an example. All truthe purchaseth hatred. It is a single Proposition, by substance, and affirmative by qualitie, and an universall by quantitie: the contradictione is, no truthe purchaseth hatred, the which is false. Therefore, this is true, some truthe purchaseth hatred: the conversion by the accident. The truthe purchaseth hatred. Ergo some thyng that purchaseth hatred is truthe.

¶ Of making an argument.

Hauere rehearsed heretofore, all singel wordes what the nature is of everyone, and in what generall woordes, they maie be found. I haue set forth the nature of a definition, and a division. I haue taught also, to signe these severall wordes into

G. is.

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into a proposition, and make the same a perfecte sentence. Nowe
thereby Gods grace, I will shewe the matter, how to soigne sen-
tences together, and to proue a matter, by knytyng propositions
handsomely in an argument, or by placynge the propositions ac-
cordingly. Therefore, there ought good diligence to bee vse in
this behalfe, soasmuche, as it is the clarkest part of all, and
the hardest peice of woork, to framme an argumēnt aptly, and to
knowe the verie reason, why thynges are so knitte together.

What an argument is.

Margumentē is a wāie to proue, how one thyng is ga-
thered by an other: And to shewe that thyng, whiche is
doubtfull by that, whiche is not doubtfull.

GTo finde out the reason that shall proue (in Latine)
called Medium in (Englishe) the double repeate.

**The finding
out of an ar-
gument,**

After this sorte wee maie finde the reason, whereby to
proue our matter: when wee haue a question or sen-
tence, that we shoulde either constiue, or confute, aske
the cause of our self, why, and wherefore that thyng,
whiche is spoken of the former parte in any sentence, shoulde be so
applied to the same. And to make the matter more plaine, I will
make this question. *Eſt ne auarus pauper?* Is a courteous manne
poore, or not? I maie thus reason with me self, why shoulde a co-
uetous manne be called poore? What affinitie is betwix them
two? Marie in this pointe that bothe agree, that like as the poore
man, euer lacketh and desirereth to haue, so the covetous man euer
lacketh, wantyng the use of that whiche he hath, and desirereth still
to haue, being never content, though God giue him enough. Then
sayng it is even so, that bothe doe lacke, and bothe doe desire to
haue, this same reason is the onely cause whereby mine argument
is made perfect. For, thus I maie framme myne argument aptly.

**The fra-
ming of an
argument.**

Uthofeuer lacketh, and desirereth euermore to haue, that
same manne is poore.

Acourteous man lacketh, and desirereth euermore to haue;

Therefore a covetous man is poore.

Thus this argumentē is more perfecte, by asking this que-
stion,

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stion, wherefore, a covetous manne is poore. As hereafter I will shewe it more at large, by another example, to make the thyng mor plaine.

¶ There be fower kindes of arguments.

A perfecte argument. A true argument, answere
granted, and *An imperfekte argument.* An argymente not graunte
d to be true.

An induction. Inductione, or inducione, or syncretis
atione.

An example.

A Perfecte argument, is an absolute gathering, or rea-
sonyng, whereby the last sentence whiche we would
proove, is confirmed by other propositions and senten-
ces more universall, and better knownen then the thyng
whiche is proved, conteyning in themselves the reason, why the
last sentence is true, and why they are applied to the same. This
kinde of argument, is fren from the generall woorde to the kinde, as
thus. If I will prove theste worthie of punishment. I must firste
ake the queſtione, why? And that thing that remmeth to my minde
unge ueruerall then theſte, comprehending the offence of theſte
in it, māke ſervē to make the argumente. As I māke thus reason,
that theſte ſhould be punished, because it is a vice, or a mischierfous
deede, and then thus I knitte vp mine argument.

Every vice, or mischiervous deede, is to be punished.

Theſte is a vice, or a mischiervous deede.

Therefore, theſte is to be punished.

Here we ſee the propositiōn, or ſentences wheretoſ
the firſt is caſted *Maior*, that is to ſaie, the Propo-
ſition at large. The ſecond is caſted *Minor*, that is
to ſaie, the little, or generall propositiōn. The thirde
is caſted *Conſuſio*, that is the lapping up of all. And
here we muſt note, that like as there be thre propositiōns, even
ſo there be thre diuers endings, caſted in Latine *Termini*. Dicte
which, the one is caſted the terme at large, in the firſt propositiōn
only, and afterwarde is referred, to the former parte of the con-
clusion, caſted *Subiectum conciſum*. The ſeconde terme is caſted
in the little, or ſeuerall whiche is in the ſeconde Propositiōn, and
this

G.ij.

Three terms.
The firſt.
The ſeconde
G.ij.

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The thirde. this is the woyde whereof the question is made ; and is spoken of in the conclusion. The thirde is called the double repeat ; which e is twise rehearsed before the conclusion, and therefore it is twise rehearsed, because it is the knyting together of the twoo Propositions, and is the cause also, why the former part of the Proposition whereof a thing is saied, and the last rehearsed parte, beynge attributed to the parte goyng before , are soigned together in the conclusion. As to make the thing plaine by the former argument, I will move this conclusion. Theft is to be punished. Theft is cal-

Examples of the 3-forms.

the 3. termes. I will proue this conclusion. Theft is to be punished. Theft is cal-
led the former parte whereof this word (punished) is spoken, and this word (punished) therefore is called the last rehearsed part, because it is spoken of theft, whiche went before. Now, to make
myne argumente, and to proue this sentence true, muste seeke a
word, whiche is more generall then that, whiche is prosted. And
that wo:de that cometh to my minde, and is perteyning to the
cause, being more uniuersall: (for every thyng that is poued is
poued by a thyng more knownen) that same word, or reason, is
called the double repeate, whose propertie is twice to be rehearsed
in an argument, and that is the first and seconde Proposition, ne-
uer entring into the conclusion. As thus. Every vice is to be pu-
nished, vice is the double repeate, whiche must be rehearsed in the
seconde Proposition, for I saide before, it must twice be rehearsed,
because it maste be evident, that the former part of the conclusion,
is in very deede contained under the latter parte of the first
Proposition. And then the argument is made as followeth.

Double repeat.

Every vice is to be punished.

These are nice.

Ergo therefore is to be punished.

^{131 22}
Termitt
large, recking
several.



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24

sion followeth, by reason that these two wordes, vice and theste,
agree in a thidre altogether, and whatsoeuer is saide of the one, is
saide of the other, and nothing can bee comprehended under the
generalisbut all the kindes haue the same concerned in them, which
in this Proposition are referred to the generall.) All vice is to be
punished) unto vice is referred this woode punished. Therefore,
whatsoeuer is comprehended under this woode vice, as theste,
adulterie, wrong dealyng, murder: this words punished, is rehear-
sed of them all: because it agreeith to the generall, and is reheat-
ed of the same. As I mate reason thus.

All vice is to be punished.

Therefore { Adulterie: { Wrong dealyng: { Are to be punished.
Murder.

DR if that which is generall, is to be punished, then Rule.
the kindes and sortes in thinges, are also to be pun-
ished, accordaning to this saying. Whatsoever is truly
and altogether rehearsed of the generall, that same is
also rehearsed of the kunde, whiche is concluded into the generall,

*g Sene rulas especially to be observed, for the making
of a perfecte argument, called Sillogismus.*

It is, that in every perfect argumēt called Sillogis-
mus, the first Proposition be uniuersall, I call that
Proposition uniuersall, when there is *Omnis*, that
is to saie, al:or els *Natura*, that is to saie, none in the
Propositio. As for example. Every vice is to be pu-
nished, this Proposition is uniuersall, because it hath *Omnis* in it,
whiche signifieth all, or every one. Likewise I call it particulaire
when the Proposition hath *Quidam*, or *Aliquis*, that is to saie, certain
or some body *Quidam* and *aliquis*, haue some countiers be hopeness.
et non sunt, vix sunt. *g The secunderule.*

Rules for
an argumēt.

Some of the Propositions be particulaire, or negative, the
conclusion is particulaire, or negative. I call that Propo-
sition negative. When *Nulus*, or *Nemo*, that is to saie,
none, or no body is in the Proposition As *Nulus Christus*
filius est generosus. *Exo. Christian is an Elmer.*

The

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Silberhardius. Is a perfecte argument, where the Propositions, can be neither Negatives, nor Particulars together; for even as two Negatives, there followeth no thyng, so of two Particulars, there followeth nothing. Therefore when any such argument is made, we may baldly say, it is not lawfull, because it is in no shode, as it is very plaine to see, in making of this argument follows thyng.

Some Courtiers are riche.

¶ Wonder fellowe will be a Courtier,

{Therefore he shall be rich.

(Some Bishops are good) but

Dithus Suche a one ias Bishop and I will go to him.

Therefore he is a good Bishop.

His argument is not lawfull, first, because of my rule
I am taught that of pure particulars, nothing doeth
followe as *Quidam* (some) is a particular. Ego I is a
singulare woord, or signifying aliusceter as a proper
name, and againe it is no figure, as hereafter I shall shewe.
Thirdly it is meete that the seconde Proposition should be inclu-
ded in the first parte of the seconde Proposition, whereof some-
what is rehearsed, or els it is no good argument in the first figure.

Somie knowes he righteous

Near Jaipur.

Therefore Nero is righteous.

This is no good argument, because that *Nero*, whiche is the first word in the seconde Proposition, of whom some thing is rehersen, is not conuented under the first part of the first Proposition, whiche is some kynges, for his former part, some kynges doth not likaks of *Nero*, nor comprehend such as he is, but honest and Godly disposen gauentours. And yet in weightie causes such arguments haue been vido, even of those that would haue dwawen us from the obedience of Gods holy wondre, and perswayed some that we were free from the obseruacio of any lawe by us, excepted in *Habacuc* Chap. 2,

The lawe of Noyses is abolished from the Gentiles.
 The lawe of the tenne Commaundementes, is the
 lawe of Noyses.
Ergo the lawe of the tenne Commaundementes, is
 abolished from the Gentiles.

Whereas this firste Proposition, comprehendeth not all the Lawes of Noyses, but the Lawes Ceremoniall whiche were as figures ordred, in declaration of Christes comming, and therefore the scripture saith vntill Iohn, the Lawe was and the Prophete, signifying that Iohns tyme he was come, in whiche the old Ceremoniall Lawes were fully veresyd and fulfilled, whiche at his commynge began to cease, seyng in hymself was the fulfyllyng of the Lawe, not that we shold not obserue the Mothal Lawes of the heauenly preceptes commaunded by God, for Christ hymself repecheth the obseruation of them, yea, he bindeth vs to a moxe straigthenesse, that not onely we shold doe no euill, but that also we shold consent to none euill: therfore this first Proposition is not generall, but particular, and so though the Ceremoniall Lawe bee gone, yet the Mothal Lawe cariech stille, according to Christes holie will.

Meditus seruimus, called the double repeate (whiche is a word rehearsed in bothe Propositions) must not enter into the conclusion, because the other twoo parties called *Termini*, bee proued by this, and brought to the conclusion, by reason they agree with this third, the whiche twoo otherwise could not enter into the conclusion, if this double repeate were not mentioned in bothe Propositions, and keepe out it self from the conclusion, as is evidently to see by an argumentation.

Ceremoniall
lawes abro-
gated.

Mothal La-
wes must be
obserued of
all.

The double
repeate.

In a perfecte argументe called *Syllogismus*, there ought not to bee no woordes in the conclusion then was before rehearsed. For no thynges to be in the conclusion, this example shall serue, whiche *Anthonius* maketh in the first booke of *Tullie de oratore*. *Hinc impossumus* thynges are not to be taught. *In philosophic are impossumus* thynges. *Ergo* philosophie is not to be taught.

H.J. This

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This argument is to bee denied, because there is more in the conclusion, then was rehearsed in the twoo first propositions. For this shoulde haue beene the conclusion. Some unprofitable thynges whiche be in Philosophie are not to bee learned, not that Philosophie it selfe is to bee rejected, for els wee might make this argument likewise.

Dronkenesse is not to be allowed.

In drynkyng is oftentymes dronkenesse.

Therefore drynkyng at any time is not to be allowed. Therefore we must straine our argument so, that nothyng be more in h̄ conclusion, then was in the other propositions: as thus.

Dronkenesse is not to be allowed.

In some drynkyng is often tymes dronkenesse.

Therefore some drynkyng is not to be allowed.

The sixt Rule.

There ought not to be mo termes in an argumentation then three, for otherwise there is no good argument.

Every politall Magistrate ought to keepe vnder disobedient persones, with corporall punishment.

Peter is an Apostle.

Therefore Peter shoulde punishe the disobedient.

In this argument is no ioyning together of the first proposition, and the secondie: for the politall Magistrate and an Apostle, are twoo maner of thynges. Therefore it hangech together as Germaines lippes, as we use to saye.

The seueniȝt Rule.

The double repreate whiche is twise mentioned in bothe propositions, ought to be no doubtfull woerde, for doubtfull woordes make fower leuerall termes whiche shold not be, as thus.

No bondman is free.

All that believe the Gospell truly are free.

Ergo none that believe the Gospell truly are bondmen.

This argument is false, and must bee denied at the firſte, because there be fower termes: for in the firſt proposition, freedome is taken for fritche aliberte, as men due vse in commonweales, to make seruantes and apprentices free. In the ſeconde proposition,

But three
termes in an
argument.

Whiſt h̄ dou-
ble repreate
ought to bee
no doubtfull
woerde.

In nobis
nes reason.

Freedome
twoo waies
taken.

dition, freedome is taken for deliviring the soul from the bondage of God, from sygne, and from death everlasting, as we rede in the Scripture. Whom the same hath made free, thei are free in verie deede; not that his freedome taketh awaie all orders in the commonweale, that no man shall haue an apprentice, or a bondman. For although the fader in heauen through Iesu Christe, hath made them free from sygne, and that once for euer, yet are thei still apprentices, and bondes by a politicaall Lawe, therfore we maste see, that there be four parties or termes, considerynge he speakeþ of one libertie in the first Proposition, and of another in the second, so that the argument is not good. A like argument there is, whiche one maste to Diogenes.

*Sophis-
tes reason
to Diogenes*

¶ That which I am, thou art not.

I am a man.

Ergo thou art none.

Here is an ambiguitie in this Clerke (I am) for if wee under-
stande in the firſte Proposition, that this woode (I am) is not
considered according to the generall substance, but according
to the qualite, or rather proper being, ſpeaking of the diuerſitie
of men, as when I liue, I haue myne owne bodie, my ſleſhe, and
myne owne boynes, thou haſte thyne owne proper unto thee, and
not that I am thou; nor yet thou art I. Then it is well ſaid, that
whiche I am, thou art not. But if I underſtande this woode (I am)
in the firſte Proposition, as a ſubſtance uniuersall, or rather
generall copulatiue to bee reheatred of the inferiours, then it is
good. For as I maie ſaie, Diogenes is a manke, Aristotle is a
man, ſo I maie ſaie of all men, and therefore thowch this Clerke
(I am), belong not to all, for their ſeverall propertie, or the
mannes being, yet it agreeþ to the generall manke, whiche is to
be called a man. Whereby we maste ſee heretofore lower parties,
or termes, and therfore the argument maste be denied at the firſt
giving this reaſon that I haue the wed before.

Notwithſtandingy, Diogenes auſterely this Sophis other
wile verie ſeruic, and adiument in the firſt. For wheras he
propouned the ſame unto him, and thoughte thereby to haue gauen

V.i. hym

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Diogenes
sun were.

hym a sole, *Diogenes* streight upon rehearsall of this said argument, tolde hym thus: Thyne argument is true enough fellowe, if I shold rehearse it vnto thee my self, and needed then no solution at all, for thy maners bacyng naught, makes thee to bee no manne.

Settlyng or placynge of an argument.

Settlyng or
placing of an
argument.



Now that I haue sette forthe the preceptes, whiche are to bee obserued in an argument, I will declare how to settle and place an argumemente, that any bothe maie give a reason, where every wodde is sette in an argument, in this or that place. Firsle therefore we must consider there be three figures, whiche serue for the makynge of an argument, and modes also whiche teache the odering of Propositions, whether thei shalbe uniuersall, particular, affirmative, or negatiue: I will define them bothe after this sort.

A figure.

The first
figure.

A figure is a lawfull placynge of the double repeate, in the two Propositions, and even as a double repeate is placed, so we maie iudge with ease in what figure the argumemente is. The figure is suthen an oder of Propositions in an argumemente, that the double repeate must be the former parte in the firsle Proposition, and the laste rehearsed parte in the seconde Proposition, wherevpon the conclusion doeth followe. And the reason that it must be so, is, because that whereas in this figure, the argumemente is euermore made from the generall, to the kinde uniuersallie (for the firsle Proposition euermore in these two figures, must be uniuersall, either affirmative, or negatiue) and by reason of the generall, there is somewhat rehearsed of the kinde: one of the Propositions must be so placed, that it maie evidently appearre, that this kinde is encluded in the generall. And therfore the generall is spoken in the seconde Proposition of the kinde.

A Mode is a lawfull placynge of Propositions, in their due qualitie or quantitie. I call that in the Proposition a qualitie, when it doeth affirme or deny. I call it a quantitie, when it is either uniuersall, or particular. Unto the firsle figure belongeth Modes, whiche maie be perceaved by these lower wordes.

Barbara.

Barbara.
Celarent.
Darij.
Ferio.

These fower wordes signifie nothyng, but seruyng for notes onely and markes, wherby euerie Proposition is knowne, either to be uniuersall or particular, affirmative, or negatiue; must not be forgotten if we will make an argument true. ly, in the firste figure for every argument that is made in this figure, is one of these fower Modes, or els it is no argument of the firste figure. If the double repeate bee the former parte in the firste Proposition, and the laste rehearsed parte in the seconde Proposition, it is in the firste figure, notwithstanding, except it be in Mode also, it is no argument. Therefore we must learne to place an argumētē in Mode also. And for the better knowledge of this thyng, note that in those Modes, there bee fower vowels to be considered and marked. That is to saie *A.E.I.O.* And the rather to helpe memorie, I haue framed a rule for these fower vowels, in these twoo versēs.

S.A. doeth affirme: *E.* doeth deny, whiche are bothe uniuersall.
I. doeth affirms, *O.* doeth deny, whiche we perticular call.

For where we se *A* in *Barbara*, thise, we must consider that these *A.A.A.* in this one mode, declare unto vs three uniuersall Propositions affirmative. *E.* declareth a Proposition negative uniuersall, as in *Celarent*: we see twise *E*, whereby wee are taught that the argument (if we make it in this Mode) must haue twoo uniuersall negatives, and one uniuersall affirmative, by reason of *A*, whiche is in the middess of *Celarent*. *I.* doeth signifie a particular affirmative. *O.* doeth signifie a particular negative, as in *Ferio*, the first must be a negative uniuersall, the seconde an affirmative particular. Againe the consonantes as firste Capital letters, placed in the beginnyng of every Mode. As *B.C.D.F.* and also the small consonant letters whiche are included, and be withyn the wordes in every Mode, bothe of the seconde and thirde figure, as *C.M.P.S.* every one of these haue their proper meamings.

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ges. As *B*. in any Mode of the seconde and third figure, declareth that the argument of that Mode, being not plaine for understandyng, or not true in sense, or perhaps, not apt to prove a presente cause, the same may be reduced to the Mode *Barbara* of the first figure, whiche shall make the argument appeare more plaine: *C*, sheweth the right pasche to *Calarent*: *D*, openeth the gate to *Deser*: *E*, maketh faire passage to *Foro*: *C*, that is not in the beginnyng of any the Modes of the seconde and third figure, but placed within the woordes, declareth that the contradictione of the conclusion, must be taken (if ye will reduce the argument to the firste figure) ioyning therewith, and usyng as a wyng graunted one of the Propositions with the conclusion, alterynge the other Hypothesoun that remayneth by contradiction also; and beside setting one of the twoo Propositions in the other place,

P, sheweth that the Hypothesoun must bee altered by conuer-

sion of the accident, *S*, tellich that the Hypothesoun must be chaunced by plaine conuercion.

What is a reduction.

What is a
reduction.



Reduction is a right framming of our arguemente, and (as a man would say) a newe probation by an other Mode and figure of that thyng, whiche was shewed before, bothe by the second and thirde figure: as thus. To make a thyng otherwise then it was before, to reduc it, or to dyng it to more plaine understanding in the shape and forme of the firste figure, is called reduction.

The division of a reduction.

The division
of a reduction.



Reduction is of twoo sortes. The one is a demonstration, which sheweth the argument more plainly, than before was touchid darkly, the other is a reduction to that whiche is impossible, commonly so termed, because in any suche alteration, the contradictione is shewed in the other argument, when any suche reduction is made from the seconde and third figure to the firste figure. And this rule is so exact true: That twoo contradictories can never bee bothe true. It be best callid a demonstratioun, or the wyng reduction.

Moste true.
Demonstra-
tive reduc-
tion.

reduction, is made by conversion of the Propositions, and by displacing the same, settynge one in an others stede, sauyng onely the conclusion is alwaies one, and kepereth his place still. The other crooked wate (called of the *Logiciens Reductio ad impossibile*) is a reduction to that whiche is impossible; when the contradictione of the Propositions is used, and brought to the firste figure. So that these twoo argumentes after the reduction is made, can never bee bothe true, considering the contradictione. As for example, in the Note Baroco, and the seconde figure.

Reduction to impossible.

{ Ba. All true christians refuse to gett goodes vngodly.
ro. Some Marchauntes refuse not to gett goodes vngodly.
co. Therefore some Marchauntes are no true christians.

Here if myne aduersarie shall saie, that the conclusion followeth not well, and that though the other bee true, yet the consequent is false, I maie forse hym by reduction to graunge it to bee true. And therefore taking the contradictione of the conclusion, and placing the same in the seconde Proposition, and alterynge the seconde Proposition by contradiction also, making it the conclusion: I shall forse hym to graunge my firste argument to be true. As for example, I will take the contradictione of the conclusion, whiche is: Every Marchaunte man is a true Christian, and likewise the contradictione of the seconde Proposition; puttynge the one in the others place, and thus I will reason: If my firste argument bee false, then this argument is true, because it is the contradiction of my firste.

{ All true Christians refuse to gett goodes vngodly.

{ All Marchauntes are true Christians.

{ Therefore all Marchauntes refuse to gette goodes vngodly.

Every one seeth that this argumente is false, beeynge the contradictione of the other: Ergo the firste reason is true. And this is the use of Reduction by a contradictione, violently to forse the graunge of our saying. For if this reason bee false, the other muste be true, but this is false: Ergo the other is true.

That

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That these thynges maie bee more evident to make an argumente, bothe in the figure and Mode, and so to reduce the same, and hyng it to the argumentes of the firste figure. I will firste give examples for every Mode of this firste figure, that one maie plainly see the whole matter, as though it were in a Glasse, remembryng alwaies, that these Modes serue for this figure, whiche figure is knowne (as I saide before) when the double repeate is the former parte of the first Proposition, and the latte rehearsed parte of the seconde Proposition. And whereas I saide before, that certayne argumentes were in no Mode, although thei were in the firste figure, and therefore not good, because thei were not in one Mode and figure, thes shalbe to understande, thei were not in one Mode, because the first Proposition must be uniuersall euer, or els it is not good. Now therefore here followe examples of the firste figure, and of the Modes thereof.

The firste figure.

The firste figure.

The firste example is a perfecte argument, being uniuersall, and also affirmatiue.

Bar. All honest thynges are to be embrased.
ba. All Christian Lawes made by a Christian Magistrate are honest.
Honest. Therefore all Christian Lawes made by a Christian Magistrate are to be embrased.

A perfecte argument uniuersall negatiue.

Co. No contener of the magistrate in a christiian.
Al. All Anabaptistes are contenners of the magistrate.
Con. Therefore no Anabaptist is a christiian.

A perfecte argument particular affirmatiue.

Da. Whatoeuer apprehendeth the fauour and grace of God, the same onely doeth justifie.
Apprehendeth the fauour and grace of God. Faith the onely apprehendeth the fauour and grace of God.
Ergo faith the onely justifie.

A perfecte argument particular negatiue.

Exortioner.

Fr. No extortioner is Godly.
Exortioner. *ri.* Some riche man is an extortioner.
or. Ergo some riche man is not Godly.

The firste figure helpeth moste of all, in teachyng or settynge
bythe thinges at large, whiche we would haue knownen. All artes
haue their generall preceptes, and therefore, the vse of them is
practised in this figure. The Philosopher saith. Every good thing
the more commonit is, the better it is. The Logician saith: all
thinges are made for some ende. Scripture sheweth, that every
manne is bounde to loue his neighbour as hymself. Every one of
these generall lessons serue well for this figure, and maie with
ease bee framed for prooef of our matter. Also if we mynde either
to confute or constreine any cause, it serueth verie well. Neither can
any cause be mentioned, but the same maie in this figure be fa-
ceted, considerynge every question hath here an apt frame, bee it ei-
ther universall, or particular, affirmative, or negative.

The seconde figure is, where the double repeate is the last re-
hearsed part in bothe Propositions, after this soe followyng: and there bee fower Modes belonging to the same figure, as it shall
appeare, whiche all thei haue these fower vowels in them, A.E.
I.O so that thei make the Proposition to be universall, or particu-
lar, affirmative, or negative, as it was before. Note that the con-
clusion is alwaies negative, sozasmuche as the firste and the se-
conde are alwaies repugnante, neither doe thei agree in the dou-
ble repeate called *Medius terminus*. And therfore the conclusion
is negative by contraposition, whereof I speake before, when I
intreated of the conversion, or tournyng of Propositions.

g. The seconde figure.

g. An argument universall negative reduced to the firste fi-
gure, by plaine conversion of the former Proposition.

Ce. No iuste man before God hath an unquiet,
Unquiet *sa.* and doublfull conscience.
conscience. *re.* All thei that truste to bee iustified by their
works, haue unquiet consciences.
re. Therefore none trusting to his woorkes,
is iuste before God.

The seconde
figure.

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G An argument uniuersall negatiue, reduced to the firste figure, making the seconde Proposition altered by plaine conversion to be the former and firste Proposition, and the firste Proposition to be the seconde: and the conclusion also to bee altered by plaine conversion.

Ca. The Christian righeteousnesse, is the purenesse of the mynde.
me. To weare a tiper, a coule, a shauen crowne
the mynde, is not the purenesse of the mynde.
fires. Therefore the outwarde attire is not the Christian righeteousnesse.

G A particular argument reduced to the first figure, altering onely the first Proposition by plain conversion.

Fe. No true Divine contemneth Philosophie.
Contemned Some English preachers contemne Phi-
losophie.
no, Ergo some English Preachers are not true
Divines.

G This argument is reduced to Barbara, onely taking the contradictione of the seconde Proposition, and the conclusion, and setting these two the one in others place.

Ba. All Christians refuse to get goods vngodly
To get good. **Ro.** Some Marchauntes refuse not to get good
des vngodly.
co. Therefore some Marchauntes are no chi-
ians.

G The use of the seconde figure.
In debatynge matters whiche stande in controuersey, we make
gette muche helpe by this seconde figure for ever more, when we
dissent from other in opinion, this figure helpeth muche for lap-
pyng vp of our argument. As if one shold say, All woorkes are
allowed before God that are doen of a good intent, I might an-
swere thus, no hypocriticall woorkes, no Proprietarye Massyng,
no meritorious prayng, althoþ thet be doen for a good intent,
are yet to bee allowed before GOD. And so I might recyle and
frame myne argument in this figure against the above rehearsed
sentence. The third figure is, where the double repeate is the for-
mer

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mer parte in bothe Propositions. And there be five Modes of the same figure. Note also that the conclusion must needs be particuler in this figure, where the former parte in bothe Propositions is the double repeate, for like as we reason in the firste figure fro the generall wodde to the knde, that is from the uniuersall to the particular, so in this figure we reason from the knde (whiche is leesse) to the generall wodde whiche is more uniuersall, but notwithstanding that the conclusion be particular, and therfore this knde of argument is verie good. For the Species or knde beynge once put, the generall must needes followe.

¶ The third figure.

¶ This argument is reduced to Darij, the seconde Proposition being altered by conversion of the accident.

Da- Every commonweale is Gods ordinance.
Sap- Every commonweale hath neede of lawes. *The third
Common
weale.* *and armour.* *figure.*

Si. Therefore sonie Lawes and Armour are
Gods ordinance.

¶ This argument is reduced to Ferio, the seconde Proposition being altered onely to conversion of accident.

Fe- No vertue shoulde be eschewed.

Virtue. *Sap-* All vertue hath her woe with her.

Si. Therefore sonie woe shoulde not be eschewed.

¶ This argument is reduced to Darij, the seconde Proposition nothing altered, but onely set in the first place, and the firste set in the second place being altered by plaine conversion, and the conclusion in like manner.

Da- Vertue onely forgiuenth synnes.

Percle. *Sap-* All mesche is purchased by fater.

Si. Therefore by fater onely forgiuenth is obteyned.

¶ This argument is reduced to Darij, the seconde Proposition altered by plaine conversion.

Da- All hypocrites colde will workes his holiness.

Hypocrites. *Sap-* Some hypocrites have been Bishoppes.

Si. Therefore some Bishoppes haue colde will workes his holiness.

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This argument followynge is reduced to Barbara, the conclusion first being altered by contradiction, and made the first Proposition, the second standeth as it doeth, and kepyng the owne place still: the Proposition at large, which was before the first, now altered and made the conclusion by contradiction.

*Bo. Some battaill is not to be eschued.
Battaill. car. Every battaill is full of muche miserie.
do. Ergo some miserie is not to be eschued.*

This argument followynge is reduced to Ferio, the seconde Proposition being altered onely by plaine conuersion.

*Fe. No malicious man is of God.
Malicious man. ri. Some malicious man is a preacher.
son. Therefore some preacher is not of God.*

The use of the third figure.

This figure profiteth muche in prouoking particular thinges and gathering of conjectures in causes that are doubtfull, when probabilitie onely and no assured knowledge, boulteh out the truthe of a matter. And because severall thynges come somet to our senses, we vse suche gathering moste commonly, and by triall of particular causes, assur our selues of the truthe generally.

It is verie necessarie that there shold bee three figures, as I haue shewed already. For in every argument that hath the shafe of a Syllogisme (for the induction and the example haue it not, neither be thei in Mode and figure) evermore we reason from the generall to the kinde uniuersall, makynge the conclusion uniuersall: or els we reason from the kinde to the generall, makynge the conclusion particular: or els there is a repugnancie of the terme at large, and the severall wherethei doe not agree with the double repeate: or laste of all wee ioyne many causes and many effectes together, whereof is made an argument called sorites, or coacessatio, that is to say, a heapping together of thynges.

Three figures necessary

First figure.

When we make an argument, and procede from the generall worde to the kinde, it is in the first figure, and even by our reason we learne this, that if the greater bee not, the lesse can not bee. As thus, if one bee not a living creature, how can he bee a man, if he be

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be a living creature, he must either be a man, or a brute bodie.

When wee proceede from the kinde to the generall, makyng
the conclusiſ particular, the argument is in the third figure. And
this is for euer true, that when the kinde is rehearsed, the gene-
rall must neareſ followe.

But when there is a repugnancie in an argumente of the
terme of large and the ſeverall, ſo that thei agree not with a third
woorde, it is euer in the ſeconde figure. And this is plaine to ſee,
that ſuche an argument muſt needs be well concluded, when we
goe about to conuife any thyng, ſteyng that twoo kindes whiche
are repugnaunt muſt needs be diſſeuered, and ſo the conclusion
to be made vpon the ſame. As it is eaſie to ſee in the argumentes
of the ſeconde figure. Therefore it is good reaſon that bothe there
ſhould bee three figures, and alſo that the argumente doeth well
proceede, beyng made in any of them.

Sometimes an argument is made, when wee couple many
cauſes together, and the verie effect of the ſame, as thus,

Overmuche gourmandise hindereth diſtillation in the
ſtomacke.

By euill diſtillation in the ſtomacke, corrupte blood is
engendred in the Liver.

When euill blood is bled in the Liver, euill humors
are ſped throughout all the bodie.

Euill humors ſped throughout the bodie, cauſe a di-
ſperature in the body, & after that byng the droſtie.

Therefore overmuche gourmandise cauſeth droſtie.

Gourman-
dise cauſeth
droſtie.

Of an imperfect argument called Enthymema.

Nan imperfect argument, is an argument wanting ſome
one part, the whiche is, when one Hypothefiſe is rehear-
ſed, and the conclusion ſtraite brought in therewpon, as
thus. That is not good whiche byngeth a man to miſchæf. Ther-
ſoſe money is not good. The Bible teacheth a man his duetie to-
wardes God and his neighbor. Ergo it is necessarie to be knowne
and read of every bodie. Pleaſure byngeth endleſſe paine after it.
Ergo pleaſure is to be eſchewed. These argumentes be imperfecte
argumentes, wanting one Hypothefiſe euermore, the whiche if

An imper-
fect
argument.

I.w. we

The arte of Logike.

We adde, a perfect argumentation followeth therevpon, as thus,

S Whatsoeuer bringeth endlesse pain after it, that same is to be eschued.

*P*leasure byngeth endlesse paine after it.

Ergo pleasure is to be eschued.

These unperfekte argumentes called *Enthymemata*, consiste partly of likelihooches, and partly of infallible reasons.

Likelihooches

Likelihooches are thosse that often hitte the truthe, and yet are not alwaies so, as thus,

S Suche a yong man talketh ofteyn, and that alone also, with suche a yong maide.

Ergo he is in loue with her.

This mate bee true, and this mate bee falle, for although the conjecture have some probabilitie with it, yet is it not for euer true. The other called infallible reasons, or rather necessarie arguments, must by all reason be evermore true, as thus,

S Suche a woman is broughē in bedde,

Ergo, she hath had the companie of man.

Another.

S The Sunne is risen.

Ergo, it is daie.

Therefore in all communication good hefe ought to be taken, that likelihooches of thynges, be not used for necessarie reasons.

G Of an argument called *Syllogismus expositorius*.

 His kinde of argument hath evermore a Rounre proper, to bee as a double repeate in bothe Propositions: contrarie to the maner of all other argumentes, and it mate be referred to the thir figure.

S Paule doth alledge godly sayngs of þ Ethnikes

S Paule was a Preacher.

Ergo, a Preacher mate alledge godlie saynges of the Ethnikes.

For whatsoeuer is truely gathered of particular thynges, the same also is proper to the thynges generall, and whatsoeuer agreeith to the kinde, agreeith also to the difference, or propertie of the said Rounre proper.

In an argument made by a Rounre proper.

Inductio

Inductio.

In induction is a kinde of argumente, when wee gather sufficiently a number of proper names, and therepon make the conclusion uniuersall, as thus.

Abraham was iustified by his faike. Likewise Isaac. Likewise Jacob. Likewise Gedon. Likewise David. And all the holie men besides, without exception. Ergo all that be iustified before God, are iustified by their faike.

An other example.

Dathan for disobedience against the superiour power, ended his life wretchedly. Likewise Abiron. Likewise Chorai. Likewise Semiei.

Neither is there any example to the contrarie.

Therefore all Rebelleſ and Traitorſ to their Prince and Kyng, shall dye wretchedlie.

An other example.

Nemboſt although he was a ioyly Hunter, yet he liued like a wretche in greate miserie.

Laban also liued wretchedly.

Pharas was ſore plagued.

Amalech, Madian, Abimalech.

Herode, with other were ſcouredgreeounſlie for their wickedneſſe, neither is there any example to the contrarie.

Therefore the ende of wicked menis wretches.

This kinde of argumente is called *Inductio*, because that ſwyng diuerte proper names, it endurēth at lengthe, and moueth the mynde to make a generall conclusion. Therefore necessarie it is, that in ſiche argumentes all the examples whiche are induced be like, if any be founde contrary, the argument is of no force, as thus.

Sathanassius liued bmaried.

Ambroſius liued bmaried.

Basilus had no wife, and a greate many mo.

Ergo all Bishops heretofore were bmaried.

The argumente is not lawfull, forasmuche as diuerſe haue been maried in the Primitive Churche, as *Spirition*, *Hermes*, *Hilarins*.

In inducſt.

**Rebelles dye
wretchedlie.**

**The ende of
the vngodlie
is wicked.**

**Bishops ma-
ried in the
Primitive
Churche.**

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The Apo-
stles had
wives.

Socrates
induction.

Fewe good
in all ages.

Hilarius, Policerates, Tertullian, and diuers other. For it was the maner of the primitive Churche, that honest married men were chosen to be Bishops, and had the charge of Christes flocke. The Apostles also (as Egnatius witnesseth) had wifes, as well as other men, and as I thinke vseth them as other men doe their wifes, or els asked their leue and consent to forbeare them.

Socrates vseth a kind of induction by alkyng many questions, the whiche all when they were graunted, he broughth therepon his confirmation concerning the presente controuersie, whiche kynge of argumente hath his name of Socrates hymself, called by the learned Socrates Induction, as if I might reason thus, lamentyng the miserie of mankind, wherein so fewe are good, and so many euill. Alas in what state be we mortall men, sayng in all ages ther hath none been almooste good. I praye you how many good folke were there when all the worlde was drownd? Surely not past eight in all. How many were founde good in the citie of the Sodomites, when the whole was burne for abominable symme with fire and Brimstone? Not tenne, no not eight, no not sixe could bee founde, as it appeareth plaine in the xviiij. and xix. Chapiter of Genesis. How many in the lande of promise, when sixe hundred thousande fiftynge men went out of Egypce? Alas but twoo onely. How many did swarve fro God euerlyng, and bowed to an Idoll in the tyme of Helias? Forsoch all the people sauyng Helias, and seuen thousande. How many tribes of the Israelites followed God? Twoo onely, where as the other temme clely forsooke hym. How many did the Lorde count to be his in the lande of Syria? None at all, sauyng Naham the officer, and the widowe of Serepta. How many feared God when Tobias was persecuted? Tobias onely. How many found Christ, when he was here hymself vpon earth? But xij. that he chose as faithfull, and yet one was a traitour afterward. Therefore, thus maie I conclude, the godlie peoples in all ages are small in number.

g The vse.

Ne profite muche by this kynge of argumente: for hereby we haue the assured knowledge of those grossenes which Nature hath grassef in vs. And where Nature telleth vs

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ys, that the whole is greater then the partes, we can not otherwise
knowe it, but by shewynge it to be true in this substance, and that
substance, and so in all other, wherbypon we conclude that this ge-
nerall shynge is true. Aristotle saith, this argument seruch well
to perswade the multeliter, when we gather many like thynges,
and at last after suche he axyng cōclude, that our argument is ge-
nerally true. As I heard once a doctor of Dummitie, whiche was
not so great in knowledge, as he was in title, a little before the ba-
nishment of the Massie, earnestly defendyng his cause with exam-
ples of suche and suche worshipfull as dwelt there in the countrie
Doeth not suche a man (Q he) devoutly heare Massie Doeth not
suche a knyght, suche a lord, suche a ladie, and suche a gentleman,
full reverently come to the blessed masse? Then neighborz (Q he)
if all these doe so, and none but the heretikes folowe the contrary,
why shoulde not you follo we the best, and to sake the worst. Which
that the people hearing suche a patched reason, were wonderfully
perswaded to belie as he said, and if neede had been, ready to haue
died, but not with hym, for he would none of that hymself, dyng
come home since gayly w^t M^r but alone, and together themselves,
if suche extremitie had been offered. Againe this kinde of argu-
mentation profiteth muche to dilate a matter at large, that there-
by the truthe maye the rather be allowed, when it is founde true
in every singular thyng.

1226. Oct 1
1227. Oct 1
I doctours
induction in
behoue of the
Masse.

A example is a maner of argumentation, where one thyng is proved by an other, for the likenesse that is founde to bee in them bothe, as thus. If Marcus Antonius Regulus had rather lose his life, then keepe promise with his enemie, then shold every man beyng taken prisoner keepe promise with his enemie. If Cities haue been destroyed for breaking of Colderocke, then adulterers must needs be punished. If Alexander dauided a weake Soldiour when he was almolte chosen for roial, and did set hym in his owne chalke agaist the fire, then shold all Capitanes and men of warre, be tender over their poore warrours and base Soldiours.

An argument
called an
example.
Marcus Iu-
stus Regu-
lus.

Alexander.

五

Effectmote

The arte of Logike.

Moreover take heede that this kinde of argument, the conserue
be like of bothe sides, or else the argumētē pronounchē not. As thus.

Peter kill'd Ananias, taken with an open iye.

Therefore Spirituall Minister's maie punishe open
offendours with temporall sworde.

How Peter
killed Ananias.

The examp̄les are not like; Peter did kill Ananias with the
woorde, and power of the hōle ghoste; therefore preachers must
not kill the bodie, but onely excommunicate men, accountynge them
vñw̄orthy to bee in the congregatiōn. The sworde is lawfull for
the temporall Magistrate onely, and for none other.

So that hath stōe of examp̄les, is well able to perswade
the halidong hearer, and shall mucha delite, even the vanitie
earred also, that must needes heare alwaies fine matters,
and straunge examp̄les to please his fantasie withall.

In heaping
argument.

Sorites, vel concatenatio, is a heaping together of
causes one vpon another. A kinde of argumētē
when the laste rehearsed wōrde of the firste Pro-
position, is repeaced in the firſte parte of the ſeconde
Proposition, neceſſarily agreeing thereunto, and
ſo going still forthe in like maner, till at the length the laſte re-
hearsed wōrde be added unto the firſte wōrde, or former parte of
the firſte Proposition. And it is a kinde of argumētē muſe uſed,
when we ascendē upward from the lowest to the highest. Or els
when we goe from the cauſe of the nexte thynges dooen. Whiche
thynges doen, are the occaſion of other thynges doen, as thus.

So man is a living creature.
A living creature is a liuely bodie.
A liuely bodie is a substance.

Ergo, a man is a substance.

Colther the lame is, therē is transgression.

Solther there is transgression, therē is feare,

Therē there is feare, therē is remorse of conſcience;

Therē where the lame is, therē is remorse of conſcience.

In other.

Justification

The arte of Logike.

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Sinful nature is not without faith.
Saints are not without a repentant heart.

Therefore, implication is not without a repentant heart.
No arguments are made negative, by this kind of argumentation. As thus:

{ The Gospel is not the Law.
The Law teacheth us the fear of God.

Therefore the Gospel doth not.

Christ the Sonne is not impetrante God the Father.

God the Father sojurn layng.

Therefore Christ is not curtiling,
But those end farr like he us with us this that followeth.

Serjeant is no serjeant.
Serjeant is master.

Therefore is heare.

And the reason is and arguments to be made magnificently, by this kind of reasoning. Neither is the consequent good, which would

des that birth is not necessarily free to me to control.

Saints and martyrs are made good by their own example.

THE CHANGES WHICH THE VENUE ARE TO BE DENIED,

Therefore, such masters are now desired.

does not like the behavior of your wife, you can't do much about it.

the upper members is the best known term. It is not the only definition, but it is the most common.

The name of Deafness, our father the Son of man and his Son of man, who made us like unto angels.

Wiederholung: Offenbar in einer anderen Zeit als die vorherigen Szenen aufgetragen, ist hier eine Art Verhör zu sehen.

It is also important to note that many companies do not have a clear policy on false packaging, which can lead to confusion and potential legal issues.

देवतानां त्रिपुरां द्वारा देवतानां त्रिपुरां द्वारा

Sed etiam multa sunt cibes nunc,
nec sibi a leto. **S**icut enim tibi per nos, sumus et haec.

କାହାରେ ପାଇଲା ତାହାର ମହିଳା ଏହାର ମହିଳା
କାହାରେ ପାଇଲା ତାହାର ମହିଳା ଏହାର ମହିଳା

R. J. Marks

三

The arte of Logike.

Marke the procedyng, and ye shall easly auoide the rrouour,
for although in sleape we spue not, yet by drynkyng we cause
lygne, and although we slepe soundly after, yet no one manne at
one tyme bothe drunkest and slepeth, therefore though in slepyng
he offendeth not, yet in drynkyng he passeth measure, and there-
fore the knytyng is nothynge worthe.

An horned argument.

Dicimus, otherwile complexio, vel caruncula Sylo-
gisminu, called a horned argument, is when the rea-
son consisteth of repugnant members, so that what
soeuer you graunt, you fall into the snare, and take
the falle. As if I shold aske, whether it were bet-
ter to marrie a faire woman, or a soule. If you say a faire. Then
auns were I, that is not good, for then commonly saie he will bee
common, and then I make late, ye are touched with the horned
argument, if that saying be true. If you say it were good to mar-
rie a harsh favoured woman, then I answere, she will be lothsome
and so ye fall into an inconuenience bothe waies. Not with stand-
yng, if either of the parties may be tounred into the aduersaries
necke againe, on bothe of them, it is a faultie argument. And you
make confute the same by immersion, that is to saye, tournyng his
tale cleane contrarie, as thus. If I shall marrie a faire woman,
I shall haue greate pleasure and conforte in her. If I marrie a
hauant woman, she shall not be common to other, for feare men
will come after her. Therefore I shall haue comforte in the waies.

Christes an-
swere being
broken on
the cheeke.

Christus pater nos. Item translat in the 18. Chap. adiudicat the
same kinde of argumentum against the ministers whiche Groote by,
and Imoret booke on the last algoris: answerest thou the bie priest
to Telus amperas hym. If I haue gnull broken, heare mynes
of the gullif? I brouwe full broken, when sumes I haue brouwe about 152

De consequentiis.

Item ther notable little after the rebuffell of such
argumentum, ther flitteth before the knytyng of
propositionis, and to decary the matter of a shorte
argumentum accertit in two propositionis, whiche
are made in sequitur upon the argument and the
consequent,

Of breff ar-
gumentes.

The arte of Logike.

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consequent, as the Logicians use to terme them.

Good argument. The first rule is to have in respect of

From the uniuersall gathering to the particular, the argument goeth well, as thus.

All officers doe their duerie.

Ergo this officer doeth his duerie.

But not contrarie.

This officer doeth his duerie.

Ergo all officers doe their duerie.

The secund rule.

From that whiche by Nature is in any thing, to that whiche happeneth casually, or comineth by some misse chuse, the reason is not good. As thus.

Sober diet is good.

A feuer causeth sober diet.

Ergo a feuer is good.

An other argument used by the Rounish Bishop.

Synne doeth not beget man.

The woorke of lust, begetteth man.

Therefore lust, other wise called Concupiscencia, is no synne.

The seconde Proposition is not true, for wicked concupis-
tence came in by mannes follie, and hath muche defaced that,
whiche Nature flesly opened. Therefore Nature it self though
God giveth recreaste, whiche is muche concerte to the wicked
lust of concupiscentia.

Nature
through God
giveth en-
crease.

The thrid rule.

Thinges disagreeing are not considered botche one waite, and with one respect.

The Gospell will eth us to make no difference of
meat and drinke, oil and salt, wine and water.

The Logicians appoynt us a diet, and forbid us
this and that.

Ergo the Gospell and the Logicians teache thinges
contrarie, alioquin I tell you, nothing.

These doe not disagree, considering their endes are diuersal.

K. iii. The

The arte of Logike.

The scripture forbiddeth superstition, in the obseruation of daies.
The Phisition hath respecte to the stace of mannes bodie.

The argument is good when substances are set, according
to their proper differences. But when they are set the one against
the other, according to their accidentes, whiche are agreeing to
bothe, the argument is not good, as thus.

{ It is lawfull for you, not to drinke wine,

{ Ergo, to drinke wine is unlawfull.

Whereas this woode (lawfull) is common to bothe, as well
to drinke, as not to drinke. The argument whiche the Sophiste
made to Diogenes, made by this rule he confuted.

{ The fift rule.

Euery thyng the more that other thynges are shrough it, the
same is alwaies the more it self. As thus;

{ Water is hotte through fire, he sayd.

{ Ergo, fire is more hottie.

{ Some loue to make sorowes,

{ Therefore the loue giveth heat.

Some argues made according to this rule, are nothing
true, and therefore it is good to give manyng of them.

It is well said and truly, this rule holdeth in causes that are
next adiuyning, and the whiche wholie compasse a mister not in
those causes that are forrein forrein, and being the halfe causes,
partly and by the wacie give onely the occasion. As thus;

{ Ouidie came to be a doctor by his maister.

{ Therefore his maister is the greyne poer.

The argument is not good in those causes that are but halfe
causes, for Ouidie is not a poer, nearely because he learned precep-
tes of his maister, but also because he hat a grete aptenesse by
Nature, and a wonderfull herte dexteriter then an other.

Some hold fast upon the saying of saint Augustine, and build
monsters upon that text. I would not believe the Gospell, saith
Augustine, except the Catholike Churche did perswade me. And
because he said thus; quod si non credam, credam in isti sententiis.

Where it
hath place,
and where
not.

Sainte Au-
gustines sat-
ting vpon the
Churche.

The

{ The Gospell is beleneved for the Churche's sake.

Ergo, the Churche is of more authoritie.

And here thei heape a number of mischies. Therefore (saie thei) the Churche made made Lawe, and appointhe Tradicions, whatsoever thei be. But I auerswerre thus, the antecedent is false. For I cheefly beleue the Gospell, considering God is the authour; and seynge the wonders thathe hath done. I give credite to it for his sake. I graunt we doe beleue the Gospell for the churches sake, but yet principally, for that God is the cheef authour, that parlswirth us to receyve his woord, and after the Churche (as the seconde cause,) telleth us that the Gospell is the truthe of God. Therefore if thei will make this siche an argument, as thei seeme to saie it is, then this that followeth, is of as good force for in all thynges it is like.

{ This child is a good boye, grammetrie rod.

Ergo, the rod is better then the boie.

The cheefest cause of the boies goodnesse is God hymself, whiche leuorth his gracie unto hym, the second cause is, his good fressheres whiche chasten hym for his offence, and lastlie the rodde as an instrument, whereby the feate is

doen, helpeth forward to byying the boye

to some goodnesse.

How shold
I knowe the
Churche, or
whiche were
it had not the
Gospel afore
instructed me



1003

the boies goodnesse. Now quicke as my armes aridian
of armes, sheweth the boies goodnesse of godfrettes and fressheres
garnisched with a knyf, or yngyl, or a ryal, or a stund, or a stund
of a knyf, or a stund of a ryal. Beside the boies goodnesse
of godfrettes and fressheres, sheweth the boies goodnesse
of a knyf, or a ryal, or a stund, or a stund of a knyf, or a stund
of a ryal, or a stund of a ryal. Now shold a godfrette or a fresshere
sheweth the boies goodnesse, or a knyf, or a ryal, or a stund,
or a stund of a knyf, or a ryal, or a stund of a ryal. It is
soo, that the boies goodnesse is sheweth the boies goodnesse
of godfrettes and fressheres, or a knyf, or a ryal, or a stund,
or a stund of a knyf, or a ryal, or a stund of a ryal.

The arte of Logike.

¶ Of the second part of Logike, called Inuentio, that is to saye, the fin- dyng out of an argument.



Etherto we haue treated of the so-
mer parte of Logike, called in Latine
Judicium, that is to saye Judgement,
oy s kil to declare the nature of every
worde severallie; to set the same wor-
des in a perferfe sentencie, and to knit
them up in argumētē, so thac herby
wee mighc with easie delyce the right
frame in matteris how thei agree, be-
yng lapped up in oder.

Invention. Now therefore the other parte shall bee
sette forthe, whiche is called Inuentio, whereby we maie finde
argumentes and reasons neare to prove every matter, where-
upon question māde rise. This parte is the shoy house of places,
wherein argumentes resse, unto the whiche wee conserue the
matter whiche wes entende to proue. There will appere diverse
argumentes to confirme the cause. Like as when therefore that
digge for gold in grounde, doe seach he nasse owlie the vaines of the
peartch, and by diligent markyng the Nature thereof, at lengthe
finde out the Mine, whiche once beyng found, thei straight byng
it to light, for the shew behauie of manie. So he that will reason
wisely, as well for the common profit of other, as for his owne
priviate gaine, muste be a diligent labourer, and considerynge
matters are put to the proofo, wherein often resteth doubtc, his
parte must bee euermōre to marke the nature of his cause, and to
seeke confirmation thereof in every parte. First by the definition,
the cause, the effecte and proper office. Againe, to see what is con-
trarie, what is like, and what chynges be incident thereto, the
whiche all when he hath doen, he shall see at length that some one
argument aboue all other, serue besste to confirme his cause, the
whiche when with trauell he hath founde out, he maie byng to
light, and bise accordyng to his will.

What

What a division is.

A place is the resting corner of an argumente, or els a **V** place.

marke whiche giveth warnyng to our memorie, what we maie speake probably, either in the one part of the other, vpon all causes that fall in question. Those that be good Harefinders, will sone finde the Hare by her sounynge. For whē thei se the ground beaten flat round about, and faire to the sight: thei haue a narrow geesse by all likelihooде, that the Hare was there a litle before. Likewise the hunteynan in huntynge the Fox, will sone espie whē he leeth a hole, whether it be a Fox borough or not. So he that will take profitte in this part of *Logike*, must be like a hunter, and leareyn by labouř to knowe the boroughes. For these places be nothing els but couertes of boroughes, wherū if any one seth diliȝtely he maie finde game at pleasure. And althoȝ perhaps one place falle hym, yet shall he finde a doulen other places to accomplishis his purpose. Therefore if any one will doe good in this kunde, he muste goe from place to place, and by searchyng every borough he shall haue his purpose undoubtely, in moste parte of thē, if not in al. We se that every proposition doeth either affirme a thyng to bee true, or els denieith that it is true. Therefore when any thing is constantly said, it nedeth somwhat euermore to confirme it. As for example. The Sacramentes are necessarie in the Churche of God. I maie proue this saying true, by reasonyng from that place whiche is called the ende of every thyng, as thus.

So to give testimonie of our faische, and to nouellour selfe in the practise therof is verie necessarie.

The Sacramentes give testimonie of our faische &c.

Erge, the Sacramentes are verie necessarie.

When any proposition doeth deny, it is needfull to haue a third word, whiche maie agree with one part of the proposition. As if one shold thus saie. Manne is not iustified by his woorkes. The place of repugnant wordes that doeth altogether disagree, giveth iust matter. And therefore I maie saye: man is not iustified by his woorkes, because he is iustified by his faische onely. For if mercie come by grace, and that freely, then woorkes can not save vs. Paule proueth the first, therefore the seconde is for euer true.

L.1. The

A multitude
or parable of
hunting.

In all argu-
ments either
we affirme or
denie.

Argumente
upon respect
of the ende.

Sacramen-
tes necessary.

The Arte of Logike.

¶ The division of places, whiche are xxiiij. in number.

The definition.
The generall woerde.
The kinde.
The proprietie.
The whole.
The partes.
The yoked woordes.

Particularlie in the very
Substaunce. As

{ Some are inward
places, called Loci
interni, & thei are

And partly incidente to
the substaunce. As

VVoorde adioyned.
The maner of doyng.
The thyng contyned.

{ Some are outward
places, called Ex-
terni, that is not in
the substaunce, or
nature of the thing
but without it, &
these are,

Either knitte with any
affinitie, called Cognata
Of the which

Some are those
whichis spring
of the causer,
called Euentia. As
for some
ende.

Either applied to the
thyng, not beeing the
cause thereof, but only
giving a name therunto
called Applicata. As

The place.
The tyme.
Thynge annexed.

{ Or els thei be accidentes
whereof there be fine.

Thynge chayneynge.
Sentences of the flag.
The name of a thyng.
Thynge compared.
Thynge like.

{ Or els thei are repug-
nes. As Inhibition.

Discordances.
Thynge disfeyng.

¶ Of the Definition:

The definition.
The generall woerde.
The kinde.
The proprietie.
The whole.
The partes.
The yoked woordes.

There bee seven places, whiche are in
the substaunce or nature of the thing

The defi-
nition.

N Definition is a perfecte sentence, whereby the vertie, na-
ture of the thyng it self is sette forthe and expounded. You
maie reason from this place, bothe Affirmatiuely and ne-
gatiuely, as thus. Fortitude is a vertue, that figheth in the que-
rell.

The Arte of Logike. 38

rell of right, I maie reason thus from the definition, to the thyng defined, if I will pronue Fortitude praise worthie.

From the definition to the defined.

Sa. Whatsoeuer is vertue, fightryng in the querell of right, the same is praise worthie.

Tri. Fortitude is vertue, fightryng is querell of right.

Si. Therefore, Fortitude is praise worthie.

If I will define a good thyng, and shewe that money is not good, I maie reason thus.

Ce. No suthc thing is good, as is desired for respect of any other ende.

Tra. All money is desired, for respect of an other ende.

Si. Therefore, no money is good.

G The general rule.

To whom the definition dooeth agree, to the same also dooeth the thyng defined belong. And contrary wise, bothe affirmatiuely and negatiuely.

G The maner of reasonyng.

If Socrates bee a liuyng creature endued with reason, then is he a man, if he be a man, he is a liuyng creature endued with reason. If he bee not a liuyng creature, &c. Then he is not a manne. If he bee not a manne, then he is no liuyng creature endued with reason.

G The vse.

The Nature of every thyng is knowne by the definition, and therefore, this place aboue all other is moste necessarie.

G Of the generall woerde.

The generall woerde is spoken of many, that differ either in kinde, or els differ in number, when the question is asked what it is, we maie reason negatiuely from this place, thus.

Co. No vertue maie be called wastfulnesse.

Tri. Liberalitie is a vertue.

Si. Therefore, liberalitie maie not be called wastfulnesse.

G The general rule.

If the generall woerde be taken awaie, the kinde carrieth not. If the generall woerde doe remaine, it shall not straight followe,

L.i. that

The arte of Logike.

that the kinde shall ensue. For it is no good argument, if I see a Tree a good waie from me, to saie thus: it is a Tree, therefore it is an Apple Tree. But I maie saie thus well negatively, it is no Tree: therfore, it is neither Apple Tree, nor yet any other tree.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

Ef every creature by Nature loue it self, then man doeth loue hymself. If every vertue bee praise worthie, then in the administration of Justice, to give every manne his owne, it is praise worthie.

¶ The vse.

The generall worde declareth the largenesse of any thyng, so that where the generall taketh no place, the other that be inferior can not bee. As if there bee no living creature in some one house, then there must needes be no maner of manne in the same house.

¶ Of the kinde.

En the kinde beynge reckoned among the places, is taken to be any one thyng that is lesse generall then an other, and by this shifte, euē proper Nounes or names of thynges shall serve for the kinde, and goe in steede thereof. Therefore, as we reason from the kinde to the generall, so maie we reason from Nounes proper to their kindes. From the kinde to the generall, an argumente is made onely affirmative, as thus: If Justice bee to be desired, then vertue is to be desired. Butche a man is a slan- derer: Ergo, he is a naughtie man.

¶ The general rule.

To whom the kinde doeth agree, to the same also the generall doeth agree.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

If sobertie bee praise worthie, then vertue is praise worthie. If vyonkenesse be deulish, then surstrectyng is deulish.

¶ The vse.

The necessarie
particelle of
this place.

En the kinde is generall to every proper name, and there- fore in describyng the nature of euery Noun proper, wee haue mutche neede of this place, to knowe vnder what kinde every severall thyng is comprethended. A- gaine,

gain, whatsoeuer is defined, the same is the kind of some one thing so that hereby wee maie learne how farre this worde stretcheth, being ordeined to set forthe the nature of every proper name.

¶ Of the difference and properte.

From the properte and difference, arguments are derived bothe affirmative and negative. He can reason a matter artificially, therfore he is a good Logicien. Essoe could not vitter his mynde at large, but did stammer and staine mutche in his speche, therfore he was an Oratour. By the properte ye maye reason thus. Suche a man feareth God, putteth his whole trust in God, and louerth his neighbour as hymself. Ergo, he is a right Christian. And likewise ye maye reason by conuersiou. Suche a one is a Christian. Ergo, he feareth God, &c.

The differ-
ence and
properte.

¶ The generall rule.

Vhen the properte or difference is graunted, then the kind straight followeth, take awaie the same, and there remaineth no kinde at all.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

Whosoever is endued with reason, the same is a man.

¶ The use.

The difference and the properte declare natures working in all things living, & therfore thei helpe well to shew what every thing is by his proper gift. We speake before of a Methode, or direct oder to be used in all our doyng; and herein we maie well se the use thereof. So heretherto we handled those places, whiche doe nothing els but comprehend the nature of a perfect definition. Now wheras the place followeth of the whole and his partes, it is nothing els but the right maner of a perfect diuision. The places that followe after declare the causes, the effectes, what be incident, what be disagreyyng from the matter, shewing example and testimonies of the auncient.

Declarers
of Natures
woorkyng.

¶ Of the whole, and the partes.

Lhe whole is that same whiche consisteth of his partes, and is diuided two maner of waies. First, there is the whole in substance whiche standeth of suche partes, that if one be taken awaie, the whole decaideth straight, neither can it afterward

The whole
is the partes.
The whole
two waies
taken.

The Arte of Logike.

*Hope his name as it did before. For an example. As a man is di-
vided into a bodie and soule. Take awaie the bodie, who counteth
the soule to be the man, v[er]e he before had his bodie joyned there-
vnto: Wee saie the soule liueth when the bodie is dedde, but no
man saith the soule is the very man, even as we call hym before
when he was compact of bothe.*

*Againe, there is the whole absolute with his partes, whiche
serueth to make the whole perfecte, adyng siche thynges, that
although thei bee awaie, yet the whole notwithstanding remai-
neth, and hath his name still, as when a man is made of bodie and
soule (whiche are the partes of his substance, and can not bee a-
waie) yet hath he other partes, whiche although thei bee awaie,
the whole notwithstanding kepereth his name still. As (a manne
lose his hande, his arme, or one of his feete, yet he is called man,
and those bee called *partes integrals*, that is to say, the partes
whiche finishe the whole and make it perfecte, after that it hath
those partes whiche make the substance.*

G The generall rule:

*If the whole be, the partes of the substance must needs be.
As if a man be a lye, the bodie and soule bothe are a lye.*

G The manner of reasoning.

If Philosophie bee good, then it is good to knowe the
Nature of thynges, the waies of orderyng mannes life,
and the skill how to reason probable: If o[ur] Philosophie
it self, is diuided into these three partes.

G The use.

Seeby we learne to examine the whole by the partes, that
if we can not obtaine our purpose to haue the whole gra-
ted, to examine it by the partes, and force our aduersarie
to assent to some member.

The integrall partes whiche make perfecte the whole, and
cause the bignesse thereof, are diuided into partes like, or not like.

Partes like are those whiche are alluaies like, and diuided e-
uermore into like. As the fleshe, bones, sinewes, fire, water, gold
Irou, Wine, Woode, Stoare. Every parte of all these is called
asimuche as the whole; as a peice of fleshe, is called fleshe, a peice
of

Partes in-
tegrales.

Partes like.

of wood is called wood, a drop of water is called water, as well as a gallon of water is called water. That be called in Latin *partes*, because they are named like unto the whole, for a piece of fleshe is aswell called fleshe, and as muche hath it the name of fleshe as a whole. Oure bath. The partes whiche haue not like names to the whole, are partly principall, and partly not principall. The principall partes are they whiche in nowise maie bee awaie, without losse of the whole it self; As the partes of humours boode whiche containe life, can not bee awaie without losse of the man. As the hedde, the heale, the herte, and the intreates. But notwithstanding, the partes of these can not be called like to the whole, for no man saith that a peece of the harte is the harte, or a peece of the hedde is the hedde, and so in the other. Those whiche are not principall partes maie be awaie, and the whols notwithstanding remaine still, as the handes, the feete, the legges and the remayn.

The generall rule.

Six the cheif partes are taken awaie, the whole needes not to be remayned, the cheif partes being brought altogether, the whole must remayn.

This maner of reasoning bothe negatiue.

by and also affirmatiue.

Suche a man hath learned Moral Philosophie, Naturall, and Logike, therfore he is a philosopher. Some Ipmates can neither write well, speake well, nor yet reteyn anyhous accordanctly. Therfore they are no Grammarien. This manne is no Rhetoricien, because he can not place his thynge in good order. For whereas five thinges be required in an Oratour, first to invent after to place thynges invented, shirly, to sette forth the matter in good wordes, fourtly, to remember all that, and laste of all, to utterisshame distinctly, and with a cleare noise. If one lacke any of these ffe, he cannot bee called an Oratour. Therfore I maise say: Such a one hath an euill memorie Ergo, he is no Oratour. Dij sutch a one hath no utteraunce: Ergo, he maise not be called an Oratour. In the negative part, it is enough to take one partie awaie, for the disallowyng of any thyng. But if I will affirme

*Five things
required in
an Oratour.*

The arte of Logike.

I generall
partition of
an Oratour

fitting any thing by the partes, I must take all the partes, and not one of two partes. For he is not an Oratour that can inuenire
one, or place thynges in good oder onely, except he can doe the
whole as it is required. Againe, he is no good Oratour that can
teache onely, or belite, but he is absolute that can bothe teache, de-
lite, and also persuade.

¶ The maner of reasoning.

Six reason from the patte to the whole, affirmatiue, and negatively, thus: Butche a one can neither judge
the knyttyng of woordes together, nor frame them in
order according to the Arte, nor avoide any subtellies: Ergo, he
is no Logician.

The partes sette so bothe the whole, and are a greate beautifi-
yng of the latier: bee yng fearefull hanvede, and in their meatures
set forthe at large.

Wordes
yoked.



Two wordes, whiche bee yng deruided of one, are
chaunged in spekyng: As of Sapientia, sapientier. A wiserman, wisedome, wisely. Here we
see that of a wiserman, is deruided wisedome. I make
reason from this place bothe affirmatiuely, and ne-
gatiuely. If one be not wise, he hath no wisedome, if one be wise,
he hath wisedome. If one doce circumspetly, he is called a cir-
cumspet man. If it be no miserie to die, then Death is not mis-
erable. Butche a one is a Philosophier, thereloy he hath studid
Philosophie. Argumentes deruided from hence haue greacie force,
if the onely yoked wordes bee tyned together without addition
of another, or els that are not strong. As thus, Preachers be euill
litters: Ergo, Preaching is euill. This argument is not good be-
cause of the addition: For Preachers and Preaching are onely
the yoked wordes, and thereloy thus I shoud say. There are
Preachers: Ergo, there is Preaching.

¶ The generall rule.

When one of the yoked wordes is added, or putt awaye the o-
ther, also is added or putt a wate,

The

The Arte of Logike.

41

G The maner of reasoning heth affirmacion and negacion
simplie, and negatiuely. Such a one is a priesly minister. Ergo he is a priesly. Such
a man hath served the kyng nobly. Ergo he is an noble man. The
preacher handeled his matter learnedly. Ergo the Preacher hath
learning. How can ye hym wittie that hath no wittie at all? Is
there no honestie in such a mannes? I maruell then why ther call
hym honeste.

The vse.

We mae learne by this place, to knoue what thynges are,
beynge considered in other. For if I would knowe, whether it bee
good or no, to be a man of honore, and to haue rule in the common
weale; I mae learne by them that doe rule, what it is to be a rul-
er, or a man of honore, and how daungerous a calling ther haue,
that are placed in high estate. If I would knowe what wisdome
is, best it were for me to marke their doynges that are wisenmen;

¶ Of wordes adioyned to the substance.

andynge of the substance. *co[n]trafactual*

Nomes adioyned are called those accidencies, whereby the
singuler word or proper name, hath an other name the
the very substance, as unto *Cato* (which of his substance
is a man) wisedome doeth happen, whereby he is called wise. Unto
Cicerio also (which by his substance is a man) there happeneth
eloquence, whereby he is called eloquent. So that he hath an o-
ther name then his substance giveth, which is to be eloquent, and
this is the woord adioyned. All quantites, qualities, and those
that are comprethended in the iudicament of relation, are refer-
red to this place, when ther are considered to be comprethended in
a substance. Virtue referred to the minde whiche conteineth it, is
a woord adioyned: compared with vice, it is a contrary referred to
justice, it is a generall woord. Woordes adioyned are perceaved
either by the sensis (as thole whiche are subtler to þ sensis) or els
by understandyng. As swiftnesse mae bre considered to be in a
man, althougþ we see him lyve a long, and so we late, such a lackie
runneth well, althougþ we doe not then presently see hym runne;
but wee remember that he hath runne, latyng now, as we haue

Wooordes
adioyned.

Virtue dis-
tinctly con-
sidered, divers-
ly placed.
Woordes ad-
ioyned, per-
ceaved either
by sens, or
els by unders-
tanding.

M.i. seen

The Arte of Logike

seen before in ure. Againe, some wordes adioynd are by nature in the thyng whiche contayne them, as heate is naturally in fire. And because we see that the same heate, althoȝt it never goe awaie, yet at all tymes it is not of like strengþ: but at somerþme itt holdeþ then at an other: we judge the same heate to bee an accident. Some wordes adioynd are not naturally clearyng, but by some other waie are adioynd to the thyng contayning them, as heat in water sette upon the fire.

The general rule.

If one of the twoordes adioynd bee in the subiecte, or thyng contayning, the other also is like to be there whiche followeth vpon the first. Item, Cato is a man worthy praze, because he is ware, sober, full of experiance. Prasse followeth vertue, as the shadowe doeth the bodie. Therfore whosoeuer hath modestie and greate knowledge of thinges, the same man of necessarie winneth praze and fame that can nos wye. Againe, if the wordes adioynd be the subiect, that concerneþ them must needes be also, as thus. If God be all goodnessse, then there is a God.

The maner of resoluyng.

Christe came into the woorlde beþyng gentle and misse. Ergo Christe came not to destroile the losse þeþre, but to sauie them. Scholers be godlie, berious, and occupied in learnyng. Ergo it is a gracieus deede to helpe suche of them as haue neede.

The maner of doing or sufferyng.

We maie by this place either praze or diþpraise, settynge forth the nature of men, and iudgynge them by their woorkes.

The maner of doing or sufferyng, called Actus.

The maner of doing or sufferyng, is when we are supposed to bee occupieng affected any maner of waie, either in doing or in suffering. There bee as many maner of doynges, as there be accidencies or wordes adioynd. And of these adiacentes, feare, sorow, trauail, heat, colde, are derived these: to feare, to be lone, to trouaile, to restle, to be hote, to be colde. And generally of those wordes that are referred unto the twoo þredicamentes, called the maner of doyng and the sufferyng, are compassed within this place, if the samewydes her considered as accidents,

cidentes, whiche clende to the substance, and make hithe be present, and also be awaie without losse of he substance. For if thyn-
ges do enibz weighed according to their propre manner of boynge,
theri are referred to the twoo places above, called the difference
and the properte. For wheres as he saie, Suche bone speake shyn:
Ergo heles a man for nothynge in an spakke naturally, but in an
oneip although in this nose (so he calleth) the willer of boynge, yet
it is not referred to this but rather to the properte, because it be-
longeth to man alone, and alwaies to man, vñlike to any oþer.

The general rule.

If the maner of boynge be suffering for the thinge conteyning
is also, and the warden moy boynge also where boynge god his-
serping haue theri boynge, followe upon the same.

If one breath, heles the man heth life in hym. If *Caesar*
came into Englande, then there was suche dynamme called *Inuisus Caesar*. If Richard the third plaid the rhauant hele to Englande,
then there was suche a man in Englande, who humore into his
diseas of rhauant. *Hec uita* alred ymed agayn stam
This place muche helpeth, either for pale or dispale.
Some officers balle the poore, robbre their Maister, and walte
their owne; Ergo suche are two chideth.

The thinge containing.

The subiect of the thinge conteyning is a substance, beynge the
boxehouse of accidentes, and the vertu poyntes hold uppon
desyden for neither wisedome, strength, healthynyn pollicie
can be at all, except they be conteyned within some one boode.

The general rule.

Take away the boynge conteyning, and there remayneth nei-
ther substance, my er deedes are null in thyng, and theri in thyng
wherong and oþer. *The maner of boynge* foloweth from this
There is fire, Ergo it is hotte. Chylde was a deuyll man, Ergo
Chylde dyed, and suffered the panger at his departing.

*Whi doest thou saye, that I auctorite assume, whi I knowe
was never yet wþ the aȝre? This is a hereticall and profane
error.*

The Arte of Logike.

Therefore there is a greate leasynge to be hem wher he is, *and the
vise of his place shal be knowne ad alia sunt, and*

*By namyng of a worthi persone, his praise is sufficienly set
froche, even when his name is onces vitered. For what learned
man hearing the name of Cicer, doth not remember therby the
full practise, and the absolute skill of all eloquence? These places
therefore help ouewell to haunplifying of matters, either in praise
or in dispaise, as ther doe for the strostast prouyng of any cause.*

*¶ Of outward places being two in the substance, but onely sou-
chyngh the substance, and without the nature of it.*

The causes of thynges.

We first are called the causes of thynges, and the thyn-
geng commyngh of causes, whiche onely are layned to
the thyng necessari, whereas the other places follow-
yng are not compley necessarily, but are onely ioyned
together, by a certayne alliance to the present matter.

¶ The division of causes.

Somme causes are called the verie causes of thynges, even by
their owne nature: other causes are happenyng causes, the which
make perhaps byng for the effect: lastly there be caules with-
out the whiche thynges can not be doen, and yet are they not any
cause to force the effect.

The verie cause of thin- ges.

The verie cause of thynges is such a one, as if it be praetisso in
verie deede, and set forth with other natural causes, the effect must
needs followe and ingayn if it be not put in practise, althoþg the
other he put ore sheffell shall not folow. As for example, althoþg
one haue clothe, yet can he not haue the use of it, excepte the Tailor
cut it out. And althoþg the Spiller grind, yet we speake to bine
without bread, except the Baker doe his parte also in the batche.

The happen- yng cause.

The happenyng cause, is such a one as althoþg he put in
practise in verie deede, yet it shall not folow. So doeghe the
effect must needs folow. As for Agreable to be the happenyng
cause, that some am manke spech yow dre, who per harsing for-
tyng cause: for them althoþg they might be comyn to folow me.

The cause without the whiche thyng- ges can not be doen.

The cause without the whiche thynges can not be doen, as thus.

The doge can not haue a woun, except the dogs fleshe bee

cutt out. The knififer shall not oþer haue come to his handes

nespes

myes ende, expte he haue some money in his purse. In tyme of warre it is euill traualing without a passport: and this is called in Latine, *cans sine qua non*, that is to say, the cause without the whiche we can not, and yet it is not the cause of our iourneyng.

The definition of the verie causes.

A cause in verie deede is a meane, by whose force some thyng doeth followe.

There be fower such causes.

Six The efficient cause. The ende. The matter. The shape.

He efficient cause is the woorkyng cause, by whose meanes thynges are broughte to passe.

Of those that are woorkyng causes, some by Nature byng thynges to passe, some by admisement, and by a sole purposed choice. Thynges wroke by Nature (and that necessarily) whiche lacke knowledge to chuse this or that, and haue no judgement to discerne thinges. As the Sunne, the Fire, Herbes, precious stones. The Sunne even by Nature giueth light to the Daie, and can not other wise doe. The Fire burneth naturally. Herbes keepe their vertue of necessarie. The Adamant that wch Iron even by Nature. And so the Bloodstone stoppeth blood. Some of these causes worke by the force and violence of Nature, some by an outward power bynging straignted thereto. That works by the force and violence of Nature, whose beginninges within hemselfes: being ayed by none other outward thing. As fire burneth, even by the naturall force of heat, whiche is the substance thereof. They wroke by an outward power, whiche are straignted to byng by the force of nature. Causes wroke by an outward power.

As water falle upon the fire wch is hotte, and yet is it not hotte by her dwine Nature; but is made hotte by the Nature and might of fire, of whom the water taketh heate.

In like maner bullettes of leade shotte out of a gunne, an

Arrowe out of a Bowe, a Stone out of a Sdyny, all these ffe not

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The Arte of Logike

into the mes by their dwyne power and myght but by force and balaunce of hym that vnteth them vident gulliam vñlizet et uertitatem sibi inquit aliud ad. *The general rule.*

From the natural woorkyng cause, ther effecte must needes folowe, as thus. If the Sonnewhene the daie must needes be which is the effecte or woorkewanship of the Sunne. Such a man hath eaten Hemlocke. Ergo he is poisoned and in danger of death. Fire is in the Chimnie, or in the rooy of the house, therefore it must never burne. Take awaie the candle, and the effecte can not be at all, for if there be no fire, there can be no flame nor burnyng neither.

The seconde woorkyng cause, is when thynges are dooen by advisement and by cholle, not be any necessarie at all, for thynges made as well not be doen, as be doen. As if therde a Shoomaker ther made by shoen made, with contrarie, if ther bee no shoomaker, therre can be no shooone at all.

The general rule.

When the voluntarie cause is put, the woorkemanship of the thyng dooen made followe. As if ther bee a Carpenter, aboue made be made. If one read good authours, and harken to the reading of learned men, he made come to good leareynge.

The maner of reasoning.

Suche a one hath dronke poison, Ergo he will dye shortly. Christe hath reconciled mankunde to his Father, by sufferyng death upon the cross, ergo suche as beleue in this sayng heath, shall live for ever. quod si quis credat in hoc mortali misterio, non morietur ad aliam vitam.

A other division of causes efficient.

Commaundynge causes. Some efficiente causes are commaundynge causes. As the king is the commaundynge cause to his subiect, to doe this or that. The Pailster of woorkes is the commaundynge cause to all the labouretters. The other efficiente causes are obediente causes, whiche seruauit woorketh ac his Maisters commaundement.

A other division of causes efficient.

Of sicke efficiente causes as doe abyue, some doe their woorke, as the Hasan woorketh vph the stonye, the Carpenter upon wood. Other efficiente causes that are obediente, are but instrumentes of dyping, as Hatchettes, Hammers, Dibbers, pincs, & other. In bar-

taill the Capitalne is the efficient commandir the souldour the
efficient obieier gunnes, darles, lowes and billes, the instrumentes
of doyng. God heede ought to be hab, that in all causes wee
make a difference, not confounding one with an other, that the
one causes and the farthest causes, be not taken al for one. A cause
farre setched is this. Suche a one sell out with his neigbor, Ergo
he killed hym. Fallynge out bynging chidynge, chayng bringeth
hatred, hatred causeth fightryng, fightryng giueth blowes, blowes
sone dispatch, sone dispatchyng is ready death. Therefore I might
more probable and moir to the pueple reason thus. Suche a one
gave his neigbor a deadlie wounde: Ergo he hath killed hym,
And thus the argument is made from the next cause.

Examples
of causes.

An other division.

Some causes are principall causes, as the holie ghoste wooy-
kyng all godlie motions, and stirring our Nature evermore to
the best. Other causes are the inclinations in man, that are either
good or euill. Thirdly, there are helping causes, whiche are mea-
nes the rather to further vs in al vertue. As learning, practisynge
of honest behaviour, acquaintyng our Nature evermore with the
best. The principall cause, that Joseph forbare to companie with
an other mannes wife: was the holie ghost that stirred his minde
with the feare of God. The seconde cause was his owne mynde,
that remembred the woorde of God, and the punishment due for
synne. The thrid cause was, that he accustomed hymself ever to
live uprightely, and not onely to auoide synne, but also to auoide
the occasion of synne. There bee othe diuisions, but I leauue to re-
hearsle them, for feare I shoulde be ouer long.

Joseph.

*The holie
ghost is prin-
cipall cause.*

 **H**E ende is, for whose cause any thyng is dooen, and is. The ende.
two waies considered. For there is an absolute ende, The ende
whereunto all other are referred, beynge called the per- absolute.
fection, and cheef propertie in any thyng; as the cheefest ende in a- The cheefest
ny man, is to be perfectly endued with reason, and to attain euer- ende in man.
lasting felicitie. The cheafest propertie in a horse, is to be of a very
good courage, and to want no stomacker; the cheafest perfectiōn
there is to be very hote and very drye. There is an other ende called

The Arte of Logike.

a helping ende, whiche serveth to an higher ende, and is onely ordained for this purpose, that we might attaine thereby the perfect ende of all. As meate, drinke, apparell, and other necessarie thynges, are helping endes for man to attaine the cheefest ende. So without these endes man could not live. To live honestly in this life, to be upright in dealyng with all persones is an helpeynge ende (as the Philosophers take it) and a testimonie to the woorde of our faische (as the Christians take it) for man to live, woorde without ende. To marie a wife, is a helping ende for manne to avoide fornication. The poore man laboureth, and wherefore? To gette his liuyng. Wherefore getteth he his liuyng? That he marie the better he able to serue God. The Souldier fighthe at his Princes commaundement, choesly because God commaundeth hym, next after for loue of the kyng and his countrey; thirdly and laste of all, that he might live the rather in quiet at home, with his wife and children. So that of one and the same thyng, there marie be many endes beyng orderly considered.

The generall rule.

Whose ende is good or euill, the same thyng is good or euill. A sworde is good, because it is good for a man to defende himself. Faische in Christ Jesu is good, for by faische we are sauued. To vndeoe my neighbour with lewdnes for gaine is moste vngodly; wherefore to be an Elurer is moste vngodly. To desire an other mans wife is vngodly, because adulterie is vngodly. Battaille is good, because it byngeth peace. For all men shold fight for this ende, that we might live in quiet with our neighbours. If thou wile be esteemed for a godlie persone, accompanie thy self with folke of honest fame, and thou shalt be well reported, especially of the honest. It is good to learne, because learninge it self encreaseth good knowledge, whiche is the ende of our studie.

Of the matter or substance, called Materia.

The matter
o: substance.
Every forme
is either na-
turall, or ar-
tificiall.

Lhe substance called *Materia*, is readie to be framed of the worke man, as hym liketh, by the whiche substance either thynges naturall, or els thynges artificiall are made. As first a man whiche is a naturall thing is made of bodie and soule. An Image whiche is an artificiall thyng, is made by the handie worke

worke of man, and is grauen out of a stone, or molten in gold, or
in brasse. From this place are made arguments, that bothe do af-
firme and also deny. As thus, if a man haue clothe, he maie haue a
garment made if it like him. But if a man haue no cloth at all, nor
yet any suche like stoffe that serueth for apparel, how can he haue
a gounē or a coate? If the Baker lacke Meale, how can he make
bread. The matters considered twoo waies. First it is a substance
that tarieþ still, as when a house is made of stone, wood, and plai-
ster, or an Image of gold, brasse, or siluer: here þ substance tarieþ
still, althoþ the forme be altered. Likewise when a house is take
dounē, the stone and timber remain still, and kepe their substance,
and serue as they did before, either for erection of the same house a-
gain, or els oþerwise as it shall please hym that is the owner. A
gaine, the substance is that whiche changeth into an oþer nature,
and can not be the same that it was before as of meale and water
Bakers make their bread: now they cannot resolute thesame bread
againe into meale and water, whiche was the former substance.

The general rule.

When the substance is at haunde, the workmanship maie
followe, and the effecte maie appere: but when thesub-
stance is taken awaie, there can be nothing made at all.
As if a manne lacke siluer, how can he make an Image of siluer?
There is no stone, wood, nor plaister: Ergo there is no house. But
if I reason thus by the substance, that changeth into an oþer na-
ture, & can nat be thesame that it was before: I reason then amisse
as thus. There is no meale or flower, Ergo there is no bread
I shold saie rather, there was no meale nor flower. Ergo there
is no bread.

The maner of reasoning.

The Shoemaker hath no Leathir, how can he then make
a Shoe? The Printer hath no Paper at all, Ergo he can
not set his men on worke to printe any chyng.

The shap called Formes.

The shap or fashion of any thyng, is a cause whereby the
thyng that is made hath his name, as Leathir when it is
made of faynmes for the foote, is called a Shoe. Suche

The shap.

The arte of Logike.

a man weareth a liverye coate garned with Clementte, and all the
peomies seruaentes haue bus plaine contes. Ergo he is one of the
gentlemen. He hath a siluer porc gilt, and wrought with Goldmi-
thes woozke: Ergo he is better then a porce wrought with plaine
silver, beynge of the same quantitie or bignesse.

The generall rule.

Then the shape or forme is made, the effectt or thyng doen
mata followe, take awaite the shape, and the use also is ta-
ken awaite. A cuppe is made, Ergo a man maie drinke in
it, byake the cuppe, and how shal you drinke of the same cuppe.
The Clement goeth compasse wise because it is round. Reason is
called the shape of manne. Therefore I mowe saye, suche a one lac-
keth the gift of reason. Ergo he is a foole.

Thinges commyng after the causes called Eventia.

Those whiche come of causes are two wates conve-
red, for either thei are called thynges, that in due tyme
followe the causes that went before, or els thinges or-
deined to some certayne ente.

Those thynges whiche come after the cause, and are made of
the same, are called effectt, that is to saye, thynges doen. And evey-
ry argument is either derived from the effectt of the matter, or
of the forme, or of the efficient cause.

From the effectt of the matter or substance,
called *Materia*, bus ye make reason.

He hath a swoyde made of Iron: Ergo he hath Iron. Here is a
house, Ergo here is stone and wood.

From the effectt of the forme.

A Boule beynge tourned rolleth, Ergo it is round.

From the effectt of the efficient cause.

It is bright date: Ergo the Sunne is up.

The generall rule.

When the effectt is come forthe, it must needs be that either
his proper cause is then, or els that it hath been before.

The maner of reasoning.

If slaughter be not to be borne in a commoneweale, then these
quereleyners, these roysters and fighters are not to be suffered to

goe

*The effectt
of causes.*

god unpunished that it do, and than our mothe goddes may
take shynge appoynted for somme ende.

Spathe which is appoynted for some certayne ende and
use, is called *destinacion*, as a house is builded to
dweller. Armoir is provided for man to defende
himself. Herbynes are meaneys appoynted for man
to recover heale. I shewed before that there was
an ende, whiche was an helping ende, and a meane to come to the
perfecte and moste absolute rade, for without this appoynted
meane and prouision of god, manne could never live, muche lessel
could he come to any perfectior in this life, as countyng the acci-
dens and wox; his seates required of man. Thus wee maie reason
from this place. Seying it is lawfull for man to defende hymself,
it is lawfull for manne to weare a weapon. If warre be lawfull,
then money is necessarie, without whiche no manne can goe for-
ward or set forth the angraine.

The shynge
appoynted for
some ende.

The general rule.

Those thynges that agree to char, whiche is appoynted to the
ende, agree also to the ende it self.

The maner of resonynge.

If a man maie lawfully buy the greate Bible in Englyshe, he
maie then also euuen without asking leue, reade it at his pleasure.

The use of all causes.

THIS commoditicte of chese casynges is so ytreace, that in ser-
tyng forthe the usibz of them, a man myght soner lacke wo-
rdes, then want mater, ffor we knowe that nothing is
doen without a cause, and therfore seyng this worlde frameth his
stis, every thyng proportioned in his mecher: wee maie truly
gather that shert is done above all that rule hath, whont the Chi-
rian calleth god. Shypnayng or dyspnayng how can a manne
better proesse, then by reperching the bate of every thyng. To
gaine, in examyning and searching out the mōte of dysmōte,
by the ende we knowe what is gaignfull: by the diffētēt cause we
knowe what maie be goen. For whatsoever is profitable, the same
is profitable for some ende, and whatsover we would haue been,
we maie soon gettētē by the offētēt illtemps haue been. Peccatis

The knowes-
ledge of cau-
ses right
needfull.

*Resonynge
of causes*

The arte of Logike.

causes of iudgement we maie judge, what will some one manne
had to doe this or that, when we consider to what ende he did this
or that. Laste of all we knowe hereby, that God hath ordered no
thing in vain, and that every thing is ordained for some one ende.
The ende of Christes death, was to merite mannes redemptiōn.
The ende of mannes life, is to trust wholie in Christes passion,
and to liue thereby for ever.

Of thynges outwardly applied, called Applicata.

Thei are called thynges outwardly applied to a matter,
whiche are not the cause of the same matter, and yet give
a certaine denominatione to it. There be three of this sorte.

{ The tyme.

{ The place.

{ Thynges annexed, or knit together.

And these three are nothyng els then the three Predicamen-
tes, or molte generall places whiche I rehearsed before.

{ Ubi. { Where.

{ Quando. { When.

{ HABITUS. { The a raiyng.

{ The maner of doyng.

The place.

The tyme.

A patroneſſe
of bauſtie.

The natures
the place and
tyme.



For this to reason from the place, called in Latin
Locus, he maie thus saie: ſuche a one is in the coun-
trie: Ergo he is not in the citie. If I will proue that
a manne beynge accused of murder unlawfully, did not
offende: I maie reaſon both from the tyme and the
place. The man was killed in the feldes, about three of the clothe
in the after noone, all whiche tyme this other manne came not a-
broade. So, he looked not out of his house all that daie: Ergo this
man did not kill hym. *Clelia* was acciſen at Rome, that he had
made a spoile of the reliques in the Temple of *Bona Dea*, wher-
as he at the ſame tyme, when this deſtre was thought to be doen,
was at *Incratium*: a village in the countrey beside Rome. *Quin-
tilian* ſaith thus: Thou hast killed an adulterer, whiche the lawe
doeth permitt; but because thou hast killed the ſame man in a Pro-
thels house, thou art worthie to dye thy ſelf: þen the nature of the
place and tyme, maketh muche for excuse of faulteres commit-
ted.

ted. As when one is not afraid euen in the Churche, and that at seruice tyme, to thrust his enemie through likewise to kill a man priuily by the high waie, is thought wortlie greater punishment, then if he shoulde kill hym manfully in the open streete, and that in the sight of other. Also to murder one in the darke night is com-
mented more heinous, then to kill hym in the bright daie. Notwith-
standingy these twoo places are rather vse of the *Rhetoriciens*,
then among the *Logiciens*: for when a manne is taken of suspec-
tion, wee goe about to moue hym faultie by diuerse conjectures.
As if he were aboue the same place at the self same tyme when a
man was slain, and also had his sworde about him: we conjecture
that he might haue killed hym. Againe, if we perceiue one to be a
riotous fellowe, readie to figh特 with everybodye, accompanyng
wiche naughtie packes, and euermore at one ende of al fraies, wa-
tyng pale when he is apprehended, shakynge for feare, or runnyng
awaie when he shoulde bee taken: we suspect siche a one that he is
not altogether cleare. Therefore Oratoy doe vse to marke thy-
nges that goe before the facte, as whether he hated the man or no,
or what gaine he might haue by his death, and also obserue thy-
nges toynd with the faulte, and chaunging of he we when he is ap-
prehended, or his sworde to bee bloudie, or any parte of his appa-
rell, and thirdly, thei note what followeth. That is, If he rame a-
waie, if he could not tell his tale plainly, and so thei conclude, as
thei are leide by suspition. Some argumentes are necessarie,
some probable, as thus; from the consequent. Siche a woman is
brought in bedde with a child: Ergo she hath had the companie of
man. Siche a man had a bloudie sworde in his hand, straighe af-
ter the death of his neighbour, euen in the same seeldes where his
neighbour was slaine: Ergo it is like this man hath slaine hym.
All whiche argumentes are derived from the place called *Couin-
gentia*, as I will shewe it hereafter.

Conjectures

*Argumentes
necessarie.*

*Argumentes
probable.*

*Of wordes annexed, or knit to the sub-
stantia, called Connexa.*

As touchyng woordes knitte ye maike understande, that
thei are toynd outwardlie to the subiecte, and give a
name unto hym accoryng as thei are. As ritches
are

*Woordes an-
nexed.*

The arte of Logike.

Division of
a knyng

are loyned to a ritche man, for where as *Croesus* is called a man by his owne substaunce, yet notwithstanding by his richeesse, he is called a ritche man. So is he that hath a wife, is called a housbande. He that hath a maister, is called a seruaunte. He that hath a fathur, is called a sonne. Woordes knitte are diuided diversly, for some are called suche as are nigh, and touching the substance. As to be full of filthe, is agreeing to the water, to be full of grasse, is annexed or agreeing to the peart, to bee cloudeis annexed or agreeing to the ayre. And againe woordes knitte, are called those chynges that a manne weareth, as to ware a Coate, a Jacke, a Harnes, to haue Shoen, to be merie, to bee dulle, and all suche as are casuall to manne. Some are called annexed or agreeing, whiche are knitte to manne, and yet not chynges worne upon his backe, but farther of, and rather pereyssed by understandyng, then knowne by eye sight. As Nobilitie, power, fame, authorite. To be an Officer, a Maior, a Sherif, a Lorde Chauncelour, Comptroller, or any other officer in the commonweale; all these are annexed to their infirmitie, ouer whom thei haue auuthorite. In this point differ woordes knitte called annexed, from woordes adioyned called *Adiacentia*, that all adiacentes or woordes adioyned, can not bee without the subiecte, as heate, cold, whitenesse, or any other like can not be, excepte thei bee comprehended within some subiecte. For it is proper to every accident to bee in some one thing conteyning hym. If there be nothyng conteyning then the accident can not be. Nor withstandyng, woordes knitt are so placed that one is without the other, and maie bee either of the severally, if the one happen to perishe: as a housbande is without the substaunce of his wife, and althoough his wife dye, yet the housbande maie bee on lyve still, sauyng that he loseth his name to be called housbande, but if a wisedome dye, wisedome must decease also, because it nulst needes bee in some one subiecte, or else it can not bee.

Of Accidentes.



Those are here called accidentes, whiche bothe themselues, and the thing also maie be together, the one with an other, and also maie be awaie the one from the other.

There be v. of this sort.

Thynge's chauncyng.	The name of a thynge.
Sentences of the Sage.	The likenesse.
Thynge's compared together.	Thynge's chauncyng called <i>Contingentia</i> .

Those accidentes are calle'd thinges chauncyng, which chance about a thynge, so that whether these thinges chance or not, the thynge it selfe maie be, or though the thynge be not, these maie so chance to bee. As for example, palenesse maie chance besore sickeresse, and the same also maie chance though a manne bee not sicker, and a man maie bee also sicker, and yet nothyng pale at all. Likewise loue and feare. A man maie loue, although he feare not, a man maie againe feare although he loue not.

Thynge's
chauncyng.

The deuersitie of three divers places.

Noydes adioyned, woydes knite to an other, and woydes chauncyng to a thynge differ thus, that in woydes adioyned called *Adiacentia*, the cause why thynge's are so framid is euer in the subiect, neither can the woydes adioyned connewe, except they be comprehended within some one substaunce. Woydes knite are of suche sorte, that by meanyng one the other is straight knowyne. As when I name a Scholemaster, I signifie Scholester also, althoough I doo not expellye name them. But in thynges chauncyng called *Contingentia*, we must at the least compare twoo together, that wee maie better knowe them to bee of this place. Therefore if I name this woyde (craft) by it self, without any further consideration, then it is an *Adiacent*, or a woyde adioyned. If I name this woyde (seruaunt) craft is referred to the place, called woydes knite or knite, considering craftis mentioned in respect of the seruaunt. If I late thus (a craftis seruaunt) then these twoo are considered to bee in this place called *Contingentia*, which is a place of woydes chauncyng to a thynge, so that whether thei chauyne or no, the thynge it selfe maie bee notwithstanding. As a seruaunt maie bee, and yet not craftis. Again one maie bee craftis, and yet not a seruaunt.

The Names
of woydes
adioyned

Woydes
knite.

Woydes
chauncyng.

The definition of thynges chauncyng.

Somme

The arte of Logikel

Some gae before the thyng, some are ioyned with
the thyng, some followe after the thyng.

SChynges chauncyng before. As thus. The skie
was redde this mornyng. Ergo we are like to haue
raine ere night. Chynges ioyned with the matter
at the very instant. As thus. Anger is in old men. Oste sutchyng
of wunde, declares sicknesse of the Lungen. If the bequeather or
maker of any will be on liue, the will taketh no place, and maie be
voide. Suche a one goeth gae in his apparell, spendeth with the
best and yet hath nothing to maintain his charges. Ergo it is like
that he commeth by his goodes naughtily.

Chynges happenyng after. Suche a one is well learned.
Ergo he hath gone well to his booke heretofore.

The name of a thyng, or the interpretation of a woorde.

Name of a
thyng.

The inter-
pretation of
a woorde.

CHe interpretation or name of a thyng, is a woode
made by the agreement of men, to signifie this or that.
PAs Philosophus is that manne whatsoever he be, that
hath a desire and a loue to the knowledge of wisedom.
Therefore if ye well expoune what a Philosopher is, you maie
reason thus: from the interpretation of the woorde. Whosoever he
be that hath an earnest loue to Philosophie, and seeketh knowledge
thereof, that man is a Philosopher.

CCaro hath an earnest loue to Philosophie, and
seeketh knowledge thereof.
ERgo, Caro is a Philosopher.

MAny wittie men take occasion to reason pleasantly
upon the interpretation of a woorde. As I remem-
ber a wittie man, and a woxthie man also did, who
enueyng at a tyme against Cardinall Poole, and
beyng vrayment in the cause of his countrie, saied
thus in the middest of his heate, a Poole, a hurle Poole, as though
his name declared his ill nature. The telling of this makes me to
remember an other. I knew one whose name was called Pope, &
beyng occasioned to folowe the lawe, concerning a matter of lande
at the first suppession of the Popes whole power, at what time in
deede straight comandement was given, not to call hym by that
name

The Arte of Logike.

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name: this manne beynge of the same name, and partly of kinred also concerningyng opinion (as the Deuill would haue it) durst not once for his life shewe his hedde, for feare his name shoule betray his whole nature, and in deede hauyng a moze fearefull hart, then neede was, thought that it might lustly be compred offence great enough in hym, that it was his euill hap, to haue suche an odious and euill name, the whiche all men as then did, every where almooste, without warr looke bitterly detest. And in deede (the proverbe saith) he is halle hanged, that hath an euill name. The whiche sentence, this man I thinke, not well understandyng, remembred it ouer welward was rather content to lose all, then that this peynissh name shoude lose hym, and cast his bodie quite awaie for ever.

Againe, the interpretation of a thyng, is then thought to be, when a Metaphore or translation is vsed, & the meaning thereof taken. As when this wodw *Ignis* (fire) betokeneth loue. Where as of che dwyn nature it signifieth fire, as we reade in *Ovid*, thus.

Quis enim celeravit ignem;

Lumineat qui semper proditur ipso suo.

Who can keepe close the fire, or hide the burning heate
That doth betraye it self alwaies with light of flame so grete
Wherin is nothyng els signified but loue, whiche is so hotte
of it self, that it must needes breake out into flames, and shewe it
self, at one tyme, or other.

The generall rule.

To whom the interpretation of a Prophete doeth agre, to the
same also the Roome it self agreeth.

The manner of reasonyng.

Suche a childe is called Dawson, and he made well be so call-
id, for his father is but a Dawne.

*Of the places called authoritie, or otherwise
named sentences of the Sage.*

 Suche testimonies mait bee called sentences of the
sage, whiche are broughte to confirme any thyng, either
taken out of olde authours, or els suche as haue been
in this common life. As the sentences of noble men, he laves
in

Woxored
speache or
metaphore.

Authoritie
or sentences
of the Sage.

The Arte of Logike.

**Tellmonies
wates vset.**

**Bristles
munde, as
touching the
worde.**

**Sentences
grafted in us
by nature.**

In any realme, quiche saynges, prouerbes, that either have been vset heretofore, or be now vset. Histories of wise Philosophers, the iudgements of learned men, the common opinion of the multitude, olde custome, auncient fashions, or any suche like. Testimonies are twoo waies considered. For either thei are suche as pertaine to God, or els to man. Those authoritie whiche come from God, and are spoken by the holie ghoste, are undoubtedlie true, neither can thei bee false: therefore, wee ought moste reverentlie to receve the worte of God, and agree to suche textes, as are written and spoken, even as though we heard God hymself speake, with lively voyce vnto vs. Mannes authoritie hath no suche greate force, althoough noble men, learned Philosophers, and stoute Capitaines, haue pronounced many thinges moste wisely. For although Aristotle saith, that the worlde neither had beginning, nor yet at any tyme shall haue endyng: I maie reiecte this saying (if any man bring me it for his confirmation) although this greate philosopher did pronounce the same. For, excepte I be perswaded by reason, it is in my cholle richer to admit, or refuse suche authoritie. Notwithstandyng, we shold not forsake wise mennes wordes rashly, but with a modest amissere, desire the aduersarie, not somuche to sticke to his authoritie, as to move the same by good reason. In prophane thinges, ye maie reason affirmatiuely very well, as thus. The best thinges are first to bee learned, for so doeth Quintilian teache. *Nasquam in tua fides.* It is hard trusyng any body. For, so saith Virgil. But I can not reason negatively, when I bring mine authoritie out of prophane authours. For, Reason amisse if I say. There is no suche disease, called the French Porques, because Galene the cheife of Physicians, never made mention in all his booke of any suche disease. For, this ruffian hath crept in since his tyme, through the naughtiness of men. And althoough it were then, yet maie it bee that he never heard of it. Hereunto might be added all such sentences, as by the lame of Nature are grafted in man. As thele following. Doe as thou wouldest he doen unto thee chankfull to hym that doest hym a pleasure. Honour thy father and thy mother. Knowe there is a GOD. Do that hast thou

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these opinions, naturally fastened in his harte, he mait lusly be thought rather a beaste, then man endued with reason.

In matters of Scripture, I mait reason both affirmatiuely, and negatiuely. Christe saith to his Disciples, *Reges Gentium dominans ut vos sunt non sic. Kynges beare rule over countreys, but you must not doe so.* Therefore, no Minister shoud haue any Temporall power, because Christe saith so. Deinate reason negatiuely thus, we reade not in all the scripture, from Genesis, to the Revelation of sancte Iohn, that euer there was Friar, Monke, Nunne or Chanson. Ergo, lette them goe scorne whence they came. We reade not in the Scripture, that worshippynge of Images, was euer allowed to be Laye mennes Bookes: therefore, take downe suche Tooltes, and let them serue for other usses.

No Friars
ne any other
suche mentio-
ned in Scri-
pture.
Images.

The generall rule for prophane authoritatis. That whiche is allowed of all wise men, or at the least by the better parte: no man ought rashly to gaine saie it, or thus. Every clumping man must be beleued in his owne arte.

The maner of reasoning.

 Rectoris thought besse, that dromkates shold haue double punishment. Therefore, ther deserve it. By texes of the Scripture, wee mait reason the matter, as thus. Cursed bee he that doeth the woork of the Lorde guisitfully, saith the Prophete. Ergo euill Bishoppes, wortyng Pastours, are accurled of God.

¶ Of the similitude, or likenesse.

Nsimilitude is, when two thynges or more, are so compared together, that even as in the first, there is one propertie: So in the other there is a like propertie, according to bothe their natures severally obserued. For like as water by continuauice, weareth a stonne, so there nothing so hard, but by tyme it mait bee compassed, or brought to passee. As Spiders make their owne Cobwebbes without any other helpe: so some good fellowes can byngynge vp newes, and tell straunge tales, without any hearyng, when there is not one woorde true. As the Palme tree being ouerlaid with weightes, riseth higher and biddeth by warde more freshely: so a noble stomacke vered

with

The Arte of Logike.

wich muche aduersarie, is euermore the slouter. And this ought diligentlie to bee obserued, that the thyng whiche is brought to make the similitude, be like unto that, whiche is proved.

G The maner of finding out a similitude.

The maner
of finding out
a similitude.

In every cause, that we do purpose to handle at large, we must obserue diligently, what thinges are spoken by translations, that is, from the proper signification, to a meanyng that is not proper. As speaking in the praise of a thing, and calling hym the lyght Sunne of the yearth. I mae gather a similitude by this word (Sunne) and make it thus. Euen as the Sunne onely genereth light to all the whole yearth: so there ought to be in a common weale, one Kyng that shoud be ruler over all.

G The general rule.

Of similitudes there is like judgement, that is, euen as wee thinke of the one, so mae we thinke of the other.

G The maner of reasonyng.

As a Dog standing at the table side, eateth that by by and by, whiche his maister hath cast ta hym, and euer looketh for more and more: so some when they haue received a luyng, for whiche thei hoped before, by and by thei are ready to take an other, and although thei be full, yet still thei are hungry.

G Of thinges compared.

Thynges
compared.

LYnges are compared together in one third word, wherunto thei bothe doe agree, as thus. If theste bee worthie death, then murther is worthie no lessse. Here ye see, that thest and murther are compared together, in one thirde word, whiche is death. Comparations are deuided twoo maner of waies, so, either thei bee equal, or not equal. Thei are equal in this wise: if the fathur haue auuthoritie over his sonne, he hath also auuthoritie over his daughter.

G The general rule.

Comparati-
ons two wa-
yes divided.

NHere thinges are equal, there must nedes be equal iudgement. Comparations are unequal, when I reason either from the greater to the lesse, or els from the lesse, to the greater. Frō the greater, to the lesse, ye may reason thus. If a capitaine with his whole compānie, be not able to kepe a towne much

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muche lesse one base souldier, can be able to doe it. The Schole-
maister can not understande the Greeke, or the Hebrew tongue,
muche lesse can the scholler, whiche never learned eicher of them.

From the lesse to the greater , ye mate reason affirmatiuely ,
as thus . Children can suffer muche colde , and can not yong men
beare a frost : Custome beareth swinge , and shall reason take no
place : Womē haue died for their countrie , therefore , mate not
men be ashamed to feare death : Noble men are desirous to haue
a good horsekeeper , that can keepe their horses well , and thei sparc
not , to geue greate stipendes to such : and shall thei not muche
more be desirous , to haue a good scholemaster , that might god-
lie byng vp their children , in vertue and wisedome ? If a horse
be not well broken , the owner will see that he mate be made gen-
tle and shall not a man , seyng his naturall childe euill brought vp ,
take paines and see hym broughte to some good order ? We can
see a Spauian , a syrent , a ryngboane , or lutsche other disease in a
horse , and shall we not be as readie to looke , that there be no faul-
tes in our children , or in the teacher , to whom we give the charge
to byng them vp in learning , and good maners ?

Horses faul-
tes are sone
seen , but chil-
dren's maners
are never
marked .

The general rule.

If that , whiche semeth to be greater , bee not added , neither
shall that be added , whiche is the lesse . Againe if that , whiche is
lesse be added , that whiche is greater halbe added also .

The maner of reasonyng .

The scholer understandeth Latine , Ergo his scholemaster
also hath knowledge in the same tonge . Negatiuely thus , If I bōwe .
GOD will not allowe a bōwe , made by the daughter , without
the knowledge of the fater , although the bōwe bee but for one
day : how muche lesse , shall that mariage take place , when yong
folke make p̄sonal contractes , without the good will , either ob-
tained , or yet once sought for of their parentes .

Ausforscher for thinges compared .

This one thyng would bee learned : when thinges are com-
pared together : to knowe whether thei be in that pointe , either
equall , or unequall . As for example , Suche a Lordē is not lear-
ned , no man will neithēr ; therfore , none of his mems are either .

D.iss. learned

The Arte of Logike

A rule for
things com-
pared.

learned of witt. In this pointe there shoule be made no compa-
ryng, betwix the lord and his seruant. For all wittie men be
not therefore Lordes, no, nor yet all Lordes, bee therefore wittie
men. Also, no, even the greateste lacke sometymes, aswell as o-
ther poore men doe. Some by inheritaunce are honourable, some
by faithfull seruite towarde the Kyng, and their countre, are
highly promoted: some againe, by bolde inhabiting themselves,
and some by chyflying on, choppie in at a windowe, when the
dobre is thurte by. Therefore, thus I make reason better. Such
a lord hath small landes, and little sustaunce, therfore his men
being more in number, then his landes can well maintaine, and
hangyng onely one his steue, living without any other trade, but
onely their bare wages, are better able to boawer, then to lende.
and must needs bee very neidle, and yet perhaps make be more
leartned, yea, and wittier also then is their Lorde and master,

An other argument.

Proxe subiectes get boyes, and shall noe mighty kynges be
able to get children? Herein is no comparing at all, such
as is required. For, a kyng is not therefore so called, because
he can haue children, but because he is a man of power, and ordei-
ned of God to rule, for the punishment of vice, and maaintenance
of vertue. Therefore, thus I make reason right well. The Kyng
ruleth: Ergo the subiectes must obeye.

The vse.

This place helpeth muche to exhorte, especially when wee
reason from the lesse, to the greater, by contrary. Neither
can any one that teacheth, want the use hereof, if thei pur-
pose, that their saynges shall take place.

Of repugnaunce.

Repugnaunce is surche a disreyng state of thynges
that no one thyng can bee the same, that the other is, by
one nature or substance, as thus. Man, and vertue, the
one can not be the same, that the other is.

The division.

Chinges repugnante, are dividde into discordantes, and in
to wonderes disreyng one from another, by any maner of meanes.

of

Repugna-
ncies, two wa-
ges deuided.

¶ Of discordantes, called opposita.

Discordantes are, when onely one worde or sentence, is contrary to an other, so that the one can not be the same, that the other is, nor yet both at one tyme, and in one place, and in one respecte can be in one, and the same subiecte, as hotte and colde, the farter and the soone, sight and blindnesse, light and darchenesse, cannot be at one and the same time, in one and the same place, of any one substance. For, though one bee blinde of one eye, and see with the other, yet wee can not saie, that thinges discordant, are in one and the same substance. For, the subiecte or substance of sight or blindnesse, is not properly the man, but the very place self, where the sight or blindnesse is. So that blindnesse and sight, are not bothe in one place, and therefore, not bothe in one substance together. For, the breaste, the heale, the legges or armes, are not the substance of the eye, but the place onely, where the eye hath his naturall being.

*¶ There be fower of this sorte.**Contraries.**Relatives.**Spatialia.**Contradiction.*

Contraries, are suche discordantes, as can not be, at one, and the same tyme, in one substance, nor without anyynge, ther maie bothe severally bee, in two subiectes, or substances, at one and the same tyme. As whitenesse, blackenesse, vertue, and vice, wisedome, and foolishnesse. Contraries, are two waies considered, for, some bee suche, that if the one be not, the other must needs followe, and ther are called in Latine *contraria immixta*, that is to say, contraries where nothing commeth betwene. As thus. A wise man, a foole. Virtue, vice, Faith, unbelief. All these are suche, that if the one be not in a man, the other must needs be. As thus. Suche a one is wist. Ergo, he is no foole. If a man be not wise, it must needs be that he is foolish. All are saien by saying. Ergo, we are conuincyd by intreties.

Againe, other contraries be so, that though the one be awaie, yet the other foloweth not therfore of necessite. For, blake and white

Contraries
two waies
taken.

The Arte of Logike.

white bee contrary, and yet they bee not so contrary, that if the white colour be not, the other must needes bee. For, a man maie be high coloured, or sallowe coloured, and yet not blacke. Therefore in such contraries, where some thing maie be put betweene the extremes, it is no good reason to say, that if the one bee not the other must needes be, and the reason is, that unto every singular and severall contrarie of suche sorte, there be divers other contrary unto hem, as the whithe come betwixt in the absence of other. As if a cloth be not white, it is no reason to call it blacke. For, it maie be blewe, greene, redde, russette, tawnie, yellowe, or any other colour els, as it shall best please the Dier. Note fur-ther, that all discordances are not contrary, accordyng to their generall woode, or common accidentes, but accordinge to their proper difference. For, if we reason thus,

Fire is an element.

Ergo water is none.

The argumente is not good, for fire and water are not contrary, accordyng to their generall woode, whiche agrath to them bothe, but according to their proper differences, as in that fire is hotte and drye, it is contrary to water, whiche is colde and moist. Thus some that maistained counterfete chastitie, were wont to reason against mariage, taking an occasion vpon that place of S. Paule, where he saith: it is not good to touche a woman, where he meanech nothing els, but consideryng the Gospele then required speedie Preachers, and that it were a clooge to bee ma-ried, and somewhat an hinderance to thole that shold traualle; he thought it expedient to forbear. Not that he conuenied mar-riage, or yet thought women to be devilles.

Therefore mariage is good like ethel.
Where as Chastitie and Marialge, are not contrary accordyng to their generall woode, whiche is (good) but according to their proper difference: As thus,

Chastitie is a singell life, without knowledge of carnall acte.

Therefore mariage is not so.

Therefore

Therefore this woyde (good) in the above rehearsed argumēt doeth signifie a thyng graunted of God, and allowed by his will, whiche nocht alswēl comprehende mariage, as he doeth virginitie therefore this argument is of no more force, then if I shold saye,

Justice is good.

Ergo temperance is not good.

And yet there is no man but will saye, that bothe these two veres are good. *Q[uod]o* thus,

Gentlemen haue soules.

Ergo poore men haue none.

Whereas GOD hath given bothe the high and lowe, riche and poore, the spirite that shall live ever. But this I speake to serue for the moste ac large the fondnesse of the other argument, concerning mariage. *It is said*: *viles instituta sunt maritatu[m]*

The general rule.

But awaie one of these contraries, where nothyng commeth betweene, called *immediate contrary*, and the other must needs followe, whiche in meetyng in these contraries, where somethyng commeth betweene them called *contrary and distant*. *That which* *Relatives* are those whiche are comparexxed among themselves *et sic referunt se* to some other. *As Father, a Sonne, a Spouse,* *a Servant, a Serva[n]t, a Subiect.* *and so of all other thinges* *that haue relation to some other.* *Mal to saye* *The grave abhors vices* *which than in di-*

If one of the Relative's bee, the other must necessary bee; if the one be not, the other cannot be neither.

The manner of considerying.

Thou art my servant, why dost thou not knowe me to be thy Maister? *Thou art a sicker, and will thinke take in hande to rule.*

*Privation in the absence of that thinge is a substance, whiche by Nature might haue beene there, *minus* *that thinge.**

The habite is the habynge of that thinge in the substance, *whiche Nature hath graunted to be there, *of all other thinges* *of**

The general rule.

Every privation is the destruction of that, whiche by Na-

*turē was, *minus* *that thinge.* *The nature of privation* *is to remoue* *some**

The arte of Logike

Deame,

Sentences
gainsayng.

Christen-
esse.

¶ *Whiche a man is blind, whom he can not see.*

Blindnesse is called apition, because it is the absence of that thinge which either by nature was, or might haue been in the substance. Neither doeth any man call a stone blind, because Nature hath utterly denied the gift of seeinge to all stones.

Sinne is called apition, because it is the destruction of that greate goodnesse whiche God pouered into mannes. And therefore God iustly punishmenteth thole that haue forsaken his grace.

G Sentence gainsayng otherwise

called contradiction.

Sentences gainsayng are twoo Propositions, the one denying that which the other affirmeth, as thus. Christ is in the sacrament really : Christ is not in the sacramente really. If anoyther, but one of these twoo Propositions must needs be false.

The general rule.
¶ If one of these twoo Propositions be grounded to be true, the other must needs be grounded to be false; for they can not be by any meanes possiblē both bothe of them shoud either bee true or false, at one and the same tyme. Alwates provided that there be no doubtfulnesse in the wordes: for if one word do signifie diversitie, then maie bothe Propositions bee either true or false, at one and the same tyme. ¶ *Thus also will contradictione be proved.*

{ *The fleshe of Christ profiteth greatly.*

{ *The fleshe of Christ profiteth nothing at all.*

In these twoo Propositions there is no contradiction or gainsayng, but that they bothe be untrue, at one and the same tyme considerynge that are bothe directly taken of Christes fleshe eaten and chewed with our teethe profitably nothing. Christes fleshe toone upon the Crosse profitably myght as the whiche purchaseth to all beleeuers life for ever.

The manner of refusyng.

If we bee iustified freely through the onely merites of Iesus Christ then this is false, that we are not iustified one ly through the merites of Iesus Christ. ¶ *This is true; Ergo this is false.*

The.

¶ Item 11. In the 11. chapter of Boethius. note K. & note M. ¶

¶ Of pxiuation, contradiction, and of contraries that immediatly followe, conditionall arguments are made, with the addition of some one conundrum, of the whiche when the one is true, the other must nedes be false, as thus Either the soule is immortall, or els it is not immortall, but the first is true: Ergo, the secod is false.

¶ Of wordes differyng.

Shen haue we the vse of this place when we reason, and prove that one thing is not the same that the other is; as Kyng *Lud* is not the same that *Iulius Cesar* or *Brunus* was kyng *Lud*, builder London, of whom the cite haue his name, being called *Lud*-des toun, and afterward by alteration of letters called London. Ergo neither *Cesar*, nor *Brunus* builded the same. Discordantes called *opposita*, are not the same that wordes differyng are, called *differentia*. If opasmuche as where discordantes be one thing onely, is set against an other one. As for example. Nothing can be set against brightnesse as discordant, but only darkenesse, nothing can be set agaist heate but onely cold, and so in other. But in this place there maie many thynges differ from sonke one thyng, and whatsoevre is not the same that another is, maie be called a word differyng, in Latine *differens*, or *disparatum*. *Socrates* is a man, Ergo he is not an ore, a stone, a horse, or any other thyng els.

Thynge's differ fowle wates, either by muddyness. As every singular man differeth one from another. *James* is one, and *Ioh* is an other. Other differ in their kinde, when thei are comprehended under diuers humors. *Brenis* of Hampton, and *Arandell* his horse. *Dylio*, *Alexander*, and *Bucephalus*, or *Brenis* with *Alexander*, are comprehended under manas their kinde and speciell, but *Arandell* and *Bucephalus*, are comprehended under this ioynde horse, which is come in speciall unto them bothe. Other differ by the generall woode, when thei are comprehended under diuers generall woodes, as this woode Baptisme, and Maristre, che are comprehended under a Sacrement of God, the other under a certaine ordinance of GOD. Lastly wordes differ by their mode generation, whiche they are placed in others.

Woodes
differyng.

Kyng *Lud*.

Chynged
differ fowle
wates.

The arte of Logike.

Predicamentes. A kyng, and manerode, the one is placed emong
the Relatives, the seconde is in qualitie.

The generall rule.

We can not make thynges that dose muche differ, to bee of
one nature.

The maner of reasonyng.

We reason from wordes differyng negatively altogether.

From such as differ in number, we reason thus.

Suche a one is called Thomas, therefore he is not the same
that Iohn is. Peter is not Paule, nor yet Paule is Peter. Faith
is not woorkes, nor yet woorkes are faith.

From such as differ in kinde, thus, I am a man, therefore I
should not be vsev like a brute beast.

From such as differ by the generall woord.

I did boadowe plain clothe of thee, and why doest thou require
raised Velvet of me?

From such as differ in Predicamente.

Virtue is a qualitie of the minde, therefore it is no substance.

Use maketh
maisteries.

After knowledge attained, exercise is moste necessary.
And happie shall he be that unto skill addeth practise,
for then learnyng is beste confirmed, when knowledge
is put in use.

Therefore, consideryng I haue set forthe the places, I thinke
it necessary after knowledge of the same, to deseribe matter by euer
one of them as thei lye in order: that other maike likewise, whē
any question commeth in controuersie, go through the places the
selues with it, and examine every worde by every severall place.

And to make this thyng more plaine, I will goe through the
places with one certaine woorde, and looke what helpe I shall
 finde there for knowledge of the same. The woorde shalbe (a Kyng)
or (a Magistrate.)

The definition.

The definition of a Magistrate. Every Kyng or Magistrate
is the minister of God for a good ende, to the punishing of naughtie
persones, and to the comfortynge of godlie men.

A Kyng de-
clared by the
places of
Logike.

The arte of Logike.

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¶ To be generall rule.

The Minister of God.

¶ The kinde,

Either a tyrant or a godly Kyng, the one ruleth according
to his luste, the other according to right and justice.

¶ Woordes yoked.

The Officer, the Office, to beare an Office, if the Officer can
not be spared, the Officer can not be spared.

¶ Adiacentes necessarie soyned.

Wisedome, earnest labour, cunnyng in sciences, skilfull bothe
of warre and peace, these all must neves be in every Magistrate

¶ Adiacentes adioyned casually.

To be liberall, to be frugall, to be of a temperate life, all these
happen to be in good Magistrates.

¶ Deedes necessarie.

To defende Religion, to enake godlie Lawes, to punishe of-
fendours, to defende the oppressed: all these are necessarie in a
Kyng, and are never founde in a tyrant.

¶ The thyng conteyning.

Noyses, David, Salomon, Ezechias, Iosias, Charles the
Emperour. Coward the slyt of that name kyng of Englannde.

¶ The efficient cause.

God hymself, or els the ordinance of God.

¶ The seconde efficient cause.

Unquier Subjectes, Rebelles, Disobedient people, are the
cause why Magistrates are odered, that the rather they mate be
ruled and kept in good order.

¶ The ends of a Magistrate.

This ende he muste needes obserue, that alwaies the people
live in quietnes, and in honest comersation passe their whole life.

¶ The effect, or els the thynges doen by a Magistrate.

Peace is made, the Realme enriched, all thynges plentuous,
but where a tyrant ruleth, all thynges are contrarie.

¶ The authoritie.

The kyng to the Romaines, lette every soule be subiecte to the
powers. ¶ Peter. ¶ We subiecte to the kyng.

p.ii.

Thynges

The arte of Logike.

Thynges incident.

The Scepter is a token of Justice, even as a Swoorde is a signe of renegement or warthe, paipng of Subsidies, Taxes, Tributes, Rente, or any such like, peomen of the Garde, and all other warters, Soldiours in warre, the obedience of the subiectes, the honour givene to hym, triumphes made, runnyng at the Bell, fightyng at the Barriers, fightyng at the tourney. All these are contingens to a Kyng, that is, although these thynges be not in a commonwealthe, yet mae there be a Kyng, yea; and although there be no Kyng in some Commonweale, yet these thynges mae be everychone of them, as it was in Abbes where the people had the rule of the Commonweale, and all was referred to their judgement.

Similitudes.

Gouvernance.

That whiche is the Shepherde to the Sheeppe, the same is the Magistrate to his Subiectes. That whiche the master of the Shipppe is to the Shipppe, or the Master of an hausholde to his house, or the hedde to the whole houche the same is the Magistrate to his Subiectes.

Thynges comparyng.

Obedience.

Scruauies mull be obedient, and subiect to their Masters with all reverence, as we read in the Scripture: how moare then shoud the Subiectes bee obedient to their Kyng and soueraine Lorde, whiche by the opinaynce of God is appoyneted to rule, and to have the gouernaunce ouer them,

Gathering
Argumēts.

We mae see by this one example, that the searching of places ministereth argumēts plentifullly. For, if we will moue a Magistrate necessarie, ye mae reason from the definition, from the causes, from the authoritie, from the thyng conteyning, from the adiuenters, from the similitude, and make good reasons for the purpose. Notwithstanding, I thonke it not necessarie, that ye searche all the places at every tyme, and for every matter. But that ye searche moste parte of them. And although wee can not finde a good argumēt in every one of them, yet it is well if wee mae gather but three or fourre good argumēts. As when we goe into a garden, we shall not finde all beedes growing ther.

although

although we searche every corner, so when we looke in all the places of invention for the proove of our matter, we shall not finde in every place a good argumente for our purpose. Notwithstan-
ding it is moste necessarie, either when we will prove a matter
our self, or els trie an others labour, whiche is set forth at large
moste eloquently: To byng the whole somme of his long tale to
these places, and make an argument in thre lines of that, which
be dilateth into three shertes.

The use of
Logike.

And for our self, if wee will reason a matter earnestly, it shall
bee profitable to see our owne argumentes before hande, derived
out of the places, the whiche shall make vs more bolde to speake,
when we shall evidently perceiue our owne reasons surely grou-
ded. And the better able wee shalbe to confirme our owne cause,
and to auoide all objections, when wee knowe surely by this arte
wherevnto we maie leane. For, although other shall impeche our
doynges, and wex our woordes, yet we shall bee able euermore
to keepe our owne, when we plainly perceiue wheresof our argu-
ment hath his grounde. Many speake wisely whiche never reade
Logike, but to speake wisely with a judgement, and to knowe the
bere fountain of thynges; that can none doo, excepte they haue
some skill in this arte.

Therefore, what diuersitie there is betwixt a blinde mannes,
and hym that seeth, the same difference is betwixt a wiseman un-
learned, and a wiseman learned. We haue seen the commodetie of
this arte by this our woordes (Magistrate) whiche I did apply to
every place, that might giue any light to the making of an ar-
gument. Now ye shall haue a question sett sondrie, and bothe the
partes of a Proposition, referred to the places of Invention, that
thereby ye maie knowe wherin the places doe agree, and wherin
they doe not. For whereas the places agree (that is to say, all
thynges are referred to the one, that are referred to the other)
there the Proposition is good, and the latter parte of the Propo-
sition is truly spoken of the firste. But where the places doe not
agree (that is to say) some thynges are referred to the one mynde
that are not referred to the other, there the thynges them selues
can not agree. I will shew this question by an example, whether it
be.

The arte of Logike.

The Mar-
riage of prie-
stes, proued
by Logike.

bee lawfull for a prieſte to marrie a wife, or no. And firſte of all I will examine a prieſte, and applie hym to all the places. Next after that, wee will referte a wife to all the places, and ſee when we haue doen, wherein theſe twoo doore agree, and wherein thei doe not agree.

From the definition.

A Preacher is a Clerke or Sheperde, whiche will give his life for his ſhepe, instructed to ſet forthe the kyngdome of God, and delituous to liue vertuously: a faithfull and a wiſe ſteward, whom the Lord doeth ſette ouer his houſe, that he maie give the houſhouldes ſeruauntes meate in due tyme.

From the generall wordes.

A Minister, a ſeruaunt of God, a holiſe man, a Goffeller, the Minister of God, ſhould bee upright in liuyng, faithfully be ſlowyng the woordes of truthe.

From the kinde.

Peter, Paule, Iohn Baptift, Cliae, Eloras, and Geryben, Ambroſe beeynge a temporall man, was after that a minister of the churche. Chrysſtome became of a laiuer, an earnest preacher of Gods woord. Petre, Peter and Andrewe bothe were fifters, therfore temporall men maie be called if thei be worthy, and deſire the ſpirituall funtion.

From the proprietie.

To be meete to teache, to be godlie minde, to doe, and to teach althyngeſ that thei are commaunded by Gods booke, ſainte Hierome in his Epiftle to Nepotianuſ, as touching the life of Preachers ſaith thus. I will not haue thee pleade cauſes, and to be a hablyng langejer without all reaſon, but I will haue thee to be a faithfull minſter of the Sacraumentes, and verie ſkilfull in the Lawes of the Lord.

To be brought vp in the ſcriptures even from his youth, to be godlie in conuerſation, and wholie to be iuſtructed with all thynges neceſſarie for a Preacher, whaſeuer is thus armed, is woythiſſe to bee a Minister in the Churche of God. This argument is derived from the whole.

The

The Arte of Logike.

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The partes.

To invent matter out of the scripture, accordyng to the apte-
nesse of his hearers, to decke his doynges handsomely, to place
his sentences in order, to remember what he speaketh, and to ut-
ter his wordes distinctly, plainly, and with loude voice.

Thynge roked together.

A preaching, a Preacher, to doe the woork of a Preacher,
i. Timo.the.iii. He that by his Preaching edifieth, the same may
is a Preacher.

i. Timo.the.iii.

Thynge cleauning or adiayned to the substance.

Labour, diligence, witre, knowledge, schrietie, gentlenesse,
virtue. Mariage, an earnest desire to bryng vp his children well
with other suche. A Bishoppe must be without fault, the house-
band of one wife, watchfull, sober, modest, herberous, apte to
teache, no greate drinker of wine, no fighter, not giuen to filthe
lure, but upright, voide from brawlyng, from courteousnesse. &c.
i. Timo.the.ii.

i. Timo.the.ii.

The maner of doyng.

To feede Christes flocke, to parte his life in daunger for the
flocke committed to his charge, to bryng vp his flocke and fa-
milie in the feare of God, in ths knowledge of his woerde, and in
dye obseruation of the same.

The thynge contaynyng.

Hierome in the firste booke of the commentaries, whiche he Hierome.
made upon the Galathians, i. Let vs not thinke, that the Gospell
resteth in wordes of Scripture, but in sense, not in the outward
rude, but in the very harte, not in the leagues, but in the very roote
of reason. Let the woordes of Christe dwelle plenteously in you,
with all wisedome. *Col.iii.*

The matter.

The woerde of God, the olde Testament, and the new. *Jer. i.*
Beholde, I haue given my woordes into thy mouche.

The shape or forme.

The shape mai be taken of the conuersation, speache, spirite,
or the maner of Preachers liuyng,

The efficient cause.

Q. i.

God

The Arte of Logike.

God hymself, the Scripture, good Preachers, Euangeli-
sters, the Lorde will give his woorde to those that preache plenti-
fully. Psalmie. xviii. I haue planted, Apollo hath watered, but
God giueth encrease.

¶The ende.

The ende of Preaching is, that the wicked might be conuer-
ted to repentaunce, and the iuste man kepte in his upright liuyng

Ezech. iii.

¶Thynge done by vertue of the cause.

To winne men to Christ, to make mens consciences quete,
to moue them to praier. When Peter made a Sermon out of
hande, there was aboue three thousande conuerted to the faith of
the Gospell, that self same daye.

¶What is appoynted to hym, and

proper to this reasonyng.

To studie earnestly, and searche the scriptures, that he maie
yonge a true minister of God, to liue a good life, and leke to kepe
a housholde, that he maie be herberous.

¶The place.

The Church, the pulpite, the vestiarie, the chauncell. I speake
openly in the Synagoge, saith Christ, and in the Churche to all
the Jewes that came therether, and I speake nothyng in corners.

¶The tyme.

A yong man, an elderly man, an olde man, to preache early
and late. 1. Timoth. iii. Let no man contemne thy youth.

¶Thynge annexed.

To have some stiplende for his Preaching. Woxhie is the
labourer to haue his wages. Math. x.

The other places solowyng, because thei are not absolutely
considered, but referred to somme other, and ever haue respecte to
the nexte woord, whiche is rehearsed in the question of that
whiche went before, thei can not severally bee handled in one
woorde: and therfore, ye must marke the whole question, and in
one argumente comprehende aswell eys wise, as the minister.
How therfore, ye shall haue this woerde vnor(a wise) described
throughout the places.

¶The

The definition.

A wife, is a woman that is lawfullie received into the fellowship of life, for the increase, or gettynge of chldren, and to vnde fornication.

The general rule.

A wife, is a woman.

The kinde.

A chaste wife, a learned wife, a manerlie wife, or els ye maie vse the proper names of women, for the kinde it self. As *Lucratia, Cornelia, Portia, Hippocratis, &c.*

The properties.

To byynge for the chldren.

The whole.

The whole woman her self altogether.

The partes.

The heade, the breaste, the armes, the bache, the thigh, the harte, the vaines, bloud, and fleshe.

Wordes jahed.

Housewife, like to doer the woorke of a wife. She doeth the duttie of a good wife: Ergo she is a wife. She handleth all thynges housewifely: Ergo she is a good housewife.

Wordes adiugned.

The loue in mariage, care ouer the familie, keping of her self to one housbande, to bee obedient unto hym, loue of her chldren losse of her chldren.

The maner of doing.

To be obedient, to be shewshaken, to be knappishe, to byynge by her chldren well, to live in mariage with her housbande, both at bedde, and at horde, according to the will of God.

The shewshaken.

The woman her self.

The matter and forme.

The hodie, and soule, of the woman, and the manne, are the matter of mariage, the coniunction it self, is the forme of it.

The efficient cause.

Q. J.

God

The Arte of Logike.

I.Timo.iii.
Genesis,i.

God hymself, the scripture, let a manne be the housebande of one wife. Then shall be two in one fleshe. The cause that one woman is maried to a severall persone, and liketh hym before all other, and the man her in like wise: is God hymself firste, that kindeleth sushe affections, next after, their consent, and full agreement, doeth make vp all the matter.

The ende.

To bryng forthe children, and to keepe them sauife, and to a wido wyne.

The effect.

Children Godly instructed, the house well ordered.

Thynges appointed for some ende.

To please her housebande, to haue a good life, to prouide thynges necessarie for the furniture of her housholde.

The place.

The house, the chamber of wedlocke, the hall, or parlour.

The tyme.

Bristoles
mynde, what
tyme menne
and maidens
should marie.

Bores beget
boros.

A yonge woman, or an olde. *Arrestis saith,* it is meete for men to marie at sixe & thirtie, for maidens to marie at eightene, but then was then, and now is now, all thynges in this wold, are ripe before their tyme. I meane, not that honestie it selfe is so, for I never knewe it ripe as yet, but euer rawe. But thus ye see the tyme of mariage, was not so hastyly looked for, as it is now. In this wold a childe shall scant be out of his shelle, but he shall be sure to one, or other, the whiche I doubt, whether it maie bee called a mariage, or no: for, chose that be of ripe yeres, no man doubteth, but if they can agree bothe, and haue their frendes good will (for, that ought to be soughte for, and also obtayned) the mariage is allowed before God.

Wordes amercian, to write together.

Mariage is referred to this place, for a wife is so calley, because she hath a housebande, neither can any woman be called a wife, except she haue a housebande, therefore, she is placed emong the woordes amercian, that is, wherre one thyng is knitte to another, so that the one can not be, excep the other breake.

Now, that we haue drawen these wordes, the Preacher, and the

the wife after this sorte, throughout the places, so farre as wee
coulde: we shold compare them together, and see wherein thei
doe agree, and wherein thei varie. Let vs compare the definitions
together, and wee shall finde some what euene there, where these
wordes be (desyryng to liue vertuously) whiche shall glue light for
an argument, as thus.

*From the
definition.*

{ Whosoever desirereth to liue vertuously, must
marrie a wife.

{ Every true Preacher of Gods woord, desi-
rith to liue vertuously.

Ergo every true preacher must marrie a wife.

Now, if myne aduersarie will denie the proposition at large,
called the *Maior*, then can I doe no good with it, excepte I finde
some what in the definition of a wife, whiche is agreynge to this
aboue rehearsed proposition. I finde in this wordes (wife) that she
is married for the increase of children, and to auide fornication.
Then I reason thus, for the confirmation of my purpose by the
argument, called *Sorites*.

{ Whosoever desirereth to liue vertuously, desirereth to a-
uoyde fornication.

{ Whosoever desirereth to auoyde fornication, and can
not obtaine it by praier, or otherwise (as to al men
it is not ginen) the same persone desirereth mariage.

Ergo, whosoever desirereth to liue vertuously, desirereth
marriage.

Againe, the generall wordes of bothe these definitions, geueneth
light for an argument. Every wife is a woman, every Preacher
is a man, and nature hath ordeneid, that man and woman mate
line in mariage (if thei be so disposed) of what degree, condition,
or state, so euer thei be, nothing in all the scriptures to the con-
trary. Therefore, I make reason thus.

{ Whatsoever is man, that same maie marrie a wo-
man by Gods ordinaunce.

{ Every Preacher is a man.

Ergo, every Preacher maie marrie a woman by
Gods ordinaunce.

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Incommo-
dities of ma-
riage mitige-
ted.

Euen as I haue doen in these places , comparyng one to an other , so ye maie doe in the residue , and where ye see any thyng seruerly for your purpose , that thei agree together on bothe parties , ye maie vise the same : if thei doe not agree in some places , ye maie refuse theim , or els so mollisfe the thyng , that suche repugnancies , maie not harme your cause at all . As where it is in the wordes abyoygned , that a woman is oftentimes overthwart , frowarde , disobedient , carelesse ouer her children , soasmuche as these be no causes of mariage , thei shall not hinder mariage , for a Godly manne will beare all aduersitie , and suffer suche euill hap , and not therefore eschue mariage , because these incommodities rhaunce in mariage . Now , I will enter into the other places , whiche doe not severally handle one worde , but haue respecte euermore to an oþer , and so by the knytyng together of two thin- ges , or settynge the one against the other , the truthe of our purpose is espied , and the cause confirmed .

From the similitude .

Similitude
of mariage.

As he is not to be coumpted a good Gardiner , or a good Char- chard keper , that is content with suche fruicte as he hath alredy , onely cherishyng his olde trees , and hath no care , neither to cutte downe the olde , nor yet to sette newe graffles , so that man is to be coumpted no diligent member in the common weale , whiche being content with the presente companie of men , hath no minde to encrease the number of people .

From auerboris .

God the an-
hour of ma-
riage .

If the greate wooyke man of thynges , God almighty hym self , after the flood , being reconciled to man , made this lawe (as we reade in scriptures) that men shoulde not liue single , but en- crease and multiplye , that the yearth might be filled : and seyng al- so that Christ hymself since that tyme , hath allowed mariage by a miracle , chaungyng of Water into Wine , whiche miracle was the firste he did uppon the yearth : and seyng Paule also bid- deth every manne that can not liue chaste , to marrie and that it is better to marrie , then to burne in fylle desires , and besides this , willeth a Bishoppe should be the housebande of one wife : it must needs bee , that the Preachers maie lawfully marrie , as well as any

any other ttemporall men.

From comparison of the leſſe, to the greater.

It is a shame to see herte beastes, obeye the lawe of Nature,
and man, especially a learned man, and a preacher, like a stoue
Giauant to striue with Nature, & to doe contrary to her bidding,

From the greater, to the leſſe.

If the daughters of Lot doubted nothing at the matter, to lie
with their owne fathur, when he was dyonke, thinking it better
to prouide for encrease by filthe lust, then that mankinde shoud
decaye: shall not then a Preacher, whiche shoud haue regarde for
the encrease of mankinde, and also a desire to auoide fornication,
marrie, if he be disposed, or other wise can not liue chaste?

*Lotter
daughters.*

Of discordancies.

De maiſ reason from the contrary, thus: If virginitie bee a
thyng giuen to Aungelles, and almoſte aboue mannes reache,
then mariage is a thyng proper to man.

From the priuation.

If the lacke of children, bee a thyng hatefull to man, then the
hauyng of chyldren, is a thyng ioyfull to man.

From the relation.

If a Bishoppe be allowed by the Scriptures, to bee a house-
bande, then is he allowed to haue a wife, and by the Scriptures
we reade, that he is allowed to haue a housebande, so Paule saith:
Let a Bishoppe be the housebande of one wife. Ergo, he is allowed
to haue a wife.

From wordes differyng.

That wōde is called a differyng wōode, whatsoeuer it is,
whiche is not the same, that an other is. As thus: A Preacher is
a man. Ergo he is no God. Priestes be men, as other men be, and
that some maried men ere now, haue well knownen. Therefore,
be maiſ marie a wombe, if he can not liue chaste, considering there
is nothyng in all the scriptures, to the contrary.

As I haue doen for the office of a Prince, and the mariage of
a Prester, so maiſ I also goe throughout the places, with any o-
ther matter, that is now in controuerſie.

*As Fanchyng, Penaunce, the Sacrifice of the Hostie,
Baptisme,*

The Arte of Logike.

Baptisme, the Latne, the Gospell, symme, slander, rule, Preaching, and every other thyng, that man is bounde to knowe.

Faith the deuised.
What is faithe? Faithe is a trust and full persuasion, where by onely wee doe assur vs, that our synnes bee forgiuen vs, and we accepted as iuste before God, through the merites of Christ.

Oribus.

Paule in the Epistle to the Hebrewes. Faithe is a sure confidence of thynges whiche are hoped for, and a certaintie of thynges, whiche are not seen.

The generall words.

A sure confidence, and a certaintie of thynges.

The kinde.

A faithe whiche is occupied aboute thynges, bothe corporall, and also spirituall, beleuyng that Christe was bothe GOD and man, by whom saluation is attained.

The difference.

Thynges whiche are hoped for, and the whiche are seen.

The propertie.

To beleue assuredly, and trust the promises of God.

The parties of faithe.

*Faith dixerit
she taken in
Scripture.*
The true faithe hath no partes. Albeit faithe is diversly taken in the scripture, so, there is an historiall faithe. As I doe beleue that WillIAM Conquerour was kyng of Englande.

There is also a iustifying faithe, whereby I looke assuredly to be saued. There is a faithe, when one man faithfully promiseth an other, to doe this, or that, and will stande to his woorde. There is also a faithe of miracles, whereby the Apostles did caste out Deuilles, and helped the diseased persones.

*Thynges adioyngynge to faithe, and also
thynges annexed to faithe.*

Hope, Charite, to be good to the poore, to forbeare from wicked attempts, to speake well of all, and to eschue excesse.

The thyng conteynyng.

The minde of man, or the soule of man.

The efficauen cause.

The woord of God, or the holie ghoste, stirryng the harte of man,

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man, and comfortyng hym in the merites of Chistes passion.

The ende of faithe.

Life euerlastyng, whiche is giuen freely to every beleueer, that confesseth in his harte Jesus to be Christ, and assuredly trueth to be saued by the onely merites of his passion.

Contraries.

Unbeleef, Desperation, whereby a man falleth from God to his vtter damnation for ever.

Thus we see how large the vse is of thysse places, for not onely shall any one be able to speake right aptly, and verie well to the purpose, whensocuer he shall seeke out the truthe of any cause, by diligent searche, and taungyng in these corners, but also he shall largelyp set out his matter with muche delice, and orderly tell his tale with singular profite, and passing gaine. And therefore I would wishe that *Logike* were alwaies the square to rule our talke, and make the vertue touche stone to trie our reasons, suche as in weightie matters full ofte are alledged, and then I woud not doubt, but that solie shold the soner be espied, and wise mens laynges the better esteemed.

Of disputation or reasonyng, what it is.


That is called a disputation or reasonyng of matters, when certaine persones debate a cause together, and one taketh parte contrary unto another, the one awnsweryng and dennyng, and the other still apposyng, and confirming the cause so earnestly as he can, wherepon after harde holde and long debatyng, the truthe either appeareth, or els ther reste bothe vpon one poincte, leauyng the matter to bee adjudged of the hearers, vpon the knowledge of bothe their mindes fullie had and perceiued. In all whiche matchyng and taungyng together, this wold bee obserued, that every of the keepe their owne standyng, that is to say, the awnswerer must still stell flatte dennyng, and shake of suchte litle reasons as are alledged by the helpe of iudgemente, whiche is the first parte of *Logike*, wherein are diuers rules and lessons set for the, especially for that purpose: the apposer muste fight with the apon of his wive, and still haue

R.S.

by

The arte of Logike.

up that whiche the aunswere doeth onerthowre, never leaſing
to ſolo we and conſirme his cauſe, till he haue brought the other to
ſome ſuiche poyncte, as he ſhall not well be ablie to auoide. And the
rather to excell in this behalfe, he muſte uſe the ſeconde parte of
Logike, whiche is cauſed Inuention, where he maie haue argu-
mentes at will, if he ſerche the places, which are none other thing
but the ſtope house of reaſon, and the fountaine of all wiſdomē.

The office and diuerſe of the appoſter.

In all debating of cauſes warines is ever thought
greate wiſedomē. And therfore he that will ſhewe
wiſte and learning, muſt uſe good aduimente,
and take greate deliueration wiþ hym, and euer-
moſe haue ſome cheef grounde in hiſ head, where-
unto he miſteþ to lauerll all hiſ reaſons before hande, that upon
the graunt of them, a weightier matter maie euermoſe be obtai-
ned. And whereas the aunswere ret perhaſps ſhall ſmell where a-
thouſte he goeth, and therfore will ſeekhe ſtarting holes to eſcape
and ſee ſuiche daunger: the diuferer muſt alwaies keepe hym iñ,
and ſuffer hym at no hande to ſlippis awaie, but force hym ſtill to
aunſwer the propouned argument direc̄tly, that either he graut
the argument to bee true, or denigh it to bee good, or els ſhewe
wherein the fault iſ, by either openyng the doubtfullerneſſe of ſome
worde, or declaryng plainly the wrong knitting and lapping up
of the whole reaſon. And because where many wondres are ſpo-
ken, greate aduaantage maie bee taken, the appoſter ſhall in as
ſe we wondres as he can poſſible, comprehendē hiſ whole reaſon, &
ſtraying it in good order, ſhall force the aduertifer to make an-
ſwer unto the partes plainly, and without cloke or doubtfull
dealyng in any wife, and upon hiſ open and manifesṭ aunſwer, a
keache reaſon maie ouſt of hande be framed, and to one upon an-
other, gathering reaſons from place to place, ſo long and ſo often,
till at length he be brought to ſome onthing, whiche he ſhall not
bee ablie to reaſonadente. And this would alwaies be knowne,
that the ſame reaſon whiche prouerely ſhould alwaies bee either
more large then or then thong whiche is propouned, or elſe of the
weight and longeneſſe ſtanchit. And ſo ones proou from the gen-

ral to that, whiche is inferiour to it : and also from the effectes of thynges to the causes: from the definition to the thyng that is defi-
ned, and likewise from all other partes of Invention after the
same sorte.

The office or duetie of the aunswere.

SHe aunswerer also must be as ware and as wittie
as the apposer is; seekyng by all subtile meanes,
to escape suche trappes and ginnes, as the cratice-
nesse of the apposer hath laied for hym. And there-
fore, vpon rehearsal of the argumente, it is needes-
full and expedient for hym to repeate it unto hymself, in the self-
same oder as is set forthe and spoken by the apposer; and after a
little pause to make suche an aunswere, that the apposer maie take
little aduaantage therby, and at no hande to graunty any lutsche
thing, that maie afterwards turne to his owne harne, the whiche
full ofte doeth happen, when wee graunt that as a truthe, whiche
is plaine falsoode, or denv. that to be true, whiche is moste true, or
allowe thinges absurdre to be compred as lawfull. And yet where
as thynges in ourward apparaunce maie seeme true, whiche are
nothyng so, but haue onely the ourward shape and colour of cer-
taintie; the aunswerer must earnestly take heede, that then he bee
not deceived. For if one inconuenience be graunted, a thousande
misshappes doe followe vpon the same, and a wide gappe is made
open to enter into all errours. Therefore the aunswerer must at
the first hear yng of his argumente, marke whether it be made ac-
cordingy to rules of Logike, or other wise, for the matter, and e-
very parte of the argumente maie be tryng in sense, When the s. a-
myng of it together is full badde. And therefore in lutsche cases the
argument must bee refused, because it is not well proportioned,
neither yet shaped in oder, accordingy as the rules of making ar-
gumentes doen evermore require. But if the argument haue his
due forme and shape, then muste the aunswered marke the truthe
of his argumente, and if the allegations been either doubtfull, or
vtrue in sense or understandyng: the same must be refused out of
hande as unlawfull, and of no force to constreine the cause. And for
the better avoydyng of euill argumentes, the one of these twoe

The arte of Logike.

waies must alwaies bee used, that either wee deny some parte of the argument, if the matter be altogether false and untrue; or els that we open the doubtfulnesse, or euill knittynge of some woorde or sentence, by makyng a distinction (as the *Logicians* terme it) and severally sooryng suche thynges, as then were thought to be euill set together. And thus the awnswere beinge ware in his doynges, maie give his iudgements without greate daunger, and soice the apposer to give ouer his tacklyng, without any aduantage gotten. But for this whole matter of awnsweryng to an argument, I doo shewe my minde at large, next and immediatly before the rehearsal of false conclusions, or deceiptfull argu-

mentes, whiche doe followe in the next page, where I speake of confutation, and therefore I surceale to talke any further in this matter, leaste

that with double inculcation of one

thyng, I maie byng tedi-

oulness unto all

men.

The



*The place of false conclusions,
or deceiptfull reasons.*



Now that I haue declared what an argument is, what the places of Inuention bee, how they serue for the confirmation of any matter, how euery thing is made in his due Hode and Figure, and also shewes the obseruation of many thynges, whereby any one shal bothe be assured that his argument is true (if it be made according to the rules) and also maie knowe that it is false, if it bee not made accordyng to the same rules: I will from hemforthe set out the maner of deceiptfull argumentes called in Latine *Reprobationes*, or *fallaces conclusio[n]e*, even as Aristotle hath set them forthe. Albeit there is no argumente so deceiptfull, but they maie easilly be avoided, if the rules be marke[n]ed that are rehearsed before, concerningy the true makynge of an argument. For accordyng to the old sayng: *Cōtrariorum eadem est doctrina*. That is to saie, of contraries there is one maner of doctrine, for he whiche can handsomely sette forthe a Lyon in his shape and portraiture, maie iudge with reason a Lione ill fauouredly painted, and can with little difficultie shewe the faultes in euery place: So like maner is one can make an argument, accordyng to the rules aboue rehearsed in his due forme and Hode, he can tell also when an argument is otherwise made then the rules can beare. To some men these places of craftie that followe, maie seeme strange, and yet euен in weightie matters, the wicked haue derived their subtle defences from these deceiptfull corners. Therfore, because suche places maie the rather be auoyded, and better knowne, I will bothe set forthe at large, and also teache aswell as I am able how to cōfute them. And firste to confute, is nothyng els but to iudge false packyng, and to unde by reason thynges knitte together by craftie. Therefore the Logician if he will do his part, must not onely fence hymself for confirmation of his owne cause, but muste therewithall ouerthowme the assertion of other, and also by reason prove their sayynges to bee false, whiche by deceipte would enuagle the weake,

Deceiptfull
argumentes,
or false con-
clusions.

The arte of Logike.

The maner of confutation, twoo waies considered.

Confutacion
ii. waies vſed
In answere
made to ſa-
tisfe the per-
ſone thre
waies.



¶ the firſte, either wee purpose by diſputation to am-
ſwere fully to the matter, or els ſecoundly (if power wan-
to compasse that) we ſeke ſome other meaneſ to ſatisfie
the man, and that thre maner of waies, either by makyng the ob-
jection ſeme leſſe then it is, or by bryngyng ſome other examples
againſt it, or els by ſekeing ſome meaneſ to goe from the matter.
Wee make the argument appere ſlender, when wee receive it
laughyngly, and declare by wordes euē at the firſt, that it is no-
thing to the purpoſe, and ſo abafe the oppoſent.

Againe, wee tourne an other argumenſ in our aduersarieſ
necke, when we bryng an other ex ample againſt him. ¶ els whe-
we charge hym with a like fault, and laye ſome greater matter
in his diſhe. Laſtly, wee ſhiſte awaie from the violence of our ad-
uersarie by makyng ſome digreſſion, or giuyng occaſion of ſome
other talke, whereby the aduersarie either is dræſen to forgoe his
argumenſ, or els beyngh blindeſ with too muche matter, is forced
either to goe no further, or els to thinke hymſelf contente. In all
whiche maner of confutation, when wee purpose to put a man to
ſilence, I woule wilche greate moderation to be uſed, and as little
aduaantage taken by ſuiche meaneſ as maie bee poſſible. For al-
though it be a poore helpe (as in deede it is none other) yet many
a man loſeth his estimation by muche blyng of ſuiche fashions. It
is a woylde to ſee the ſubtill braine of many braggyng bodieſ,
whiche with bold countenance bare an outward shadowe of wiſe-
done, hauyng onely the maſkyng viſage, and lacking the na-
tural face. Thei will ſtanck ſtouth in mauiteinaunce of an un-
truſhe, and with countenaunce ſene to ſpeke it ſpeke, and by their
bearing it out, almoſt perſuade the hearers, that thei onely haue
the true parte, and that the other are aliogether deceiued. ¶ thei
will ſai, that no man woule once thinke that for shame,
whiche the aduersarie btereſch without all shame: nea, thei will
ſai, he ſpeaketh too ſuo habilitie, and ſo daſhe hym out of coun-
tenaunce, that he ſhall not well knowe what to ſai, and laſt of all,
thei will trifle and tope werely, and ſo with impudent laughing,
make the other paſt ſpeaking. ¶ I woule put an enſign in this men-
ſon.

so as though they were giltye, but their owne doynges shall putte
in thē selues on Gods name for me. Notwithstandyng, I would
gladly wylle (as I saide before) that there were a measure vsed,
and then suche doynges myght better be boynē.

We can swere to the matter two wates, either generally, or
particularlē. A generall answer is made thys wates. First whe
the faulter is in the matter, that is to say, in the woordes of either
Proposition, when thys signifie diuers thynges, or be diuersly ap
plied to the wey it plainly: and either denie it as foolishe, or els dis
solve it as doubfull. As thus, the Libertines reason.

*Whatsoever is naturall, that same is not euill.
To synne is a thyng naturall.
Ergo to synne it is not euill.*

The severall or seconde Proposition is not true. And ther
fore the argumēt is falle in the matter it self, for God did create
the Nature of manne pure and cleane, and saied, that all was good
whiche he had made at the firske creation. Neither was it Gods
will that manne shoulde alter his commāndemente, and swarue
from the pathe of his appointed Lawes, but rather the sugge
stion of the devill, and the weakenesse of our felthe brought man
to hell, death, and damnation.

Againe, when the faulter appeareth in the forme and maner of
makynge an argument, wee must declare that it is not framed ac
cordyng to the rules, whiche require that every argument should
borthe be in Hode and Figure, as I haue before suffiently decla
red. As thus,

*All Magistrate doe reuenge.
Every bolde hardie man doeth reuenge.
Ergo every bolde hardie man is a Magistrate.*

This argument being made in the seconde figure, is of no
force, considering it is no Hode of the same figure. For in this fi
gure all the propositions do not affirme altogether, but one of the
twoe doeth denie, as it appeareth plainly to hym that listeth to see.

Thirdly, when the faulter is bothe in the matter, and in the
maner of making, (or that is to say, in the arguments,) and he werte
the faulter plainly. As thus,

Answers
made to the
matter two
wates.

A genera
lē
answere
thys wates.

Libertines
error.

The faulter
in the forme,
by
making than
argument?
.

concerning
and second
figure also.

Fault bothe
in the matter
s forme also.

Every

The arte of Logike.

Every slaughter is synne.

Every adulterie is synne.

Ergo every adulterie is slaughter.

First the fault is, that slaughter is not well defined. For in warre
tyme it is lawfull to kill, and every man maie stande in his owne
defence againste violence robbers, and rather kill then bee killed.

Thirdlie, the argumente is in no Mode, although it bee in the se-
conde figure. The particular auoydying of an argumente, is fve
waies vse, either by declarynge in what deceiptfull subtelie it is
contein'd. Or from whence of the places it is wrongfully derived.
Or to shewe the wrong framyng in every Mode and Figure. Or
to make an argumente with a like reason, and so to anoythe the
cause. Or last of all, to vise the straunge deceitfull places, whiche
shalbe laste rehearsed.

And now will I tell perticularly euery deceitfull argument
that when suche a subile argumente shalbe vse, either in disputati-
on, or priuate talke; any one maie espie the fault out of hande, and
shewe in whiche of these capious reasons the subject resteth.

And first a false conclusion is a deceipt vse in an argument,
whereby one vnder the colour of truthe, goeth aboue to enueigle
the hearer, or thus, a false conclusion is an argument appearing
to the ignorant as though it were true, and yet is nothing true at
all. Aristotle doeth diuide them into twoo partes. Some be called
deceiptfull arguments when a doublfull woorde is vse, or the kind
of speche is strange, and maie be taken twoo waies, and that the
fault is rather in the kind & maner of speaking, then in the matter
or very thing it self. Therfore those that be good Grammarians
and knowe the propertie of wordes, and are knollie in the tonges,
can gaily well solute suche errors as be made by the mistaking of
wordes, or by false understanding of wordes, wherof in very perde
many heresies, and muche false doctrine haue had their first begin-
ning. There be again some craftie subtilties which are not in the
mode, but rather spring either of the euil knitting together of the
Propositions, or els of the confusio[n] of the things, that is to say,
when one thing is falsly appointed for another, as in this proposi-
tion a man maie easly espie false packing, which is in the i. figure.

I particular
answering
the waies.

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

I false con-
clusion.

False con-
clusions;
twoo waies
diuided.

Phrases not
knowe, haue
caused errors

Item the
second
partie
of the propositio[n]

Concupiscent.

No synne doeth dege a man.
Concupiscentia. *Concupiscentia doeth beget a man.*
No. Ergo concupiscentia is no synne.

The seconde proposition, although it make deceiue a man that is not ware, yet it is altogether false, because nature whiche is a thing ordene of God, doeth beget manne, not the wicked impatience, or rather the destruction of nature, whiche after warre followed. Here it is plaine, that mingle mingle is made of thinges, when generation, whiche should be attributed to nature, is referred to concupiscentia, because it is in Nature, and nexte adioyning unto it.

Now, for the number and diuidyng of these deceipfull arguments, it is to understande, that there be 12, whereof 6. are called subtleties in the word sygnature of speakeing, and the other 7. are called subtleties without the word, when thinges are confondued, when the knyting is altered, and one taken for another.

Decipfull arguments.

In the woorde are these following,

- i. The doubtfullnesse of wordes.
- ii. The double meaning of sentences.
- iii. The ioyngynge of wordes that shoulde be parted.
- iv. The parrying of wordes that shoulde be ioynged.
- v. The manner of preche.
- vi. The accus.

*The number
of false argu-
ments, or the
division of de-
cepfull argu-
ments.*

 All these names be comprehended vnder this one word (doubtfull) notwithstanding Aristotle setteth forth divers waies, that he make shewe the difference of these doubtfull chynges. For, some arguments haue the doube in a woorde, signifying dauerly, some in the propertie of the phrasse, some in the ioyngynge together of woordes, and some other in the diuidyng, and displacing of the same, as it shall appere more plainly, in the handlyng of these places severally,

*Diversite of
subtilties.*

The doubtfullnesse of a worde.

Homonymia, whiche maie be called in Englyshe, the doubtfullnesse of one woorde, when it signifieth diversly, is a manner of a subteltie, when the receipt is in a woorde, that

*The doubts
manner of a
woorde.*

The arte of Logike.

Every slaughter is synne.

Every adulterie is synne.

Ergo every adulterie is slaughter.

First the fault is, that slaughter is not well defined. For in warre tyme it is lawfull to kill, and every man mae stande in his owne defence againste violence robbors, and rather kill then bee killed. Thidlie, the argumente is in no wode, although it bee in the seconde figure. The particular auoydying of an argumente, is fwe waies vsed, either by declarynge in what deceiptfull subtiltie it is contained. Or from whiche of the places it is wrongfully derived. Or to shewe the wrong framyng in euer y wode and Figure. Or to make an argumente with a like reason, and so to auoide the cause. Or last of all, to use the straunge deceiptfull places, whiche shalbe laste rehearsed.

And now will I tell perticularly every deceiptfull argument that when suche a subtile argument shalbe vsed, either in disputacion, or private talke; any one mae espy the fault out of hande, and shewe in whiche of these capious reasons the subiect resteth.

And first a false conclusion is a deceipt used in an argument, whereby one vnder the colour of truthe, goeth aboue to enueigle the hearer, or thus, a false conclusion is an argument appearing to the ignorant as though it were true, and yet is nothing true at all. Aristotele doeth diuide them into twoo partes. Some be called deceiptfull arguments when a doublfull wode is vsed, or the kind of speche is strange, and mae be taken twoo waies, and that the fault is rather in the kind & maner of speaking, then in the matter or very thing it self. Therfore those that be good Grammarians and knowe the propertie of wordes, and are skilfull in the tonges, can gaily well solute suche errors as he mae by the mistaking of wordes, or by false understanding of waies, wherof in very dede many heresies, and muche false doctrine haue had their first begining. There be againe some craftie subtilties which are not in the wode, but rather spring either of the euill kniting together of the Propositions, or els of the confusion of the thinges, that is to say, when one thing is fally appointed for another, as in this propositiō. Whō a man mae easly espy false packing, which is in the i. figure.

Concupiscence.

A particular
answeryng
the waies.

A false con-
clusion.

False con-
clusions,
two waies
diuided.

Whōes not
knowe, haue
caused erroris

taled thus
takēn aboue
this page

S. 1. No synne doeth beget a man.
Concupiscence. S. 2. Concupiscence doeth beget a man,
no. Eng's concupiscence is no synne.

The seconde proposition, although it make deceiue a man that is not ware, yet it is altogether false, because nature which is a thing ordeneed of God, doeth beget manne, not the wicked impo-
tentie, or rather the destruction of nature, whiche afterwarde fol-
lowed. Here it is plaine, that mingle mangle is made of thinges,
when generation, whiche shoulde be attributed to nature, is re-
ferred to concupiscence, because it is in Nature, and nexte adioy-
gynge vnto it.

Now, for the number and diuidyng of these deceipfull argumen-
tes, it is to understande, that there be 13, whereof 6. are cal-
led subtleties in the woorde manner of speaking, and the oþer 7.
are called subtleties without the woorde, when thinges are confon-
ded, when the knytting is altered, and one taken for another.

*The number
of false conclu-
sions, or the
division of de-
ceipful argu-
ments.*

¶ Deceipfull arguments.

In the woorde are these following,

- i. *The doubtfullnesse of disorder.*
- ii. *The double meaning of a sentence.*
- iii. *The ioyning of wordes that shoulde be parted.*
- iv. *The parting of wordes that shoulde be ioyned.*
- v. *The manner of speech.*
- vi. *The accent.*

*¶ The manner
of speech.*

 All these names be comprehended vnder this one woorde
(doubtfull) notwithstanding Aristotle setteth forth di-
uers waies, that he make shewe the difference of these
doubtfull chynges. For, some argumentes haue the doubtle in a
woorde, signifying diuersly, some in the propertie of the phrasie,
some in the ioyning together of woordes, and some other in the
diuidyng, and displacing of the same, as it shall appere more
plainly, in the handling of these places severally,

*Diversite of
subtilties.*

¶ The doubtfullnesse of a woorde.

Homonymia, whiche maie be called in Englishe, the doubt-
fullnesse of one woord, when it signifieth diuersly, is a
manner of a subteltie, when the receipt is in a woorde, that warre.

*The doubts
fullnesse of a
woorde.*

¶. i. hath

The Arte of Logike.

hath more significacion then one. And the reason is, that such arguments are not good, because there are twaine serues in the two Propositions, so by the double repeate, signifieth one thyng in the firste proposition, and another in the seconde proposition. Therefore, nothing is proved in the conclusion, when such doubtful wordes are placed in a proposition. And therefore, when such a subtletie is espied, a man may denie the consequence, giving this reason, that it is a subtilltie drawn from this place of doubtfulnesse.

¶ An example.

Arme of dou-
ble vnder-
standing,

*¶ A. Every arme is a substance made of fleshe,
blood, bones, sinewes, and veines.*

¶ God the father hath an arme.

*Ergo God the father is one that hath a substance
of fleshe, blood, bones, sinewes, and veines.*

I answer this knytyng is not good, and therefore I denie the whole. The reason is, because it is a subtilltie, of a doubtful word, for in the firste proposition, the arme is considered to bee such a one, as man hath, but in the seconde proposition, it is not so meant, for it signifieth by a metaphor, the power, strength, or might of God.

¶ Another example.

Evill twoo.
wyses taken.

¶ F. There is none evill in the Cittie, saith the prophete, whiche the Lorde hath not doen.

¶ T. There bee many synnes, and horriblie evilles in the citie.

Ergo God is the authour of sinne.

The mistres
of wordes
haue blinded
us pur blis.

I denie the consequence. Because there is doubtfulnesse in this word evill: for in the firste proposition, evill doeth signifie the evill of punishment, as we call commonlie all calamitie evill, and all punishment evill, whiche are not sinne, and in the seconde proposition, evill doeth signifie offence, and all naughtinesse that is committed. Therefore, the seconde proposition is not agreeing with the first, and therefore, the argumente is not good. Of no one thyng riseth so muche contropersie, as of the doubtfulnesse, and double taking of a woynde. Scholars dispute, wise men fall out,

but, Lawiers aggre not, Preachers ware herte, Gentlemen
strue, the people misse, good men give counsaile, women haue
their woxes, this man affirmeth, the other denieth, and yet at
length, the double meaning beyng once knownen (when all thin-
ges are quicke) endes the whole matter. Therefore, it is good,
first to be well grounded, and surely to state our belues, upon some
one assured knowledge, before we talke of thynges doubtful,
wherin resteth erro. Well learned of all other is that man onely
in my minde, whiche saying expaignement sentences, can by reason
tughe the truche. Salomon saith in his Proverbes.

God the fater from the beginning created wisedome. The
Iniquitie, the wicked, or the seditious libertine maye take here
an occasion to proue that Christ was man onely, and reason thus

*God the fater, from the beginning created
wisedome.*

*Christe the sonne of God, is the wisedome of
his fater.*

*Ergo, Christe the sonne of God, was created
from the beginning.*

Therefore, it muche maiesth to knowe the double meaning
of every doubtfull woyde. In the fift proposition, wisedome li-
guristh the woyde reuelid, or preached by the mouthe of man. In
the second proposition, wisedome is taken for the secound persone
in Trinitie, accordanctyng to S. Iohns Goshell. In the beginning
was the woyde, and the woyde was with God, and God was the
woyde. Every one knoweth, that ebery woordis is not God, and
per this woyde (which passeth all wordes) is God the sonne which
other wise is called the wisedome of his fater. A certaine persone
that is no small foole, as all menne full well knowe, that knowe
her at all, beyng earnestle at a tyme, in commending a bishop of
his acquaintance, declinid to a noble personage, that this bishop
had a goodly base voice, and made at one tyme (as he) as base a
sermon, as he never had the like in all his life before, and there-
fore, worthie to be compted a greate clerke. In his foolishhe iudge-
ment, who will not say, that this Bishop was basely praised.

William
Damer.

The Arte of Logike

The ambiguitie,

Ghe ambiguitie is, when the construction bringeth error, haung diuerse understandinges in it, as when the wordes be placed doubtfully, as thus. *Crasus Halim penitenti magnum perterritus opum vim.* Crasus going over the flood Halim, shal overthow a greate Empire. Here is not mentioned, whether he shal overthow his owne, or an other mannes. By the whiche, Dantz in dede, he being deceived, lost his owne kyngdome, when he thoughte to subue his enemis, and byngyngh them under subjection. Therefore, when sentences bee spoken doubtfully, that thei maie be construed two maner of waies, and the partes diversly pointed, make contrary understandyng; they are referred to this place. And the rather to make it more open, I haue made two Englishe verses, which being diuersly read haue two contrary meauynges.

{ A robborie doe not feare thy God, thy maker.
Will punylle not one: God spareth, be thou suer.

Otherwise.

{ A robborie doe not: feare thy God, thy maker.
Will punylle, not one God spareth, be thou suer.

These are two verses also in Latine, whiche because they be very pretie, and maie be two waies taken, I thinke it not amisse, to set them forthe here emong the other.

{ *Si laus tua, non tua frama, virtus, non copia retum.*
Leander te fecit, hoc deus exstinxit.

{ In Englishes chms.
Worthynesse, not wilnessle, Godlinesse, not goods,
brought thee thereunto.

{ Richesse great, and much auerchaytis, with worldy
honour to come to.

These verses being read backwarde, either in Englishes, or in Latine, beginnyng at the last worde, haue a cleane contrary understandyng, as thus.

{ To come to honor worldy, with auerchaytis much,
and greater richesse.
Hereunto, brought thee goodnes, not Godlinesse,
wilnessle, not woxynesse.

Verses sent
to the Popes.

These two verses were written to the Pope, as woxhie such
a one, and sette upon Halquillus in Roome, even for very loue,
as I take it: not of the Pope, but of Gods holpe woxde.

*An example of suche doubtsfull wryting, whiche by reason of
poinctynge maist basne double sense, and contrary meanyng,
taken out of an entrelude, made by Nicolai V dali.*

 Alerte maistresse, whereas I loue you nothynge at all,
Regardingyng your richesse and substancialle chiese of all,
For your personage, beautie, demeanour, and witte,
I communide me unto you never a whitte.

Sopie to heare reporte of your good welfare.

For (as I hear say) suche your condicions are,

That ye be woxhie fauour of no liuyng man.

To be abhorred of every honest man.

To be take for a woman inclined to vice,

Nothynge at all to vertue giwyngh her due price.

Wherfore concerningyng mariage, ye are thought

Suche a fine peragon as nere honest man bought.

And now by these presentes I doe you aduertise,

That I am minded to marie you in no wise,

For your gooddes and substancialle I could be content.

To take you as ye are. If ye will be my wife,

Ye shall be assured for the tyme of my life.

I will kepe you right well from good rayment and fare.

Ye shall not be kept but in sojowre and care.

Ye shall in no wise live at your owne libertie:

Doe and saie what ye lust ye shall never please me.

But when ye are merrie I will be all sad,

When ye are sorie I will be very glad.

When ye sele paueharter easel I will be binkinde,

At no tyme in me shall you muche gentlenesse finde,

But all thinges contrary to your will and minde.

Shall be doen, otherwise I will not be behinde,

To speake and as for all them, that would doe you wrong,

I will so helpe and maiutene, ye shall not live long.

Now any foolishhe dothe shall comber you but I.

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I (who ere saie nate) will sticke by you, till I die.
Thus good maistresse Custance the lorde you sauie and keepe,
From Roisteroister whether I wake or sleepe,
Who faoureth you no lesse, ye mate be bolde,
Then this letter purporteth whiche ye haue vnsode.

The contrary sense of the same, in the same wordes.

 Mere maistresse, whereas I loue you, nothing at all
Regardyng your richesse and substaunce, chief of all
For your personage, beautie, demeanour, and witte,
I commende me unto you, never a whitte
Sooke to heare reporte of your good welfare,
For (as I heare saie) such your condicions are,
That ye be woxthie faavour: of no lityng man
To be abho:red: of every honest man
To be take for a woman enclined to vice
Nothing at all to vertue giuyng her due pice
Wherfore conternyng mariage, ye are thought
Suche a fine peragon, as heuer honest man bought,
And now by these presences, I doe you aduertise,
That I am minded to marrie you: in no wise
For your goddes and substaunce: I could be content
To take you as ye are. If ye will be my wife,
Ye shall be assured for the tyme of my life
I will keepe you right well, from good ratiment and face
Ye shall not be kept; but in sondwe and care
Ye shall in no wise lye: at your owne libertie
Doe and saie what ye lust: ye shall never please me
But when ye are merie: I will be all sad
When ye are syrie: I will be very glad
When ye seke your hartes ease, I will be vnlinde,
At no tyme in me shall you muche gentlenesse finde,
But all thinges contrary to your will and minde,
Shall be doen other wise: I will not be behinde,
To speake, and as for all them, that would doe you wrong,
I will so helpe and maintaine, ye shall not live long,
Nor any foolishhe dolce shall comber, you but I.

I (who ere saie naie) will sticke by you till I die.
 Thus good maistresse Cystance, the iorde you lave and keye,
 From me Roisterdoister, whether I wake or sleepe.
 Who fauoureth you no lesse, ye maie be holde,
 Then this letter purporteth whiche ye haue vnsolde.

To the three deceiptfull arguments.

Non iunctio dissimilatorum, a ioigning together of those thynges, whiche shold bee disseuered, and are either to be applied to the thinges that goe before, or to the thinges, that followe after.

*The ioigning
of wordes
that shold
be parted.*

Secundum. Whosoever knoweth letters, now hath learned them.

Terti. A Grammarian knoweth letters.

Ergo, a Grammarian now hath learned them.

Here this Aduerbe (now) if it had been referred to the firste pointe, whiche is as ye see in this worde (letters) and the pointe afterwarde made, when this worde (now) had been put to it, all had been well; but because the worde (now) is other wise placed, and referred to the nexte sentence, whiche is (now hath learned them) (it is a false argument, because this worde (now) shold be referred to the firste pointe, as thus.

Secundum. Whosoever knoweth letters now, hath learned them.

A Grammarian knoweth letters now.

Ergo, a Grammarian hath learned them.

And so this argument is good, being thus placed, but though this subtilitie seeme childlike, yet olde babes haue vsed it, even in the weightiest cause of our redempcion, and thought therein to soile the Godly, reasoning in ieste after this sorte, and yet mea-nyng good earnest.

Sainte without workes doeth Justifie.

Sainte without workes, is a dedde sainte.

Ergo, a dedde sainte doeth justifie.

*Faith without
worke.*

Here one may see a false packyng, for, in the firste Proposition, faith standyng a lone, is severally referred to the laste worde, of the same Proposition, whiche is (doeth Justifie) in the secounde Proposition, faith is referred to the twoe wordes

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wordes (without woorkes) so that the same faiche, is not ment in the seconde proposition, that is mente in the firsste, and the reason is, that wordes are ioygned together, whiche shoulde not be so ioygned, for now there are fower termes, whereas by the rulers of Logike, there shoulde be but three (faiche) is one (doeth iustifie) is the seconde (faiche without woorkes) is the thirde (a dedde faiche) is the fowerte terme. And the reason that there be fower, is, that faiche is firsste severally considered, whiche never wanteth woorkes followyng her, as fruite declaryng what the tree is; nor that the fruite doeth purchase iustificacion, but rather giueth a token, that by faiche it self, whereof suche woorkes doe spyng, iustificacion is attained. In the seconde proposition there is mentioned a dedde faiche, a faiche without woorkes, whiche faiche the Deuill hymself hath, whereas if the argumente were true, there shoulde bee none other faiche, considered in the seconde proposition, then was rehearsed and mentioned in the firsste proposition. I haue laboured the rather at large, to make this matter more plain to the ignorant, not that it so muche needed (for the evassion is easie of it self) but to shewe that this unlearned argument is of no greater weight, then the other above rehearsed were.

¶ Of partyng wordes that shoulde be ioygned together.

*The parting
of wordes
that shoulde
be ioygned.*

*The lawe and
the Gospell.*

D*isjunctio consonitorum*, is a diuidyng of thynges, whiche shoulde be ioygned together, and a makynge of wordes severall, or els a disseverynge of twoo partes, whiche shoulde bee but one, for, like as by the other place, wordes are ioygned together, whiche shoulde bee deuided, so nowe by this place, that thyng is deuided, whiche shoulde bee all one.

{ *The lawe and the Gospell, are two divers thynges.
The woorde of God, is the Lawe and the Gospell.
Ergo the woorde of God, is two divers thynges.*

In this argument (the woorde of God) being a whole thing of it self, is diuided, and where respect shoulde bee had, to the twoo partes ionctly considered together, whiche are nothing els but the whole: partes are severally understanden, and referred to the whole, not bothe together as they shoulde bee, but severally with

with their properties as thei shold not be. For the woorde of God is not the Lawe onely, or the Gospell onely, althoough it stande in these two, but is the Lawe and the Gospell bothe ioyned together: For whereas manne is made of bodye and soule, the bodye is not manne, nor yet the soule neither, and yet thei bothe ioyned together, make by a perfecte manne. Againe, not therefore are the Lawe and the Gospell Gods woordes, because thei are two divers chynges, but because thei doore bothe properly belong unto Gods woordes. And therefore the Lawe and the Gospell, are otherwise taken in the first Proposition, then thei are in the second proposition, wherevpon there are fower termes, contrary to the rules aboue rehearsed.

An other example.

The Articles of our faische are twelue in number.
To beleue in God the fater, and Iesus Christe
his onely sonne, are in the Articles of our faische.

Ergo to beleue in God the fater, and in Iesus
Christ his onely sonne, are twelue in number.

This argument is to be denied, because the doublenesse rifeth of division; for, to beleue in God the fater, and in Iesus Christe his onely Sonne, are the Articles of our faische, and yet thei two are not the whole twelue in number. Therefore, thei two being of the twelue are wrongly placed, if thei bee divided into twelue. Againe, there be fower partes or termes, for in the first Proposition, this part (the Articles of our faische) comprehendeth the twelue in number, but in the second Proposition the double repeate, that is (the Articles of our faische) doe not comprehend all the Articles, but two onely, therefore it is an emill argumet.

This kinde of argument is vud ostentymes of chose, whiche by reportyng an other mannes labour and his well dooynge, de-
maul the same, either by addyng or diminulyng the same, as by takynge a peice of a sentece out of some Doctor, and applyng it for their purpose, or by addyng more then thei finde, as bothe Divines and Lawiers often tymes full vngadlie haue doen, not regarding the whole course and order of the thyng, but taking ouer patches and peices to serue their vngodlie purposes, whiche

*The articles
of our faische.*

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In dede made nothyng for them: neither thei themselves doe understande what thei byng, when thei dooe not marke the whole course of the matter. The Romishe reason thus:

If thou wylle enter to heauen, keepe the com-
maundementes. Therefore, keepyng the commaundementes,
purchaseth heauen.

Romishe
readis for ius-
tification.

Workes are
good, not be-
cause menne
doorth them,
but because
god aloweth
them.

The maner
of speache,

Confession.

This argumēte is false by leavynge the beste out, for the doc-
trine of the Gospell must firsly bee had, our faſte must bee fast-
ned, and Christe must ſanctifie our dooynges before thei can bee
good. Neither is any thing good becauſe we dooſt, but becauſe it
pleaſeth God to accept it. It is true, he that dooſt well ſhall have
well, but who is he? Euen the ſauue boode whiche firſt beleueith in
Christ, and apprehendeth mercie by faſte, whiche woorkes God
accepteth for good, otherwiſe he ſhall never come where God is.
Therefore eſpide the ſubtilties of the vngodly, and ſee their fraude.

To the fifth place.

Entra dictio[n]is, called otherwise in good Latine,
forma orationis, the maner of ſpeeche is when the
phare breedeth error, and the propertie of the
tongue not well knowne engendereth ambiguitye,
as the eight Chapiter of Matthew. When Christ
had thole whiche were healed of the Leprourie: goe and ſhew the
ſlues to the Priest, our Fathers applied this ſaying to Confeſſion,
thinking that every one was bounde in conſcience, vnder
paine of damnation, to confesse his ſynges to the Priſte euer
pere once, where as Chriftes meaung was nothyng ſo, and
therefore thei were muſche deſeuined in the maner of ſpeaking.
This order was in the olde Lawe, as we maie reade in Levit-
icus, that Leperes came not into the toun, but if any happened to
be whole and amended, he was firſt comandeſed to ſhewe hym
ſelf to the Priſte, that the Priſte ſeyng his boode cleane, might be
a witneſſe to the Congregation of his amendmente; and ſo the
man after that might the rather be ſuffered to goe abroade, and be
in compaニー with other men.

But euen as thei haue fondly breasted this place to Confeſſion,

tion, even so myght light women, and euill disposed wifes, abuse their houſbandes sondrie, exponydynge ſaint Paules woordes in the ſeventh of the firſte to the Corinthians, where he ſaith. The wife is bounde to the Lawe, as long as her houſbande liueth, but if her houſbande ſlepe, ſhe is at libertie to marie with whom ſhe will. But God forbiid that women ſhould take this aduantage of their houſbandes ſleepyng, as the Nomishe folke haue abuſed almeſme wakynge. Sleye in this teſte, ſigniſteth nothyng but death: and per̄nigthe women alweil abuſe this teſte, as other men haue abuſed Chriftes ſaying for the maingeyntaunce of Confeſſion. Therefore, the propertie of every ſpeech, and the maner of ſpeakynge ought alwaies to bee obſerued; wee ſaie in Englyſh ſwetyng to ſome one, with whom wee are offendid, ah firſt, ye are an honeſt manne in deede, and yet we doe not meane that he is honeſt in deede, but chynke that he is a naughtie fellowe. Now the diſciple, Chrift, when he ſhould bee taken of the Jewes, ſaid to his Apoſtles, dermite & regnife us, ſleye on firs, and take your reſte, not that he would thei ſhould dooce, but to their rebuke and shame he ſpake it, because thei wer careleſſe and toke their reſte. So ſaule rebukid the Corinthians, because thei made þeacheſi men their Judges, and pleaded their cauſes un‐der them ſaide, if there be no boode among you to heare your owne cauſes, make vile perſonnes and abiedees to be Judges among you, Not that he would it ſhould bee ſo, but to their shame he ſpake it, as he ſaith hymſelf. Also to this place maye be referred the kinde of phaſe, proper to every tongue. As where it is in the Gofpell, Agree with thonke auerlare quickly, whiles thou art in the waſe with him, leſt I haue aduertisſe deliuer thee to the Judge, and the Judge deliuer thei to the Spinifer, and then thou bee caste into pifon. Verely I ſaie unto thee, thou haueſt not come out thence, till thou haue paieſt the diermonsſe farthing. The whiche matter ſaint Luther bearing hath cheſt woordes in the laſt ende. I tell thee thou depeartest not thence, till thou haue made good the utermost ſhire. Who doth not ſee, that this laſt ſentenge doth not ſignifie a condicō, but rather nocht, that he ſhall never come alſo. On (þe ſecond meanyng conſidered) how can manne
complaiſand

Sleye, what
it ſigniſteth.

Chrift taken
of the Jewes

Pauls rebus
þyngthe Co.
rinthians.

Hebione
phrases
Mat. v.

Luke.xii,

C.ij. through

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through synne condemned to the fire of hell, deliuered hymself, or his rausome to God for his saluation. Againe, I read this in the firste of Matthe. Joseph as lone as he awooke out of slepe, did as the Angell of the Lorde badde hym, and tooke his wife unto him, and knewe her not, till she had brough特 sorthe her first sonne, and called his name Iesus. Howthen, did Joseph knowe her afterwarde, that is, did he the acte of Matthe with her? No verely, he did not companie with her carnally at all, but she liued still a virgine, he bare the name onely of an housebande, or maried manne. As we reade also that Iames and Iohn were called the brethren of Christ, and yet were they not in blood his naturall brethren. But some not expert in tonges, maie wonder muche at this expositiōn, notwithstanding if they would weye other places, that are in like maner written, they shold haue no neede to maruaile at all. We read in the eight Chapiter of Genes. When Noe had sent a Crowe out of the Arke, to hyng tibynges againe, he said that the Crowe came not till the pearth was drye, and yet we read not in the scripture, that the Crowe came to the Arke againe at all, but did rather flie cleane awaie. And yet the text saith, untill the pearth was drye, the Crowe came not. The Prophet saith, of God: Thou art from woldē to woldē, and yet there is no determinate tyme mentioned, for God is a hyng substance for ever. Pea, I thinke wee haue the like phrase also, euē in our English tongue. The stiffe necked saith thus: I will haue no preaching till all menne be agreed. And when is that? Marie neuer I thinke. Therefore those that be ignorant in the tonges are easely deceipted. Likewise we read in the twelveth Chapiter of S. Matthe. *Qui dixeris verbum aduersus spiritum sanctum non remittetur ei, neque in hoc seculo, neque in futuro.* He that speakeþ a woord against the holie Ghost shall not be forgiuen, neither in this woldē, nor yet in the woldē to come, that is to say, he shall never be forgiuen; for proofe whereof and full confirmation, that this meaning is true, and oughe not other wise to be take, Saint Marke also speakeþ of chescene matter, hath these wordes. Verely I saie unto you, all synnes shall bee forgiuen unto meanes children, and blasphemie wherewith they blasphemeth. But he that blasphemeth,

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If a pheimesth the halfe Ghoste, thalpeneit haue full intentioun, but
thalpeneit gylte of etter all damnation. Thus we see the maner of
speech vsed in Mattheu, is plainly opened here in Marke. Saith
Luke in like maner, whosoever speakeith a woode against the
sonne of man, it shalbe longuen hym. But unto him that blasphemeth
the halfe Ghoste, it shall not be longuen. And yet notwithstanding
sayng all this, the weake learned referte this place to Purgatory,
moste vainly and without reason. The maner of speche
causeth ambiguitie, by reason of the affinitie in wordes, and when
one hath losse all his money in his purse, and for lacke of coine, is
faine to holde the candle: An other manne when he seeth the same
bodie, dooeth his dutie with his Cappe of to his benter, nighke faire
merely by the wate of a sute to the worthest persone; I praye you
sir, let this good fellowe be couered, he is bare, where as bare si-
gnifieth a bare purse, aswell as a bare hedde: and is properlie so
saied. Againe and moste aptly this subtiltie taketh place, when
semences be euill pointed, and the sente thereby depreaued, as some
that maintaine Justification by workes, haue straungely abused
a text of saint Augustine, makynge the pointe plaine, where as it
should be an interrogatiou, and hath been of late yeres so found in
an old written hande. The sentence is this. *Qui facit te sine te, no*
potest servare te sine te. He that made thee without thee, can not
he save thee, without thee: Where as makynge it a plaine pointe
in Latine, it bath a cleane contrary understandyng, and maketh
muche for the maintenance of false Religion. For it is as muche
as who shoudt saie: He that made thee, without thee, can not save
thee without thee. Moreover, wordes spoken by imitation, that
is to saie, when one rehearseth that whiche an other man saith,
must diligentlie be obserued. Paule wryteth to the Corollas. he wryteth
the naughtinesse of some men, that will keepe simple folke in sub-
jection with their Tradicions, and trouble the conscience of the
weake, sayng, doe not touche, doe not taste, doe not handle mente
whiche shoulde recited, in rebuke to the hypocrites and oblligate
phariseis, and yet some notwithstanding fonde haue miscon-
strued the same, perswadyngh themselves that Paulie gaue such
commanademente. Therefore those thynges whiche are spoken

Luke.xij.

Ware, two
wares taken.

Augustines
sayng de-
praved.

Woo:des
spoken by
imitation.

T.ii), by

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by imitation, following another mannes speeche, must therwise
be understanden, then those wordes which a man speakeþ of him
self, and giueþ instruction certaintly thereto. Thus farre haue I
handled these subtile argumentes whiche are in the wordes: now
will I rehearse all suche false conclusions as are in the matter.
And first this is to be noted, that the faultes of every argumente,
are either in the wrong defining, and not well scryng forthe the
nature of any thing, or els in not aptly dividynge, or lastly, not ad-
visedly wryting the causes of thynges, but heapping them vp wth
out order or reason. The other subtelties above rehearsed, maie
either be auoide by well marking the true definition, or els ha-
ving respecte to the division, by declaryng severally how large
every wordes mate bee taken, and what erroure may rise by the
false understanding of some one word: the subtelties following,
containe suche absurdities, and rise not upon the nature of some
one word, but take the ground of the matter and thyng it self,
and so forth. *There be sevene in number.*

1. From the accident, *i.e. from that which is partly and after a sort*,
as a present, such as a man, a place, a thinge, &c. *so to be full and wholie so.*
2. The mistakynge of sentences graunting,
you may, and may not, *and so forth.*
3. The consequenc, *i.e. the cause that is put for the cause,*
disdaininge your selfe to prove thynges that are as doubtful,
4. The Cuckoos song, or thynges doubtfull,
which is referred bothe to the substance, and also to
the accidents, or els wheþ the accidents whiche are not of the ve-

rie substance of man, but may be attaineþ the man living still are
not well ioyned together, or els when we make our argumentes,
ab iugensi, that is to say, by that thyng whiche happened to a
manne casuallie, and pronounce the same to bee the verie proper
cause

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cause, why and wherefore this or that is so. Of the first, this may be an example,

¶ That fleshe whiche fleshe is, fleshe is not. ¶ And ¶ That fleshe is fleshe. ¶ And ¶ That fleshe is not fleshe.

Fleshe & fleshe.

A. 15. folio 26v.
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In the firste Proposition I understand the substance of fleshe, and in the seconde Proposition I meane the accident or properte whiche is in them bothe, and therfore myne argumēnt is not lawfull, because It refertothe bothe the substance and the accident, to one and the same habite. For although fleshe and fleshe be not all one in substance, because fleshe is onethynge, and fleshe is another, and either of hem hath their propre being and substance substance, yet thei agree bothe in their accident, that is to say, in bothe to serue for the sustenānce of man.

¶ As hymme male be committēt, so fleshe dothey
wicked menne; even when they execute Justice
sine spāne. ¶ Therefore wicked menne doe no Justice,
being set in authoritie.

Wicked me
nne, even
in executyng
Justice.

The firste Proposition is true, and the seconde also, for whatsover is not of fleshe, the same is spāne. Whether can any thyng bee well, how soever it seemeth in our eyes, except our faithe bee firste fastened upon the free merite of Christ. Wherefore the Jewes how sover the same kepe oder, obstatung latines, syþeþing riotz, yet all their waynges are nochtynge but hysche, whiche are the doȝe, send it never so honest by goddes to the light of man. And yet this argumēnt is not truly laþed up. For in the firste proposition (spāne) is confuted by hymself, and therfore it is tenuelē laþed, thaþ no spāne male be committēt. In the seconde proposition, wher execution of Justice is compared with spāne, it is not so of it self, but because the persone is full hymself which executeth the Lawe, and therfore the offence commeth casuall, and as the Logician saith per accident, wheras spāne before was considered according to the substance. And therfore though the officer beeþing mightis, offendith hym he quickeþred Justice, (for as he maketh all workes go on) yet must he do Justice,

because

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because it is so commayned, evyn as he must assuredly beleue that
Jesus is the Messias, and the promised Saviour sent of God.
And though the doyng be knell to hym, yet it is good to other. A-
gaine, thus reason some.

Faith is a
woorde,

By faithe we are iustified.

Faith is a woorde. Ergo by workes we are iustified.

This Proposition is false, considering that faithe in the firste
Proposition is the same, through whiche we are iustified, not by
the wortchissh of our belyevynge, but through the free merrie of
Christe, the whiche we apprehende through faithe. And therefore
we must in this saying consider that faithe is referred by relation
to Christe, through whom onely all mercie is attained, and that
grace commeth not because faithe is a woerde, but because mercie
goeth before, & removeth fely all heileneers, without wortchissh
ether of belyevynge, or els of doyng any other woerde. There-
fore in the firste Proposition, faithe belyeng not so taken as in the
second, we maye satz well it springeth from this deceiptfull place,
and is therefore not lawfull.

Angyl god, this man is a wicke fellowe.

This man is lame.

Ergo this same man hath a lame wif.

This is enughtly false, because the accidentes of the hodie are
referred to the substance of chernude, as by this laste argument
ye mane see the somesesse whiche as of the hodie, is attributed to
the minde, whereby the reson is baine.

The thid deceyt is, when many shrynges are referred to one
subiect, we make that to be the verienest and cheef cause, whiche

is ne assaid thyng, and commeth by hap unto any hodie, as thus,

Davids a blessed man, and Ild is he et son ar ti
gilladis chunne. Davids an adulterer.

Ergo adulterers are blessed men.

I deside the consequent, because it is a deceiptfull argumemente

þythat whiche is the accident. For when many shrynges channet
to the minde þou must see what shrynges comen are of the shryng
þythat.

whiche we attribute to the subiect, David is a blessed man. And wherefore? Not because he was an adulterer, for, that happened to hym casually, but because he was chosen of God, and had the feare of God before his eyes, and although this happened by the instincie of the Devill, yet he called for grace, repented soore, and trusted in Gods mercie, as the *psalmes* plentifullly heare wittesse, and this was the cause why he was blessed, so that in the first proposition, David is other wise considered, then he is in the seconde proposition, syng an accident casually happenyng, is mentioned in the seconde parte, whereas in the first proposition a naturall power of God, and his especiall gracie are bothe together reheatred and comprehyded. And therfore, ye must obserue that in suche deceiptfull argumentes, altho many thynges are referred to one subiecte, yet are they not after one sorte comprehended in the same subiecte, but diversly considered, as when Ioyngne accidentes, both of bodie and minde together, as thus.

This fellowe is a Gospeller.

This fellowe is blinde.

Ergo, this fellowe is a blinde Gospeller,
Here ye may see the accidentes of the minde and bodie, ioynged together, whiche shoulde not be so. And as for men blinde by nature, I haue knownen suche, that myght more worthely haue been Bishoppes, then other, with all the eyes they haue. For, though their sight failes, yet their tonges serued to set forth the glorie of God. But sorne of our pastours see oure well for their owne profit, and ouer litle for our laufe conduite.

The Agapitiles reason thus, ergo ad rem

That whiche is nothyng, deserueth no punishment.

*Noynne is
nothyng.*

Ergo, sonne deserueth no punishment.

In the first proposition, that thyng is meant, whiche is me at ell, but is cleane gone from nature, or els never was within the nature of thynges. In the seconde proposition (sonne) is reported to be nothyng, because it self being nothyng worse, shoulde haue man of his other vertues, and so ouerthowith nature, almyghtie as it self, whiche is a myghtyng, we judge that he hath loste his

C.L.

The Arte of Logike

his light, wherein we esteme the light, to bee a gift givyn of God, and bludynesse to be the taker awale of that whiche was givyn of God. In like case, sinne is the destruction of that whiche was being of it self nothyng. And so in this case, to doe well, is a thing the wante whereof, is nothyng, the whiche is sinne. And thus, We see that this woyde nothyng is two waies taken, first, when a thynge is nothyng at all, neither yet euer way, agayne, when a thynge is nothyng, whiche before was some thynge: As before sinne, was gracie, whiche sinne is here called nothyng, and yet before nothyng, whiche is mentioned in the fyrste Proposition, was never yet any thynge, the one is called in Latyn, *Nihil prius*, the other is named, *Nihil nequeat*.

Moyses lawe
increaseth
sin.

SWhatsoeuer increaseth sinne, is not to be taught.
The Lawe of Moyses increaseth sinne.
Ergo, the Lawe of Moyses is not to be taught.

I aunswere, the lawe increaseth not sinne, by the owne nature, but casually. For, when man hymself is corrupted with vice, then the Lawe maketh his sinne appeare hanous, and increaseth the knowledge of sinne in hym. So that in the fyrste proposition, the nature of increasynge synne, is considered in the seconde Proposition, the casuall happenyng is rehearsed, and the knowledge therof mentioned, whenchings are made open unto our eyes, and the feeling of sinne evident to our haries, which before for wante of hall, was not seen, nor yet knownen at all. All suche arguments must be avolded by distincion, that is, ye must declare the double meanyng in the two propositions, and then ye haue solued the subtiltie.

of the part
to the whole.

The second.

Prom that whiche is partly, and where a partie so, to bee fully and wholly so, and by reason of the partie, to give iudgement of the whole.

hopes

houses were good to be let for hire ; when men runne awaie with them. It is rather called the carion, or carcase of a horse . Whis calleth a dede man , suchē a one as he was before ?

¶ Againe, when fantasie frameth soone woder in a mans hev , and a thyng is conceitid by imagination , whiche is not at all .

{ Antiques or gargettisles are devised by painters .

{ Ergo, therē are suche creatures in verre .

¶ Thysly, whē a thyng may be , and is all ready in power to late streight , it is .

{ A ragged Colte maye proue a good horse .

{ Ergo, the Colte is alreadie a good horse .

¶ Everyn weightie mattēr of religion , this reson hath been bled , as ye shall see hereafter .

¶ Fowrthly, when the parte is taken for the whole .

{ Wine is euill for those that be sickē of an ageue .

{ Ergo, wine is euill for all men .

This argument is frome the particular , to the universall , the which is easie to be avoided . Therēfore errores doe often challice when we comprehendē the whole , speakeing only of the parte , & when we make the signe , to bee the very self challice , and all though ye haue had chylde examp̄les before , onely to make the matter plaine , ye shall see that in weightie mattērs , this deceiptfull argument hath been vise .

We heare many now adayes criē out , and saye the Lawiers are naught , they meane no trut̄h , but onely seke for lucre , where as no man I thinke , condemneth all Lawiers , although he haue full cause to accuse some wretched Lawiers . Somē late againe that p̄iestes haue leste som̄ication ḡodly well , and are never suspeyed nat̄uāly of wroghte doone , beinge hoken in lawfull mat̄ter , yet some spre not to saye againe , that therē haue made an exchaunge , leaþing up whoredome , and following conuictiōnes , the Deuill and all : Marie God forbiide , that all p̄iestes shoulde so doe . And in verē if any one shoulde so reason , I would rechek̄ his argumēnt to bee comprehendē , within the compasse of this false conclusion . Thus ratiōn the Analytisles , quod H. C. qd.

The Arte of Logike.

Unrighteou-
snes in e-
very kingdō.

{ Unrighteousnes is altogether reproved,
In every kingdome is much unrighteousnes vied:
Ergo, every kingdome is altogether reproved.

By this meanes wee shall have no kyng dome, no lowe, no politicall oder, no trade, no discipline, no iudgement for affraunders. But this argument is to be rejected, because it is to be derived from the parte, to the whole. For, althoough many thynges be amisse in a politicall bodie, yet the whole therefore must not be dissolved, the lawes must not bee abrogated, nor yet good oder abandoned: for the chief thyng that is in every Empire, is a thyng ordeined of God, and a righteous thyng, as for an example: Politicall oder, lawes, statutes, judgement, execution, and punisshemente of offendours, been altogether ordeined of God, and therefore, they reason amisse, that saie there is an abuse in a politicall oder, therefore, wee shall haue no oder at all, in any common weale: and againe ye shall perceiue, that there is more in the conclusion, then was rehearsed in the twoo former Propositions: for, in the seconde Proposition, the vices generally are rehearsed, but in the conclusion, the realme selfe is altogether named. Therefore, wee ought diligentlie to note the circumstaunce of the thyng, if wee will auoide this subtilitie, and when a thyng is spoken in parte, we must not therby iudge the whole: to measure the universall, by that whiche is compyended under the generall.

{ A man maie forsake an adulterous wife,

{ Ergo, he maie forsake his wife.

This is from the inferiour, to the universall, whiche is not well gathered, as it standeth here: for, although a man maie forsake his wife, having naught of her bodie, yet maie he not forsake an honeste woman, when it liketh hym to chaunge. For, this woord (wife) in the firste Proposition, is hedged with her circumstaunce, that is to saie, adultrie, which causeth diuorcement. Neither is this argumente good, the Kyng maie put to death every euill man: Ergo, the kyng maie put to death every man. Againe, if we will reason negatively, as we did before affirmatively, we shall frame our argumente amisse: as thus.

C. No wife should be put awaie.

Ergo, neither a gaughie wife should be put awaie.

G. Again.

C. No wine is euill.

Ergo, no mingled wine is euill.

This is from the universall to that, whiche is inferiour, and as ye would saie, hedged with his circumstaunce, and compassed with that, whiche before was neither in wife, nor yet in Wine, for a wife so long as she kepech her selfe to her housewande onely, she is no adulteresse, & wine that drinketh of it selfe, is not intinge-
led, and therefore, the argument is not good, because that thyng
is in the lesse, or inferiour, whiche was not in the generall. There
is a figure in Rhetorique, called *Hyperbole*, that is to saye, when
a thyng is spoken beyonde measure increasid, and yet is not so
largely ment. As when I will prase a man for his strenght, I
will saye, he passeth *Hercules* in manhoode, meaning that he ex-
celleth in manhoode and valiauntnesse. If wee knowe one that
runneth well, either dogges, man, or horse, were use to saie, he is
as swift as a Swallowe, he fletch like an arrowe out of a bowe,
meaning onely that he is exceeding swifte. Therefore, we must
diligently take heare, when suche speeches are used, that we take
not them as they bee spoken, but as they are ment, neither take
the whole for the partie, when the whole is expresse in wordes,
and the partie in understanding. And alwaies bee wile in
our mountynge, that ascendyng ouer high, we be not commayned
to come downe as foles. A noble man had a childe, whiche
was very towardye in learyng, and partayn for suchs worthynesse
as was in the childe, and partly to get favour of liche a perte, as
the fader was, dimer comayned the childe wonderfullly well,
and one above all other, thinking to late the fader, not content
with right excellent, & memorious knitte, & to make, saied
thus after other memmes judgement, and reporte givem: Surely
in my minde, the childe is even a very monstre. Whiche that the
noble manne laughes, to heare his folly, and all the other like-
wise that were there. Therefore, it is good in usyng suche par-
tayn reportes, discretely to weigh them before hande alwaies.

Things spe-
ken aboue
measure.

The Arte of Logikel

Hieremie saith.

Sic Domine quid non hominis via est,

I knowe Lorde that man hath not his waie.

Therefore, man hath no free will at all, no advise, no choise,
to deliberate either this waie, or that waie.

Free will.

Jeremie.

Sennacherib

*sq̄ regnū
duca et
rūbus*

Christosome
his sayng.

Platoes sayng
of Gods
doyng.

Eposes fable
of a cart that
stucke faste.

This consequence is not good: for Hieremias saying will be
understante excludentely: the waie of man that is to say, the car-
rying of man, is not onely rated, or ledde by the power, strength,
or force of man, neither can he doore any thyng of hymself alone,
without the helpe, or grace of GOD. Sennacherib that wicked
king, thought by his owne power and wisedome, to winne his
spurres against Ierusalem, but he trusted to himselfe
and his owne wisedome, that he lost his boores and all xlengthe
The chies and principall cause of all Gods actions, procedeth from
God, without whom all our doings are thair, but so not with-
standing doe they procede, that man hath cholle, will, and liberi-
tie, to doe good thynges, being assisted with the grace of God. As
Christalle praiseth the labourer, and laich. To him that hath shall
be givene. And Christosome saith very well, God dwelleth unto
him, but he dwelleth the willing. For, God will haue our good
will, to be longned with his calling. Therefore, Pldes in his iiiij.
booke, where he frameth his common weale, doeth wel mitigate
this Dixeritole, in this sentence which semeth incredible (God
doeth all thynges, and ordyneth every action) saying I doe well al-
loue this sentence, that God ruleth all thynges; but so now with
sayng I allowe it, will be well understande. For if it were beth
to ground it so, that mannes will, labour, and diligence, must be
soughted Hieremito, As we see in sayng upon the See, shipmen
call to God for helpe, and God will helpe them, but so not with-
standing, if ther helpe them notes. Hieremys in reference there-
is in the fables of Epose, a cart of one whiche stode stucke in the
mire, whiche man seyng his carte laye faste, cryede to Hercules
for helpe, and praised that he myght come from heaven: answere
was made, that he shold first helpe hymself, and then call vpon
Hercules, of els his carte were like to stille fall. *In hoc agitur, illud dicitur.*

The

The Church doeth not erre. *¶* The pharisees are the Churche. *¶* Ergo, the pharisees doe not erre.

The deceipte is, from the particulerre to the universall. As who shold say, Some doe not erre in the Churche. Ergo, no man doeth erre at all, that is of the Churche; whiche is false, for the Churche is as full of the evill, as of the good. The good men that are trained in the truthe of God, and taught the true loue of God, by ofte readyng and followyng his woode, haue the true lighte, and erre not. Other that be flounchfull, carelesse, drowned in ambition, and all worldly luste, both erre, and doe erre, from tyme to tyme. Wherefore, whereas I soie, the Churche doeth not erre, it is called *Synechdoche*, that is to say, when the parte is used for the whole.

An other argument made by the Anabaptistes.

To the iuste, there is no lawe set.

The riotous sonne after his conuercion, is iuste.

Ergo, to hym there is lawe set.

The iuste is
free from the
Lawe.

This argument is from the parte to the whole: he is deliuered from the lawe, for so muche as pertaineth to his condamnation, but he is not free, for so muche as belongeth to the due obedience, whiche he owech unto God: for this order standeth for ever, maister stedfastly, that every creature bee obediency to God the creatour. Againe, to al suche as euery iuste man, that is conuerted from his cuill waies, there remaineth a wicked inclination, the same must alwaies bee bidaled and kepte in, even with the terror of the Lawe, as though it were a mousercalle.

The signe is often tymes tourney, and the thyng it selfe, as I reheatred before.

Where is lawes George upon the walloway?

Ergo, it is saint George byment.

This argument men haue vset, when they haue seen a man painced vpon a wall, or graven in a stonye, but aswell they myght call the picture of the herte St. George, as the picture of the man. This is St. Christopher. This is St. Lou. This is the picture of Christ.

Images tau-
ken for sain-
tes.

The Arte of Logike.

Chistre: Ergo, it is Christ. This is an Image of our Ladie: Ergo
it is our Ladie, and here she will worke wonders, more then in
an other place, as she did at Walsingham, at Boston, at Lin-
colne, at Ipswich, and I can not tell where, when Priestes ga-
thered money, and poore folkes were mocked. Here ye must de-
nie the consequent, because the signe is not the thyng signified,
neither is GOD bounde to any place, to the whiche he hath not
bounder hymself by his woorde, nor per any saintre neither. This
rule overthoweth all maner of Noolles, which haue been in all
ages, from tyme to tyme. In this kinde of subtilitie, ye must di-
ligently obserue fower circumstaunces, the persone, the tyme, the
place, and the maner of comparyng thynges togidher, all which
are fals, and deceyfull reasons.

¶ The persone.

{ An Officer appoynted by the Kyng, maie sende an
offender to warde, by authoritie.

Ergo, every man maie.

¶ The tyme.

{ It is not lawfull to walke in the Strete's of London
after the marche is set.

Ergo, it is not lawfull to walke in London at all.

¶ The place.

{ It is not lawfull to give a blowe within the courte:
Ergo, it is not lawfull at all in myne owne defensse.

¶ The maner of reasoning.

{ It is an Image of a man.

Ergo, it is a man.

Compare these two together, and make the accidente ab-
saygnyed to a man, and ye shall perceve that it taketh away all
substaunce, and leaueth onely the shadowe: for, this wode pain-
ted, restraineth the other, and compasseth hym within his boun-
des, so that a painted man, can no more be called a man, then an
adulterous wife, can be called a wife, for so long is a woman cal-
led a wife, as she keepeth her self within the boundes of matrimo-
nie, otherwise he is no wife, although men use to call her wives.

¶ The three deceyfull.

Secondum

The art of Logike

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So much for the kind of men and causes, but what of fault? that is, when a cause
that is not able to prove the matter, is brought before us; as
I thought were of lesser industry, but the ground be-
ing considered, the fault is easily espied.

I cause that
is not put for
a cause.

Ergo riches are not good. Eccles 10:15
¶ In all such arguments wherin good thynges are repro-
ued, because evill thynges abuse the same, the evill will and the
naughtienesse of the man whiche abuses such thynges is
to be rebuked and therfore wherit is otherwise remealed,
that a cause whiche is not, is purly a cause. Eccles 10:16
¶ Some abuse par-
ties meanyng when they goe about to deplane philosophie.
Eccles 10:17
¶ Dache warres that we shoule not bee devided
and alius in vaine by philosophie. Eccles 10:18-19 (See
Eccles 10:19)

Philosophy.

The argument doeth not followe for a good thyng made bee
muche abuse, and yet cheching it selfe make not bee altogether
rejected as naught; therfore I will wchch you condemne demon-
strations and principles, whiche are allurac studies taught by
Sciences, as in *Mathematices*, and *astronomie*. In *Philosophie*,
the whole is greater then the parts, yet as thou wouldest be
born thare bee hiscience the whole of Sciences, when there is
nothinge that hath no conuention with an other, as
some have said. And so he will make a Christiane schollasche
for his professione as the *University*, and the whole Bible belouen
will bee the wchch wchch bee muche abuse that bee not per-
mitted to bee taught, as in *Mathematices* and *astronomie*, and

**Good Party
chairs and
until 11pm.**

The art of Logike.

of it, it was a better hyspo when he had nochaste to transpren-
chers. Heresies were encreasid more ripe; haughtynesse myght more
abounded. Therefore giving us the olde learning againe, and take
you the newe.

This reason is not woorches entiaue. The wickednesse of
the Preachers commeth of their leaping, but of their vici-
ous Desires, all nauishtes desires : for out of one and thselame
flowes the Bee sucketh honie, and the Spidele dragnet posson.
By these and suche other examples ye maie easely espie, where-
fore the argument is not good, if you make whether the true cause
hee in the former Proposition, or some countrefect reason whiche
seemeth to ypose, alwayes in dede therethat ypose the matter at
all, for if I reason thus, so ion the seaford 1663

Slobo and Robson looked through an hedge,
and the one said the other was a gipsy.
Even they two are both of honest men.

What reason seeth not, who dwelleth far any longer at all, that
the greater bangles together like as whene postured; and that the
Auriculae, touching at all none the Consequents; and yet
the other arguments above rebuked (if they be narrowly mar-
ked) are as foolish, and as impudent to be laughed at, as is this
foolishesse reason, and impudent argument.

¶ *Leave not the signs of thy Clemency, so long as*

The consequent is false, for Christ doth exhort his Disciples to fear the signs, not because they signify none evil to come, but because that where as they signify harm, you shall hence write to the world such wicked experiences; yet he will be a present succour to his Church, and never leave it in affliction. So when he godlike heart this (remember Deut. 32) did make believe, but that Death is an horrible dying, and much repugnant to man's Nature. This doceitfull argument is of the use in this our life, and made a buckler for divers matters, when they gat them to her of a wile, so that surely his gentle friends would not be any less for it. As mine eye did often see him, I mighte

cause. Do whichev're that is rich he shoulde help a poore man in his
fate. Consider yow selfe. I have a greate charge vpon me. I can not
doe for yow. Do whichever Mischme he haue. See he breake no lawe in
the meane time.

• 球体模型

does for you. ¶ whiche Bishopper shoule bee desired to teache or
preache, to sake he is sick. ¶ whien a Lawier besyng desired to
helpe a poore man, and piasered therupon a little moneys, even so

231Shoppe.

the a poore man, and planted therupon a little money, even so
much as the poore man shal well spare, and yet not halfe so
much as the lawe would have straught to say, I answeare, I
can not doe for you, if I were not called upon otherwise by others
then you. It shal not talke to do you good, this is as the late in-

Lawler.

Englysshe better habbe accuse then none at allly in Latin is called *Noscere noscere noscere*. And the usynge of surfe excutes knowyng. A brenche is also in anglishe that is to saye the name of the fruit from whence it is called *blacke brenche*.

Dresden.

king of the land from one to another till he reached Denmark. He had a wonderful good birth, which was late lost to his charge, that he had written other naughtie decrees and whistled for the obtaining of the peace at Alnwick; him. He announced that the same decree was not written with his usual writing penney, but with a swan feather; a very fine swan feather indeed, so fine and bold, that he caused him to call the young swan king of Denmark. After several notable histories of a young child in Elmet land,

ମାତ୍ରାଚାର୍
ଓ ପରିବାର
ଜୀବନ

led Papirum, whiche because he had it in his power, and woulde to
bee wonderfull, and also for such as this purpuleright aperte, I
think he it meant to have written for the same purpose.

Capitius.

the rest are to be received in this place. This 7th day of Feby
A.D. 1742/3. I have made a present of this to Mr. George to be
put into the hands of Mr. John Williams, printer to the Assembly
of the Province of New-Hampshire, who will publish it.
I am your affec son & friend, John Adams.

ରାଜ୍ୟ ପାତ୍ରିକା
ଅଧ୍ୟାତ୍ମିକ
ପାତ୍ରିକା

... all suggestions that were submitted to him to further the cause of the slaves, he would either add one thing to the other or add two things together. He was never able to do any thing by himself. His wife was also always at his side, opposing his ideas.

for them to have family and kinship ties for the space of ten years. Using bonds of mutual support, they can after their bereavement take up residence in the same town or city as their surviving relatives.

Women who
know their
rights.

10

五

confession.

The arte of Logike

confession, and having the Instrument of dissolution by her, that
is, a verie good birche a rodde, charged her soone cruelly to tell
her, every whiche that was debated in the parlemente house, or
else he shold smarre for it surely; So what with the strengnesse
of the thing, and what with the stresse of her sonne, she was won-
derfully much chid, till she had gote shewre what of the boore. The
boore himselfe first consideryng his faders commandemente,
and consideryng how he shold bee pained at his handes, if he tolle
all thynges in dede, as they were; and againe on the other side,
see yng present paine before hym, therodde at hande, his mother
with child, till she were somewhat satisfied, thought he is better pre-
schein, and by the wale, to mocke his mother, and so to stoppe her
mouthe with some fraged tale; then fleshe to bewray his fader,
his frenndes, and all his countrey. And therfore that he begaine
crastely to shape his tale? Mother, if you will promise me to kepe
that close, whiche I shall disclosse unto you, and tell it no boore li-
ving, you shall heare the whole matter, cur was it so? She an-
swered, she would not tell it agayne, whatsover it were. Then
said he, mother, the materre whiche cometh parlage, and the
Counsell have longe debated, whether it were better for one man
to haue twoo wifes, or one woman to haue twoo households,
and as yet the matter changeth in suspence. When she heard this,
her harte burnet, and her stomache was uncharaged wonderfull-
ly, that except she had laien it, none of her neigbours tappe, it
was like she wold haue blast. One the godesdaye in March miche
spende with her tongue, as she doeth with her fader, and telleth it
immediately to her nexte neighbour, and from thence to all other, till
at lengthe the number knewen bygynge wherepon the knyghtes wholie
to goe altogether to the Counsell house, to entreate the Senatores
to leste no longer upon this matere, but that they determinie with
one alient and concerte, that it shal be knowne wherefore it is
every woman to haue twoo households, and not otherwise for
no wifes good, any thyng betwixen us the countreymen and
flesyng. By this example maye learn the stricteesse of this be-
synes. For when the mother setteth her sonnes, when the count-
reymen of their felenges sayng, Flesyng, you haue done wronge,

Papirius
answerte to
his mother.

Women ha-
ve yll counsell

of quod
ancti a wond-

The arte of Logike.

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which the ~~W~~ormsall never thought, nor yet onck mynself, this
is, ~~an~~ ~~cause~~ ~~pro~~ ~~cause~~ ~~to~~ ~~say~~ ~~a~~ ~~cause~~ ~~that~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~put~~ ~~for~~ ~~a~~ ~~cause~~
~~the~~ ~~cause~~ ~~of~~ ~~The~~ ~~Tower~~ ~~of~~ ~~London~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~cause~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~King~~



Allaciam consequentia, when the consequent, that is to say, the latter proposition is still gathered by the antecedent which goeth before. And the way to know the faulter of his argumentation, is to examine the argument with the preceptes of Logique about it hearded.

Ergo good deeds purchase life.

This argument is not good, for considerynge we can not fulfill the Lawe by our selues . Againe , woorkes are wicheyn that are dooen without faithe , so that first wee maist bee in the state of grace by faithe , and assuredly though lathe to holde ever , before our woorkes shall bee accepted by god , neither can our dooings bee perfecte in any parte , to fulfill Gods will and his commandementes , and therefore though euill dooers deserve deathly penaunce , god dooers can nevere phreache his , so long as we be enocable to fulfill the Lawe , by God knoweth we shal nevere be satisfactorie , our consciences , the worlde and all , destryng witnessesse against us . Oflynes that bee hot proprie , neither long , no strong argument is made by them .

Quite a number of people have been affected by the recent outbreak of Legionnaires' disease. The disease is caused by a bacterium called Legionella pneumophila. It is spread through the air, usually from cooling towers or hot tubs. Symptoms include fever, chills, headache, muscle aches, and coughing. In severe cases, it can lead to pneumonia and even death. To prevent infection, it's important to avoid exposure to contaminated water sources and to follow good hygiene practices like handwashing and avoiding smoking.

萬葉集

The conse- quent, and right to inter- viewed with

**Woochers
without faith
are wicked.**

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¶ The arte of Logike.

serve leggyng his bread. And yet God doeth not feede all Christians with his woode one ly, but leth his appointede will generally. Like wise in the sacraments God feedeth vs spiritually, becasyle the fleshe eaten profiteth nothing, and thei the eate the sacrament in faith, trust in God, and God in them spiritually, & haue life everlastyng, where as other that eate it without faische, haue it not at all for lacke of faische, considerynge God is no wicken man. But in the old worlde many wonders were wrought, and because thynges might bee, all thynges shold bee as thei would haue it, and yet I can not be perswaded to thinke that, becasyle all priestes maie be honest, therfore thei all be honest.

From the generall to the inferiour affirmatioun, is no good argument made. **H**e is a man of power, **E**rge he is a good man of power. **H**e mane not withstandyng bee an evill maner, yea, and soner evill then good, for none can tell almoste now a daies whiche the good menre doore phell. **O**nly shal have diverseng places full, yet some can finde them at home. **A**gainst, to make an argument made. **T**hose the dea whiche happen to a maner, and wyl be aswiche the reason may not of necessarie follow. **S**o this old man goeth geily, and lifles yongman **E**rge he is in loue with some woman.

In this reason, whilom hee made vnew farie, as though it
rould not other wise bee, but that he more indeue, because he
ministris his appall among manlike. This for this whole expe-
cnes cause, I thinke it best that ye marke the viiiij. shillings aboue re-
ferred, and ye shall not faille to espie the faulke, for the receipt is sone
seen if he sell the aungement to accoumpt. in a short tyme.

**Any que-
tion.**

Questions asked two jewels.

ibyng many myndes, and yet for the bidders questiones before we come to the purpose. ¶ Of the firste, this may bee an example.

To water and wine botte or no?

The question is in two. In that he must answere to the bothe, whiche he can not doe at onys pnyne, and quynce one refuted answere vñrely, according to the demanders will. But this is a crise, and one that hath but a sponefull of wite, maye answere to this question, byng a distinction, and severally shewyng the qualitez of bothe wine and water, other will he can not be able to make a reasonable answere, as the question is propounded.

Is wodipping of hantles, and prayng to Goo hymself, allowed amonge Chyldren by me? ¶

Here ye see, that for two bidders bynging to oþer, one certayne question is directly required, wheras no man can hardly answere at a woordes end; and therfore the question bynging to bothe severally, must severally be faunced.

I will abbe abbe on oþer, whiche agreeþ to the bounde manner of abbyng, and I will abbe the lymite rather to givethat of languyng, then that there is any greace weight in it. ¶ And never tooke paines in a matter of Lawe by a certayne gentleman, that was sometyme a Scholler. The gentleman promised hym a boote for his labour, the Lawler after paines taken, required his boote, the gentleman denide his deute, houghly the lawlere had wittesse. And thus the gentleman remaynted boote for hymself.

Sir or he, all bootes bee not of one colour, but of oþers colours, some blanke, some white, some bayl, some baylif 3 ouer pouþry by piontelle. Nowt you no more of one colour, than 3 ouer of another, considerynge 3 ouer promis to you no more of one colour, then I did of an oþer, and I haue no oþer ge of my piontelle, well in bringyng one certayne colourred boote, to an oþer. Therfore, either I owe you bootes of all colours, or no. I owe you none of all oþer. If bee not oþer you bootes of all colours (considerynge 3 ouer promis you durare) therfore I owe you none oþer, seynge boote maye be Lawler, whiche this shoulde shewe, mache boote he will. But yowre selfe shoulde be wised yowself, if you sette myne piontelle, upon the gentleman save hym to reasonable,

¶ horse
piontelle
a Lawler.

The arte of Logike.

sonable, and heard hym spise, he gaue hym accoording to his promise, consideryng he referred the whole matter so gently, to his pleasure.

¶ Of this seconde maner of askyng, when of one thyng many are asked, one may easly bee emraigd and brought to an incovenience, before he beware, and of this kinde of askyng there is also another example in *Zalphe*, where he speacheth in his booke *De inventione*, of this figure *inductio*, which is by thynges not doubtfull, to prove that thyng true whiche is doubtfull. *Socrates* sheweth that *Astas* had this talkke with *Zenophon* and his wife, to manner and forme followynge, after other communication had before. And tell me in fauour (*of the*) if thy neighbour had more pretious te welles then thou now hast, whether wouldest thou wylle to haue hers, or thyng owne? So he answered, I woulde haue hers. What if she had more costly garmentes, more fine apparell, wouldest thou not haue it also? *De inventione* sheweth *Obwell*, This, what if thy neighbour had a better househinde then thou haude hast, whether haddest thou rather kepe thyne owne still, or haue hers? With that she blushed. Then *Astas*, when opportunity serued, spake to *Zenophon* like wise, and saide merrily unto hym, he not knowing of this that was spoken before. If you shewe celling *Zenophon*, what if thy neighbour had a better house then thine, wouldest thou rather haue thyng owne, or thyng neighbours? I woulde haue his fauour he. What if he haue better lame then thou hast, wouldest thou haue his or thyng owne, I woulde haue his fauour he. What if he had a better wife then thou hast, wouldest thou change or no? Here *Zenophon* laid never a smirche. Then spake *Astas*, so as mynthe as herte of you, enely bath not answereyn me in that pointe, whiche I woulde aske to knowe; I my selfe wyl shewe whiche herte pouchneth. If on you breng a woman, fiftie denariis haue I in mine to your househinde, and *Zenophon* bearing a maraynlyng desyreth to haue a right haueste wyfman. Therefor, excepte you be he shall in behalte your schule, then ther maist be knowe, whether mynthe or my woman shoulde haue whom nearely then you consider, imbolded yow herte wyl enuy me more, monre earnestly

Socrates.
Dipasla.

Act 12
Zenophon.

earnestly desire that, whiche you thinke principall and best of all, boche that thou being a housebande, myghtest haue a rytte honest wife, and you also beyng a woman, myght bee married to a rytte honest housebande.

The sixte deceipte.

Repetitio principij, the Cuckoos song, that is, repeyting of that wholy in the conclusion, whiche besyde was one ly spoken in the firste proposition: or els by thynges doubtfull, to proue thynges that are as doubtful.

The Cuckoos song.

{ Every sauanderer must be banisched the Courte.
Duche a man is a sauanderer.

Ergo, every sauanderer must be banisched the court.

The conclusion is not well gathered, for it shold not bee universall, but particulare, and therfore, synging the samme is repeated that was spoken before, without any good probation: in my mindest mate bee called the Cuckowes song. Well willed folke that followe luste, and forslake reason, vse ofte the Cuckowes song. As beyng asked why they will doe this and that, they awnswere streight. Marie, because I will doe it, or because it pleasech me besite so to doe. The poore men beyng thus awnswered of the wealthie, shall hardely escape daunger. For, though it be a plaine deceipte, and by reason shold bee overthowen, yet so longe as might beareth rule, and right is set a side, reason is out of ceason, and doeth but little helpe. Some women are subiect to this awnswere, whiche in witte doe excell, though in the eight partes of reason, fewe scholers can hardly finde them. Well, God graunt all our willes, to stande euer with his will, and then I doubt not, but this harme shall with ease be avoided, and all deceipte for euer set a parte. Againe, when an unknowen thyng, is proued by a thyng, that is a smiche unknownen as the other is.

A reason without reason.

In Purgatorio, sinnes be forgiuen to the dedde.

Ergo, we must saie Massie still for the dedde.

Purgatorio.

This wile reason, sondre Preachers heretofore haue made, that therefore, we must haue Massie for the dedde, because in purgatorio sinnes be forgiuen the ded. And yet doubt I alsmuche of this place purgatorio, as I mistrust this foolish Massing, and

The Arte of Logike.

to saie truthe, it is sinne to like either of them bothe, and as for purgatory, I thinke there was never any suche, but onely invented to scare the simple, as children haue been made afraied with a bister, or els found out to picke mennes purses. An other.

Paying to
Sainctes,

Thus many hundred yeres haue men vysed to payle
to sainctes departed.

Ergo, they doe not amisse, that praise to the ded stille,
I haunswere, whoredome hath been vysed these many hundred
yeres: Ergo, it is lawfull, bothe to haue stewes, and to goe to
the Stewes stille.

Custome,
Purce vnto
naughtynesse.

Every man maie see, how foole shal this argumente be, and yet
it is as good as the other every ympe of it. For, althou[m] menne
haue prayed, men haue gone on pilgrymage thus long, and thus
longer yet is not therfore true, that the people did well therin.
For, wee Englishmen knowe (not onely by heare saie, but also
by good experiance) that custome is the mother, and the fylke gi-
uer unto all errore. And therefore, when suche argumentes are
made, we saye Dubium per id quod aque dubium est, confirm-
atur. That whiche is doubtfull, is proued by that, whiche is as
doubtfull, and so we doe not allowe the argumente.

Anabaptis-
tes.

Thirdly, when that thyng is taken to prove, as thought
were undoubted, and every bodie agreed thereunto, whereas yet
it is in controuersie.

The Anabaptistes haue the holy Ghoste, the te-
cher of all thynges.

Ergo, they neve[n]t to haue the Gaspell, nor yet be
bounde to followe it.

Who knoweth not, that hath any knowledge of the truthe,
that the fylke maie be lawfully doubted, and rather denied, then
graunted.

Lowlyerly, this deceipt is then used, when that whiche sol-
loweth, pouereth that, whiche goeth before, as though the Carte
went before the booke, for, ofte tymes that thyng whiche is pro-
ued, is more assured than that, whiche doeth proue, as thus.

Infantes.

Infantes haue faische.
Ergo, they must be Baptised.

The

The Arte of Logike.

8r

The consequent is undoubted true, soasmuche as wee finde it so in the Scripture, that in the Primative Churche, whole families were baptised, children and all: for, wee revere not that they were excepted, and yet some doubt, and that of the greatest Clerkes, whether children haue faith, or no.

{ The fiftete deceipte.

D ignoratio eluchi (that is the mistakynge of contradictorie propositions) is a deceiptifull argument, whiche romprehendeth in it selfe, all oþer aboure rehearsed subtleties. The occasion of this errore is lech, for not knowyng what is contradiction. Contradiction therefore, is a repugnancie of one and the same not substance onely, nor yet name onely, but of the substance, and name boþe together. Aristotle notwithstanding hath compassed this deceipt within his boundes: First, when respect is not made to one and the same thing, but diversly applied.

29. mistakyn
g of contradic-
torie proposi-
tions.

{ To eate fleshe, is good for health sake.

{ To eate fleshe is not good whē offence may folowe.

{ Ergo, to eate fleshe is good, and not good.

Truthe is, and yet shall it not folowe, that whosocuer eateth, the same man doþ offend: considerynge to eate is lawfull, andis none offence to God at all, beþing once allowed by the magistrate, in whose hande lieth the whole sydying of this matter.

Againe, this deceipt is used, when contradiction is made, accordyng to divers respectes, as thus.

{ The Lawe is to be folowed in Morall preceptes,

{ and not in Ceremonialles, nor yet alwaies in Iuridicalles neither.

{ Ergo, the lawe is to be folowed, & not to be followed

It is even so, and yet not true neither, that the lawe is alwaies to be recited, & to be folowed, as it pleaseth our phantalles.

Thirdly, this subtletie is fashimed, when a contradiction is used, and yet not used of like sorte, so that the latter parte, doþ not denie the former, in one maner of understandyng, as thus.

{ I knowe the woynde of God,

{ And I doe not knowe it.

Chose that line licentiously, and feare not the generall refection,

P.ij. rection,

The Arte of Logike.

rection, maie iustly bee here concluded, and the twoo sentences, whiche seeme to gainsaie, maie both be true in theiis soi, some knowe that the scriptures are of God, or at least thei know, that the scriptures are commonly taken for the woerde of God, and yet thei themselves, knowe not one woerde of Gods will, nor yet passe a whitte for it. Or we maie saie, that those poore soules in the Pop. & reigne, knewe the woerde of God onely by hearesaie, when they heard the Gospell reade in Latine, and could not tell one woerde what it ment.

{ Fowterly, the tyme mage alter thynges, and make twoo diuers thynges to be bothe true, as thus.

{ To worke upon the Sabbath is forbiidden, and yet not to wooke upon other daies, is also forbiidden.

{ Ergo, to worke, and not to worke, are both forbiidden

It is an easie matter to auoide all siche deceiptes. Therfore, there is a rule in *Logike*, that twoo contradicções can never bee bothe, either false or true, at one and the same tyme, and that in one respecte, as thus.

{ All true beleuers shall attaine saluation,

{ Some true beleuers shall not attaine saluation.

These twoo propositions can never be bothe together, either true or false. Now the ocher, whiche were made before, mite be bothe true, at one and the same tyme, and therefore, they are not contradicories, because thei are not considered in respecte of one and the same thyng, at one and the same time, but diversly applied and considered, as thus.

{ To preache in the congregacion is meete for a man,
and not for a woman.

{ Ergo, to preache is meete, and not meete.

All this is true beyng diversly considered, first a womā maie not preache, and yet a man maie, and so the sentence is true, and it mite well be saied, to preache is meete, and not meete, without any contradiction at all, because of the divers respectes, whiche be had bothe to the man, and to the woman. If the rule of contradictione propositions before rehearsed be well marched, all these deceiptes maie easely be auoide.

*¶ Of particulaire answeryng false argumentes,
whiche are derived from the places.*

Vhen I see an argumente derived, from thys sub-
tile places, oþers from the places of iuention,
whiche I haue before at large declarid: I ought to
obserue diligently, the generall rules and yacep-
tes there giuen, for, if one reason thus from the ge-
nerall worde, such a man followeth naughtinesse: Ergo, he is a
thiefe, the argument is not good, and the error appereth the ra-
ther, by this generall rule. From the general to the kinde, the ar-
gument is not good. For, though one bee naught other wise, yet
maie he liue naughtely long enough, and yet be no thiefe at all.
as he maie be an adulterer, a swerer, or such like.

*¶ False reasons made through the
euill framing of an argument.*

THE wrong framynge, maie with ease bee espied, if the **False rea-**
rules be once learned, that are before sette forthe for the **sons through**
same purpose. And againe, all other kinde of argu-
mentes, haue rules especiall, and proper to them selues, where-
by the true ordering of an argument, is better knownen.

¶ Of obiections made to an argument.

DObiections are then vsed, when wee doe not dissolve the **Obiections.**
argumente, by the rules of Logike, or directly moue
the daunger, but byng an other thyng, as an example,
to shewthowre that, whiche was spoken before, and this maner
is fower waies vsed.

- i. By takyng occasiōn of the selfe same thyng, that is put forth
and wlestynge it other wise.
- ii. By vsyng the same example in an other matter.
- iii. By makynge a cleane contrary example.
- iv. By standynge to auothorite, or usyng sentences of the sage.

For the first, this example maie serue, riches are good, be-
cause they byng pleasure. The awnswere: Maie Marie, richesse
are euill, because they byng woe.

Of the seconde, thus. Suche a one is an honeste man, for, I
haue hym once giue almes to the poore. I awnswere, suche a one

The Arte of Logike.

is no dronkarde, for, I sawe hym once sober.

Of the thirde, thus. Sowche an honest man hath once received a greate displeasure of his frende and neighbour. Ergo, he maie hate hym devly for euer. Maie, not so, for the wicked man will sometymes forgiue, receyuyng displeasure, and therfore, the good man must muche more forgiue.

Of the fowterth, thus. Forgiue hym, because he is a childe. Maie, not so, for Salomon biddeth that the rodde shold not goe from the childe, therfore, it is good to beate hym when he offendeth.

I haue traansaled thus farre, to disclose untruthes, and to open cloked errours, wherein though sometymes, the examples be but slender, yet in greater matters, the same deceipte hath taken place. Therfore, though to the Englishe arte, they maie seeme straunge, yet I hope they will bee better taken, when this is knowen, and fully seen, that they give light to greater matters, and that Logike by good order, and perfecte reason, dooth rule all, and espelth faultes, whiche otherwise would breed offence: for, looke what false argument is used, the same maie with ease bee founde in some one of these deceiptfull corners, or els where in the places of inuention, and therfore, maie by arte easely be auoide: especially, if the other rules aboue rehearsed, bee once well digested. For, the rules are touthe stones, to trie untruthes, and to frame matters right. And generally good heed ought to be had, that the matter, and forme of every argumente bee true, accordingyng to the rules, for, by these twoo pointes, all errorres are espied. The faulke is in the matter (called in Latine Materia) when wordes are doubtfull, and maie diuersly bee taken, and also when the pycche or substance of the matter is confounded, and straungely usyd by wordes ioygned together, and thynges not orderly placed: in all whiche kinde of argumentes, ye must vsle either a flatte deniall of the proposition, or els vsle a distinction, to shewe how the argumente maie be true, and how it maie be false, accordingyng as it is understanden. We vsle a deniall, when of two propositions in the argumente, we denie either

Faulte in the
matter.

the proposition at large, or the severall, by shewyng the faulke to be

bee in the definition, in the division, in the causes, or some other place, as thus.

I had good cheare in such a mannes house.

Ergo, he is an honest man.

Here the faulte is in the definition, for, if I would goe about to define an honest man, every bodie would laugh me to scorne if I would thus define hym. That man, whosoever he be, that maketh me good cheare at his house, is a very honest man: but I must rather saye thus. Whosoever he is, that doeth as he wold bee done unto, and wrongeth no bodie, but liueth still uprightly, godly, and continently, the same is an honest manne, or els not. For, vertue is gotten by long practise, and by well dowyng of many good thinges, not by makynge a good dinner, and therefore, the other above rehearsed definition, because it is not lawfull, nor agreeing with the rules of a definition, is utterly to be denied this reason applied thereto, that the definition is not lawfull. Notwithstanding, in taking of honest men, euermore the wealthiest are considered, and therefore, thys and such like talk is commonly vsed. Of what opinion is such a manne? An honest man surely, saith an other, for, he will eate his meate I warrant you, he is none of these scrupulous consciences, he hath the Bible in his house ye mate bee sure: talke with hym of the Sacrament Gospell p̄r-
tcs, taken
for good men. As when you will, and he is able to aunswere *ad amnia quara.* As though whole religion stode in these pointes onely. I asked once, a fellowe in Latine, if he could doe any thyng in the Scriptures, whose learnyng I was then commannded to examine. He aunswered me thus. *Eiam, possum fabularide Sacramento, si placet.* That is, yea sir, I can babble of the sacrament if it please you. Dea, & I, Marie then you haue enough, and I warraunte you against all men, and so bid him farewell, beyng well instructed of his great worshyness. Item, remembre of an other, and that no small bire, whiche was better learned then wise, and yet not so well learned in deede, as he thought hymself (in his owne opinion) wise and vsed an other more daungerous reason. For, whereas it chancenly occasioned talke, that one in his compaines enued against the same mannes frende, speaking thinges nothing roth-

some.

The Arte of Logike.

some, and otherwise then he would gladly heare, although not greatly mislyng the quishen, in reportyng truhe, he tooke the matter very herte, and like a frende speake earnestly, in his fren- des cause, testifysing for his honestie, with mooste constaunt wo- des, & to perswade hym the better, he vised this soye reason. Thou art to blame (q he) to deprauie suche a maunes estimation, for, by Gods mother, he is a very honeste manne, for, he is my speciaall frende, I wold thou shouldest knowe it, and therefore, cease thy railingyng: with that, other came to parte them, for, they fell to rea- sonyng with argumentes, that were neither in figure, nor in moode, but stooode in plaine buffettes, which is a subtiltie, that is not mentioned within the compasse of this booke, and therefore, daungerous, neither can it bee avoided, excepte one haue a hed- pence, or some weapon in his hanve to beare of suche deceytes, and so sauie hymselfe hatuelesse. Some call suche rough dealyng Carters Sophistrie, when the first reasoneth a matter by buffe- tes, whiche the tongue shoulde moue by argumentes. Again, for the diuision: when it is not well made, it is to be denied in like maner, the cause shewed why, and wherefore, as thus.

{ Every man is either wastfull or covetous.

Cicero is a man,

Ergo, Cicero is either wastfull or covetous.

This diuision is not good, for, many men offend in neither, but line moderately, content with their owne, bee it never so lit- tle. Moreover, when no true cause is applied, but a false reason loyed, ye mate avoiude the daunger by denying it, as thus,

{ Money maketh vncleesses.

Ergo, money is naught.

Or thus,

{ Fire burneth houses.

Ergo, what shall we doe with fire?

Or thus,

{ Water drowmeth whole cities.

Ergo, water is nothing profitable.

In all suche argumentes, the true cause is omitted; and a counterfeict cause vies. For, neither money, nor fire, nor yet wa-

ter

Mage ouer-
throweth
reason.

Carters
Sophistrie.

ter doe harme of theim selues, but the naughtinesse of nature,
whiche abuseth them, and the negligence of man, whiche forsyth
not to them, is the very true cause of their euill doyng: and yet in
weightie matters, such sondre reasons haue been vsed, as for the
readyng of Gods woyde, for women to be learned, for *Rectorike*
to be taught, or the temporall law at this daie, in this our realme
to be frequented, or occupied.

Gods woyde
Rectorike.
Temporal law

A distinction must be vsed, when any woyde is doubtfull, and
maie be taken diversly. As thus.

I Tyme healeth sicke folke.

Ergo, it is very good.

Here a distinction must be vsed, for tyme aswell signifieth an
hearde, as it signifieth the space, whiche is an houre, daie, or pere.
A frende of myne was called Harris: one not well knowyng his
name, called hym Harrissonne. I denigh the sonne (*& he*) not
meanyng the second persone in Trinitie, but the addition of this
woyde (sonne).

A learned man a Phisition (some knowe whom I meane) *A Phisition.*
hauyng at a certayne tyme a coate of Ueluet, that was mucche
worne, and bare at the breast, beyng then also poore withall, and
hauyng a thyme purse, sittynge at a table, and layng his hende
upon his breast, saied thus merely to his frende Willm (*& he*) for
all this haerde woyde, at the woyste I am thus mucche worthe,
even in bare Ueluet. Thesame manne afterwarde, sittynge at a
table, not hauyng elbowe roume, but beyng troubled, and his
coate somewhat araid, whiche was dressed at the Othiermans,
not past two or three daies before, saied merely: I praye you my
waisters, her good to my coate, for I promise you, within these
two or three daies, it hath scape a scouryng.

A young man of Cambridge, standyng in a galerie ouer the *Young men
of Cambridge*
water, and lookyng on his booke, hauyng the water on the one
sise, and a gardine on the other sise, wherin (as it chaunced then)
were diners maidens of the toun (say it was aboute Easter, at
what tyme maidens gadden aboue), after they had taken their
shaker, as they call it, he beyng thus beset, one of his fellowes
beyng alound, and syng hym ther, had hym come ouer to hym.

The Arte of Logike.

He answered, I cannot come. That he demanded why? Marie (q he) because I am compassed with fire and water. Meanyng the maidens to be fire, and a prouocation to lust, burning woxle then fire; and so all good authours haue used this woyde fire. As Terence. *Accende ad ignem hunc, iam calces plus satis.* Come to this fire, saith Parmeno to Phedria, meanyng I haue the hatlot, and you shalbe as hote as coles by and by. Therefore where syche speache is used, it is awaies called in Latine, *Metaphora.* That is to saye, a tourning from the proper signification to that whiche is not proper, wherein the olde Philosophers haue wonderfully excelled, as Diogenes, Socrates, and in our time sir Thomas More, a man for his witte, very singular.

Faulte in the
making of an
argument.

The faulfe that is in the forme, or maner of makynge, as we call it, mae be dissoluen, when we shewe that the conclusion, is not well proved by the former Propositions, and that the argument is either not well made, in figure or in moode, or in bothe: for of true thynges, none other thyng can be concluded but truth, if the due forme of concluding be obserued, and the just placynge or settynge of the partes or termes, called in Latine, *termini*, as ye heard before, be truly kepte, as the rules before haue taught. Notwithstanding of false Propositions, an undoubted truthe mae well enough be concluded, as thus.

Every synne, mae be suffered in a common weale.

Every execution doen by a lawe is synne.

Ergo every execution, doen by a latine, mae be suffered in a common weale.

The two first propositions are manifestly false, and yet the conclusion is very true. So that ye mae see after two false propositions, a true conclusion mae followe, and notwithstanding of two true Propositions, a false conclusion can be made. So as we late in Latine. *Ex veris illis etiam sequitur* that is to saye, of true thynges, nothing doeth followe but truthe. Therefore, when the conclusion semeth not good, ye mae justly suspect the other two Propositions, although they seeme never so true, for undoubtedly, the faulte is either in the euill knyting, when the argumente is not in his moode and figure accordingly, or els in the

the confounding of wordes either euill placed, or not well applied, or els in the doubtfulnesse of some worde.

All riot is an offence.

No coueteousnesse is riot.

Ergo, no coueteousnesse is any offence.

Thus we see a false conclusion, made of two undoubted true Propositions, and yet I saied before, of true saynges nothing doth followe, but onely truthe. But abide, ye must examine this argument with the rules, and then ye shall see, that the faulter is in the forme, or maner of makynge an argument. For it is in no moode in the firste figure, although it be an argument of the first figure.

Sometime the faulter is onely in the matter, and not in the maner of making an argument, whereto there are diuers examples aboue rehearsed. Sometime the faulter is bothy in the matter, and in the maner of making an argument, as thus.

Faulter in the matter of an argument.

The pearl is profitable, and causeth muche plentie

All men are in the pearl.

Ergo all men are profitable, & causeth muche plentie

First, it is in no figure, becausse the double rehete in the first Proposition, is the substance of the pearl, and in the seconde Proposition, is the beynge in the pearl, and so there bee fower termes in the twoo Propositions. Againe, it is in no moode, becausse the firste Proposition in the firste figure, is not universall. And this maie suffice, whiche heretofore I haue rehearsed for the solution of an argument, soasmuch as he that can diuide, define, and make his argумент in minde also shal, according to the rules before mentioned, and diligently marks doubtfull wordes: shall soule espye the faulter in an euill argument, soasmuch as it can not other wise bee, but that he wyllo be knowen the bess, shall easly juge, and without difficultie espie the wroght.

And nowe theracher to delighte the reader, I will adde here certaine wittie questions and arguments, whiche can hardly be auoide, keeyng very pleasaunce, and therfore haue vnuowchis to be known.

The Arte of Logike.

Trapping
argumentes.

They are called trapping argumentes, because sive that
awaſwered unto them, can auoide daunger, and thus thei are na-
med in ſtraunge wordes.

Crocodilites.

Antistrephon.

Ceratine.

Abitation.

Cacofitation.

Vris.

Pseudomenos.

Crocodilites, the Serpentes guile.



Crocodile.

Crocodilites, is ſuche a kinde of subtilitie, that when
we have graunced a thyng to our aduersarie, bee-
yng asked before what he will ſaie: theſame tour-
neth to our harme afterwarde, and caueth an in-
conuenientie, therupon to enue. In thourſ doe
ſeigne, that the Crocodile being a monſter in Egipte, did take a
womanes childe from her, and ſpake with the mother in this wifer:
woman, I will give thee thy childe againe, if thou wilt ſaie truthe
to me, and tell me assuredly, whether I will give thee thy childe
againe, or no: She aunſwered, I knowe assuredly, thou will not
give me my childe againe, and therefore it is reſon I haue my
childe againe, because I haue ſaid truthe. Hauing ſaid the Cro-
codile, I will not give thee thy childe againe, because thou maileſt
be ſeen to haue ſaid truthe, leſt that if I give thee thy child again,
thou ſhouldſt haue made a lyfe: neithir yet wold I haue giuen
thee thy child againe, if thou haddeſt ſaid otherwiſe, because then
thou haddeſt not ſaid truthe. And herof this argumente hath
his name, called Crocodilites. Notwithſtandynge, Lucian tolleth
this tale after an oþer ſayor, and maketh Chriſippus to tolle an
other man, what he would ſaie, incalfe he ſhould be aſked a que-
ſion of the Crocodile, as I haue before reheatid.

The rebound-
ing or tour-
ning againe of
an argument

A Antistrephon, is nothing elſe, then to tourne a mannes ſa-
ying into his owne neche againe, and to make that whiche he
bringereth

byngeth for his owne purpose, to serue for our purpose, in Latine it maste be called, *Inventio*. And as Gallus hath a notable ex-
ample of *Pithagoras*, a noble sophiste, and *Erasimus* Scholer
to the same *Pithagoras*. This *Erasimus* was a very young man,
and glad to learne Eloquence, and to pleade causes in the Com-
mune place. This yong man therefore, considerynge *Pithagoras*
to be a singulaire man in his behalfe, and a meete Scholemaster
for his purpose, desired to bee his Schoeler, and promisid to give
 hym a greate somme of money for his paines, euen as muche as
he would as he, and gaue hym upon a grement halfe in hande be-
fore he learned, and couenantid therupon, that he shold haue
the other halfe, euen at the first daie that he stode at barre, and
by pleading, got the oþer hande in iudgemente of his aduersarie.
After this, when he had been a good while *Pithagoras* Schoeler,
and profited very muche in the Lawe, and yet not withstandyng,
came not to the Barre, but still shiffted hym of, and tractid the
tyme (of like because he wold not pate that residu of his mo-
ney) *Pithagoras* taketh advisement, as he hymself thought, be-
ry subtilly, and charged hym with his promise, having an action
of debte against hym, and therfore he called hym to the Lawe.
There, when he had hym before the Judges, he beginneth his
tale in this wise.

Here I haue thee now (*Pithagoras*) and learne there:
þou foolishe fellowe as thou art, and marke this pointe for thy
Learyng: whethere the iudgement be givien with thee, or against
thee, I shall haue my money every geute of it. If thou art cast in
the Lawe, I haue wonne by vertue of the Lawe, if thou art not
cast, but gettest the oþerhande, by iudgemente of these menne,
þou muste I haue it neverthelesse, because our bargaine was so
made, when I first began to teache thee. *Erasimus* hearyng this
answerto as ye shall heare, I could easilie avide this your ero-
red subtiltie, and bee without all danger, if I wold not stande
at the barre my selfe, but get some auocate for mes for by suche
meanes, you could not charge me with any debte, considerynge
I my selfe pleade no cause. Norwithstanding I like it better a
shoulders solde, that I my selfe am here personally, and speake

Pithagoras
and his scho-
ler *Erasimus*

Pithagoras
reason to his
schoeler.

Erasimus
answerto
his master.

The Arte of Logike.

in myne owne cause saying that not onely I will gette the ouerhande of you in this our matter, whereby I shall be discharged of deute, but also euen in this argumentement I will touche your owne woordes, into your owne necke agayn, and so triumphe bothe waies. And therfore leare you againe as wise as ye are; and marke this pouere for your remembryng, whether the iudgemente be givyn with yoldyng against you; I shall sauemy money euer groote of it. For if you be cast in the Lawe, I haue hope by vertue of the Lawe, app so I owe you nothing. If you be not cast, but geete the ouerhande of me, by the iudgemente of these men; then accordyng to my bargaine, I shall pate you nothing, becausse I haue not gotten the ouerhande in iudgemente. The iudges sayng the maister so doubtfull, and so harde to determine for either partie: sayng to bothe amissley left the matter ryme with out iudgemente so that thynge, and deferryd the same to an other season. This yester day that the yong man byng the Scholer, gaue his maister a boane to graunt, and bet hym with his owne rodde, whiche the maister had made for his Scholers tale.

Bristophus
185.

There is in Anthonys a wonderfull mettie talke, betwixt the father, and the sonne, which serveth well for this purpose. For where as the sonne had beaten his father, contrary to all order and honestie, yet notwithstandingyng, the sonne thought he had as good auchoiitie to beat his father if he did amisse, as the father had to beat hym. And therefore he said, wherfore shold my father beat me? His father made aunswere. Marie (or he) because I loue thee, and wold thou shouldest doo well. Marie therefore (or the sonne) will I beat thee to, because I loue thee also good father, and wold thou shouldest doo welle, and with that laied on strokes surely, till he made his father graunt that it was as lawfull for the sonne, to beat his father, as for the spide, to beat his sonne.

A good sonne
paine of shame

Homed ar-
gumentes.

 **E**rroneous argumententes, are called homed argumententes, the whiche are so daungerous to us, we were unto both the partes propouned, that it will be harde to escape a scote, Euen as when ye see a Bull, and would ouche hym by the horns,

homies, ye see a smiche daunger in the one homie, as in the other
and so you feare to take hym on either side: In like case, when
these horred arguments are propouned, a manne uner can tell
what to answere. As we reade in the Gospell of Mattheue, the
xxiiij. Chap. when the Pharisees did send their Disciples (whiche
did pretende holinesse, and heare a face of true Religion) to take Christe
Christe in a snare. And therefore, first they came, gauyng hym a
name of auctoritie, & called hym master, flatteringly, as though
he might speake his mynde freely to them, because there was
none but his scholers, and suche as thought vnsigneably to haue
distray in the truthe: secondly, ther praise hym for his goodnes, that
he is true in all his dealynge, and vseth no dissimulation: and
agayne they saye, that not onely he is true, but also teacheþ the
waie of truthe, and then thus they begin to question with hym,
and to feele his minde, what he will saye (for truly they thought
to take hym in a trappe, whether he held his peace, or spake) and
therefore they saied, Sir, make we lawfully piae tribute to Cesar
or no? O how thinke you, doethit stand with Gods worde, that
we make piae or no? Here Christe was beset by two waies. First
it was daungerous for hym to holde his peace: for then he myght
seme by so doyng, to haue reopeete to the persone of meyne, and
for feare, not open the truthe, in suche a weightie matter, and so
staine the glorie of God. Of the other part, if he shold answeare
it were a daungerous peice of wrochte in like manner, for they
thought, he would either speake on Cesar's side, and allowe pay-
ing of tribute, and so incure the hatred of all the people, wher-
by they myght boldly afterwarde, putte hym to deaþ: or els they
thought he would speake against Cesar, and so he shold com-
mit treason, and bee apprehended therpon, as a traitour. But
Jesus knowing their naughtie purpose, and plainly seeing where
about they went, disappointed them of their will, that ther could
take none advantage of hym at all. And therefore he saied, because
he would publishe their falsehood, what tempce you me, ye hypo-
crities? Wherwile the rymme of the tribute. And ther take him a
penn, and he saied unto them, whose is this Image & superscripti-
on? Then they saied unto hym, Cesar's. Then saide he, gne therfore

Pharisees
sought to
take Christe
in a trappe.

Christes
answers.

2010.12.20.2
grec. class.

The Arte of Logike.

unto *Cesar* the thynges whiche are *Cesars*, and unto God, those thynges, which are Gods. Christe did not at the first, when they propounded their question vnto hym, plainly saie, give unto *Cesar* the thynges whiche are *Cesars*, but when he had asked them, whose cōygne it was, and that they by their owne confession, had graunted it to be *Cesars*, whereby they bare witnesse of them-selues, that they were subiecte to *Cesar*: he saide, for asmuche as you graunt your selues, by the vertue of this cōygne, to be tributaries, pale on Gods name to *Cesar*, the thynges that partaine to *Cesar*, and unto God, those thynges that are Gods.

Cacofalata.

Gaill argumen-
tates, that
make aswell
against one,
as with one,



*A*cocifates are suche argumentes, that being propo-
ned betwene two persones, they serue aswell for the
one parte as the other, as thus. You must forgiue him,
because he is but a childe; no Marie, therefore will I
brate hym, because he is but a childe. Or thus. This man shoud
not be iudged to dye, by any temporall law, because he is a p̄est:
yes Marie, therefore shoud he be adjudged to dye, because he is
a P̄ieste, and hath offended, whiche shoud haue givē good ex-
ample to other of well living. Alas saith one, it is pitie suche a
man shoud be hanged, considering he is a gentleman. And why
not Gentleman, aswell as other poore menne, if they deserue it?
Dea, why not they rather then any other, if they more deserue it
then any other.

Falsitata.

Ibsurde rea-
soning.



*S*istata are suche argumentes, as are impossible to
be true, as when a childe of two yeres olde, shoud be
accused of adulterie, as thought were like, that he
could offend in suche filthinesses: or els thus; If one
saie, he holdeth his peace, and yet doeth speake ill.

gVis.

Uncertaine
reasoning.

Vis is nothing els, but when one goeth aboue to proue
a thyng, and maketh that whiche shoud proue, to bee as
uncertaine, as a thyng which is proued, as thus. In pur-
gatorie synnes are forgotten, by vertue of the Massse, Ergo, we
must saie Massse still. Whereas I thinke there is no Godly wise-
man, but doubteth alsmuche that purgatorie is, as he maie lusly
saie,

saiet, that the *Masse* sauerth no man.

Pseudomenos.

Eis is called a lyng argumente, for what soever ye shall saie, ye must needes saie amisse. *Epimenides*, a manne boyn in *Crete*, saied that the people boyn in *Crete*, were liers, said he true or no? If he saie that he saied truthe, I mate well saie that can not bee well saaled: for if the people in *Crete* be liers, then liced *Epimenides*, and so this sayyng can not be true, because he was a man there boyn and one of *Crete*, and saied thei were liers. Againe, if ye iudge that the people there be not liers, then *Epimenides* saied truthe, even when he saied, the people of *Crete* are liers, because he himself was a man of *Crete*. But this subtiltie is thus auoiled if ye will saie, that where as mention is made of the people in *Crete*, yet all are not compreheñed under the same, neither is the Proposition diuersall, but indefinite, that is to saie, not comprehendyng all but certaine, as thus. The people of *Crete* are liers, truthe it is, that many of them be liers, and yet *Epimenides* mate be excepted, and be a true manne of his woorde notwithstanding. Also he that was warned in his slepe, not to give credite to any peyneas, did not think that dreame baine, although he iudged many other to bee little esteemed, and small heede to bee giuen to them. For by this dreame he was warned not to beleue greatly other dreames, and yet notwithstanding, he was warned to belieue this dreame.

Ileseng.

Epimenides

One warned
not to belieue
dreames.

That whiche I craved at the firste settynge for the of this booke, the same request make I now in correctyng of the same. I desire of all men their fauourable helpe to suppose my weakenesse, or at the leaſter to give me none euill reporte for my well meanyng, and then I shall thake my self ſufficiently rewarden. But if offence ſhould breede through labor ſustained, and no fauour gotten, when gentleſſe had been offend, it had been as good (in my minde) to plake and lose nothing, as to take paines and lose all. But my truthe beeryng staied bypon

E.I. the

The arte of Logike.

the honest and godlie affected, I haue traauled without feare, hoping well that my doyng shalbe taken without blame. And therfore this obiected, I shall desire all menne for the loue of God to embrase the truthe, and not to wedde themselues to any opinion, without some staine and sure foundation of Goddes truthe. And where as God is the auctorite of peace and concord, and loue th^t that unfeinedly call vpon hym in truthe; I shall hartely praise to God, that all weare drawe after one line, and leke one uniforme and sounde doctrine, to the praise of God, and the conforte of our soules. And because some heddes are verie holde to enter farther then witte can reache, oþers haue a minde vainly to question of thynges not needefull: I thought it not amisse to set forth *Aristotles* mynde, as touchyng thynges that shoud not bee brought in question. There bee lower thynges (saith he) whiche shoud not be examined by reason.

Some thynges
not to be
examined by
reason.

- j. And first, no man ought to argue of these thynges, wherein if any one put doubt, he deserueth punishment. As to reason whether there be a God or no. And therfore *Tullie* saith verie well, it is a wicked and an ungodly custome, to dispute or talke against God, either in earnest, or yet in sporte.
- ii. Againe, it is a sondesse to reason of those thinges, whiche our sensles judge to bee true. As to knowe by reason, whether fire be hotte or no. The whiche were madnesse to aske, and surely if any one shoud reason with me, I would bid hym put his finger in it.
- iii. Thirddlie, it is euill to reason of those thinges, whiche can not be knowne by mannes witte. As to knowe what God the Father is in persone, what the halie Ghost is, how thei sitt and are placed in heauen, or of what makynge the soule of man is.
- iv. Fourthlie, to talke and despite of those thynges, whiche are vndoubteable true. As in *Aritmetique* three and three are sixe. In *Philosophie*. The whole is greater then the parte. In whiche matters to moue any earnest question, or to dounbe ouermuche in thynges nothing doubtfull, were either stark madnesse, or else plaine foolishnesse. Therefore I wylle of God, that all our reasoning might be fastened vpon suche matters, as are necessarie herte for the hearer to learne, and also good for the godlie reason.

The arte of Logike.

89

her to teache. Wherin though I haue doen nochtynge so well my self, as my good will was therevnto, yet I trust all honest hartes will testifie with me, that I haue moche earnestly minded the glorie of God, and the settynge bythe of his holie name, throughoute the whole course of this my rude and simple booke, the whiche once doen and knowne. I hope the gentle reader will beare with me in oþer thynges, and rather helpe me then hate me, when I seeke to helpe all, and hurte none. I aske in reward but louyng reþope for incessant labour: the one is easie for all menne to graunt, oþerwas busie for me to compasse,

Thus I liue in hope, yea, I hope well,

for through hope, beholde I

trauall. GOD be

praised.

FINIS.



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et cetera.

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
Richard Grafton 1514. 1533. 1535. 1536.

Thomas Vaux 1533. 1535. 1536. 1537.

Richard Grafton 1532. 1533. 1535. 1536. 1537.

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John Kyngston 1503. 1506. 1507.



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